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Letter from the editor 
his issue of Workers of the World signals the beginning of a partnership with 
DuEPublico, the Documentation and Publishing Division of the University 
of Duisburg-Essen, which will from now on shelter our online journal. As a 
result of this partnership, Professors Norbert Meder and Patrick Eiden-Offe, 
from the University of Duisburg-Essen, have joined our Editorial Board. 
 
Issue no. 8 of Workers of the World had as guest editors Alexander Gallas 
and Jörg Nowack, from the University of Kassel, Germany, who organized 
a dossier on “Mass strikes in the global crisis” – the contents of this dossier 
are explained in the Introduction. We are also glad to include in this issue an 
article by Ravi Ghadge, from Kennesaw State University, on the Bombay 
textile strike of 1982-1983. 
 
Our next issue will include a dossier, coordinated by José Babiano, de la 
Fundación 1.º de Mayo (Spain), on “trade unionism in the era of 
globalisation”.  
 
Workers of the World is the journal of the International Association Strikes 
and Social Conflicts (http://www.iassc-mshdijon.fr/).  
Articles for Workers of the World should be sent to the executive editor at 
workersoftheworld2012@yahoo.co.uk. 
 
António Simões do Paço  
Executive Editor
T 
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Introduction: Mass strikes in the global crisis 
Alexander Gallas and Jörg Nowak 
 
 
espite the fact that there have been spectacular strikes in many parts of 
the world since the inception of the global economic crisis in 2007-8, the 
news media and the academic public have mainly focussed their attention on 
street demonstrations and occupations of squares where the dominant 
regimes of crisis management were resisted. In our view, the negligence of 
strikes in accounts and analyses of the current cycle of protest is the flipside 
of a focus on middle-class mobilisations, which betrays the class bias of 
journalists and scholars alike. Moving beyond the silence on conflicts 
around work, we want to chart, in this special issue, the manifold forms of 
strikes that are occurring around the globe in a conjuncture of crisis. We 
contend that even if there is no evidence for an increase in strikes on a 
global scale, there are novel economic and political dynamics triggered by 
them that merit our attention. 
 
The Continuing Economic and Political Relevance of Strikes 
It is quite common among political commentators and social scientists to 
infer from declining strike incidence in the global north that conflicts around 
work are a dying form of social confrontation.
1
 Labour scholars have 
                                                 
1
 See for example PAKULSKI, Jan and WALTERS, Malcolm. The Death of Class. 
London: Sage, 1996, p. 86; MEYERSON, Harold. “If Labor Dies, What Happens Next?”. 
The American Prospect. September 2012, http://prospect.org/article/if-labor-dies-whats-
next. 
D 
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responded to this claim in various ways. Gregor Gall emphasises that 
workers nowadays often air their grievances with actions other than strikes, 
for example overtime bans or work-to-rule.
2
 It follows that the decline in 
strike incidence in the global north cannot be equated with a decline in 
labour conflict, and that labour scholarship should not be focused 
exclusively on the strike weapon. Beverly Silver, in contrast, looks at the 
shifting geographical patterns of capital accumulation. She suggests that the 
shifts have led to a relocation of conflict from the old capitalist centres to 
“emerging” and newly industrialised economies, arguing that “where capital 
goes, labour-capital conflict shortly follows”.3 This suggests that we should 
examine the question of labour conflict from a global perspective, which 
calls into question whether the assumption of a decline holds beyond the old 
centres. 
Both observations are correct; however, it is also important to stress that the 
strike weapon is not an instrument of the past even in countries where strike 
incidence has declined markedly. In fact, large-scale strikes have been 
occurring around the globe in the wake of the global financial and economic 
crisis – not just in the “emerging” economies and the newly industrialising 
countries, but also in the old capitalist centres. Accordingly, the aim of our 
special issue is (a) to show that workers across the globe continue to resort 
to large-scale strikes – and, in so doing, cause significant economic and 
political upheaval, (b) to explore the motivations behind their decision to 
down tools, and (c) analyse the political-economic contexts in which strikes 
take place and the effects that strikes have on these contexts. 
 
Analysing the North and South 
In line with our global orientation, this special issue contains three 
contributions looking in-depth at the global north and, more specifically, the 
Eurozone, and three that deal with “emerging” economies. It concludes with 
a comparative analysis of strikes in the global north and south. 
The articles on the Eurozone cover France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. 
They converge insofar as they argue that the labour movements in these 
                                                 
2
 GALL, Gregor. “New Forms of Labour Conflict: A Transnational Overview”.In: 
ATZENI, Maurizio (ed.), Workers and Labour in a Globalised Capitalism: Contemporary 
Themes and Theoretical Issues. Houndmills: Palgrave, 2014, p. 210. 
3
 SILVER, Beverly. “Theorising the Working Class in Twenty-First-Century Global 
Capitalism”. In: ATZENI, Maurizio (ed.), Workers and Labour in a Globalised 
Capitalism... Op. Cit., p.50. 
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countries find themselves in a defensive position vis-à-vis the ruling blocs 
that exercise political and economic control. In a situation of deep crisis, 
workers try to defend themselves against onslaughts on their jobs, wages 
and working conditions as well as their social and political rights. At the 
same time, it becomes clear that the conditions of struggle vary greatly 
across the national borders inside the Eurozone. 
Along these lines, Hugo Dias and Lídia Fernandes highlight in their 
contribution that the Portuguese governments and the EU responded to the 
Eurozone crisis by imposing austerity on the country, to which the unions 
reacted with defensive political strikes. In this situation, a shift in political 
opportunity structures took place, which was reflected, first, in the 
rapprochement of the unions and the social movements invested in the 
struggle against cuts and, second, in the transnationalisation of stoppages: 
there was a strike against austerity affecting the entire Iberian peninsula on 
14 November 2012.  
Similarly, Maria Gorosarri and Luciole Sauviat analyse the strikes in recent 
years against the dominant government strategies of crisis management in 
France and Spain. They argue that there is a marked difference in the 
dynamics of the strikes in these two countries: whereas the stoppages in 
Spain came close to a mass strike in a Luxemburgian sense with new forms 
of working class consciousness and organisation emerging, the same cannot 
be said of France.  
Looking at Germany, Stefanie Hürtgen argues that the recent strike wave in 
the railway sector can be seen as a reflection of a deep-seated social crisis in 
the country. This crisis was born out of the deregulation and fragmentation 
of labour relations, and is reflected in the privatisation and marketisation of 
the German railway system. The “small” train drivers’ union GdL 
successfully led the opposition against the changes and did so by using the 
strike weapon. When the Merkel government responded by cracking down 
on the right to strike for smaller unions with a new law, the GdL managed to 
bypass this crackdown. 
In the emerging economies, strike waves also occurred in recent years that 
had significant economic and political effects. In many cases, they follow 
more closely the pattern of traditional industrial action in the sense that they 
are confrontations with private employers and aim at improving wages and 
working conditions. Nevertheless, they have important political implications 
Introduction: Mass Strikes in the Global Crisis 9 
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because they address the configurations of labour relations and the 
structures of domination in the countries in question. 
Correspondingly, Jörg Nowak compares strikes and their links to political 
protest movements in Brazil and India. He highlights the fact that large 
strike waves in the automobile industry (India) and the construction and 
public sectors (Brazil) preceded the emergence of political protest 
movements with significant middle-class involvement. These movements 
were directed against corruption and also, in the Brazilian case, against 
public transport fare hikes, the state of the public sector and the government 
in general. A key difference was that workers in India were more politicised 
than workers in Brazil; however, for the street protests, the reverse was true: 
Whereas the Indian activists just lambasted corruption, the Brazilian 
movement had a broader political agenda. 
Luis Campos and Bruno Dobrusin analyse the development of labour 
conflict under the Kirchner and Dilma governments in Argentina and Brazil 
in recent years. They suggest that there were implicit arrangements between 
labour and capital and alliances between centre-left governments and trade 
unions in the run-up to the crisis. However, the precarious balance between 
the neo-developmentalist and neoliberal economic policies, which was 
installed by governments in both countries, could no longer be sustained 
once the countries faced economic difficulties from 2012 onwards. In turn, 
strike incidence surged and the pre-crisis arrangements and alliances eroded.  
Looking at China, Tim Pringle also observes indications for growing worker 
militancy and strike incidence. In his view, this development has two 
effects: on the one hand, the Chinese union federation ACFTU is stepping 
up efforts to sustain its claim to represent workers; on the other hand, a layer 
of independent worker representatives is emerging that is supported by 
NGOs. 
The contribution of Hermes Augusto Costa and Hugo Dias concludes the 
special issue. They take up the theme of the “general strike”, which is 
discussed in several of the other articles, and do so by engaging in a 
comparison across the North/South divide that focuses on Portugal and 
India. In their view, the general strike is a defensive form of struggle in the 
neoliberal age chosen because other means of influencing political decision-
making are absent. In the Portuguese case, the strikes took place against the 
backdrop of the imposition of austerity through governments and the troika; 
in the Indian case, the background was the liberalisation of the economy and 
the insensitivity of governments to union demands in a situation of general 
economic insecurity. All in all, Costa and Dias say that unions in the north 
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have much to learn from unions in the south in the sense that they have to 
reach out to marginalised and precarious sectors of the population.  
 
Strike Waves across the Globe 
Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this editorial to complement these 
analyses with a complete account of the strikes waves around the world that 
took place since the crisis hit in 2007-8. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a 
cursory overview by listing some of the salient actions and conflicts. 
In Western Europe, there were numerous one- or two-day political strikes 
against austerity in Europe in recent years. This was not just the case in 
Portugal, Spain and Greece – countries badly hit by the Eurozone crisis – 
but also in the UK, Iceland, Italy and Belgium. Furthermore, there was the 
four-week strike in reaction to the restructuring of the pensions system in 
France in autumn 2010, which affected, in particular, the transport sector 
and the oil refineries.
4
 In Germany, the recent strike wave in the railway 
system was complemented by large-scale strikes of postal workers and 
nursery nurses.  
In the US, there was not just a large protest movement against the restriction 
of collective bargaining rights in the US state of Wisconsin in 2011. 
Recently, “Fight for $15”, a national campaign for a minimum wage of 15 
dollars started by retail and fast food workers, is gaining traction. The 
campaign is underpinned by protests and strikes, which have been taking 
place across the country in the last few years.
5
 
In emerging and newly industrialised economies, there were numerous 
significant industrial actions in recent years. In Egypt, substantial cross-
sectoral strikes took place in the run-up to the Arab spring and in 2014. In 
South Africa, there was a miners’ strike in 2012; in the course of this 
                                                 
4
 GALLAS, Alexander, NOWAK, Jörg and WILDE, Florian (eds.). Politische Streiks im 
Europa der Krise. Hamburg: VSA, 2012. NOWAK, Jörg and GALLAS, Alexander. “Mass 
Strikes against Austerity in Western Europe – A Strategic Assessment”. Global Labour 
Journal, vol. 5., no. 3, 2014, pp. 306-21; GALLAS, Alexander. “Politisierte Streiks: Zur 
Dynamik und Deutung von Arbeitskämpfen in Großbritannien”. Arbeits- und 
Industriesoziologische Studien, vol. 8, no. 2, 2015, pp. 67-91. 
5
 COLLINS, Jane. “Theorizing Wisconsin’s 2011 Protests: Community-based unionism 
confronts accumulation by dispossession”. The American Ethnologist, vol. 39, no. 1, 2012, 
pp. 6-20; LUCE, Stefanie. “15$ or Bust: An Appraisal of the Higher Wages Movement”. 
New Labour Forum, vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 72-79. 
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stoppage, the Marikana massacre took place, where 41 workers were killed 
by the police. Furthermore, there was a five-month strike in the platinum 
mines in 2014. Apart from the stoppages in the Indian automobile factories 
and the Brazilian construction industry, there was a big strike in the 
Cambodian garment industry (2014) and wildcat strikes in the Turkish car 
industry (2015).
6
 
Many of these strikes and protests attracted considerable attention in the 
political scene.
7
 There were not just wide-ranging debates about their 
legitimacy and effectiveness, but also legal and policy initiatives aimed at 
restricting the right to strike – in the US, but also in European countries such 
as Britain, Germany, Greece and Spain, and at the level of the ILO. The 
initiatives to ban or restrict strikes show that they are still considered to have 
disruptive effects on the economic and the political level. 
 
Strikes of a New Quality? 
Obviously, our list of strikes in the crisis constitutes anecdotal evidence. 
Actual numbers at the global level are hard to come by. The methods of 
measurement differ between countries, which also means that data are 
difficult to compare across national boundaries. Furthermore, they are 
incomplete and, in various cases, unreliable.
8
 Finally, there is no definite, 
single method of quantifying strike action; numbers differ depending on 
which measure is used: the number of stoppages, the amount of days not 
worked due to stoppages, or the number of workers involved. 
According to the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), the number of 
days not worked in Europe was lower in 2011-13 than at any time in the 
2000s (between 32 and 35 days per 1,000 workers); however, the number 
                                                 
6
 BEININ, Joel and DUBOC, Marie. “The Egyptian Workers Movement before and after 
the 2011 Uprising”. Socialist Register, vol. 51, 2015, pp. 136-56. 
7
 SILVER, Beverley. “Theorising the Working Class”. Op. Cit., p. 46f. KARATAŞLI, 
Şahan Savaş; SEFIKA, Kumral; SCULLY, Ben and UPADHYAY, Smriti. “Class, Crisis 
and the 2011 Protest Wave: Cyclical and Secular Trends in Global Labor Unrest”. In 
WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel; CHASE-DUNN, Christopher; SUTER, Christian (eds.). 
Overcoming Global Inequalities. London: Paradigm Publishers, 2015, pp. 184-200. 
SCHMALZ, Stefan; LIEBIG, Steffen; THIEL, Marcel. “Zur Zersplitterung des sozialen 
Konflikts in Westeuropa: Eine Typologie nichtnormierter Kämpfe um Arbeit”. Arbeits- und 
Industriesoziologische Studien, vol. 8, no. 2, November 2015, pp. 49-66. 
8
 GALL, Gregor. “New Forms of Labour Conflict“. Op. Cit. p. 213. SCHMALZ, Stefan; 
LIEBIG, Steffen; THIEL, Marcel.“Zur Zersplitterung des sozialen Konflikts...“. Op. Cit., 
pp. 49-66. 
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recorded for 2010 was the second highest in the same period (70 days).
9
 The 
case of Brazil seems to be different: According to DIEESE, the Brazilian 
trade union think tank, strike incidence has gone up markedly in the country 
between 2008 and 2013. Likewise, data compiled by the ILO suggests that 
there has been a marked increase in strike activity in South Africa in recent 
years; however, the picture is less clear in the case of India. Moreover, there 
seems to be a significant decline in the US.
10
 All in all, the existing numbers 
are inconclusive; there appears to be no clear quantitative trend concerning 
strike activity at the global level. 
However, it is also possible to ask whether there are qualitative changes to 
strikes – which would also explain why there is a long list of memorable 
actions and the renewed attention to strikes in the political scene. In our 
view, it is possible to observe several such changes. These concern the 
political context of strikes, the actors involved, the tactics and strategies 
chosen, and the overall dynamics triggered. Both in the contributions to this 
special issue and other recent literature on strikes, we find five noteworthy 
patterns: 
1. Geographical expansion: Various strikes in recent years expanded 
beyond their initial sectoral or geographical extension; individual 
strikes were perceived as being linked, which transformed them into 
strike waves. In “emerging” and newly industrialised economies 
such as Egypt, China, Brazil and South Africa, there was a rapid and 
uncontrolled geographical diffusion of strikes at the national level. 
This suggests that the control of trade union apparatuses over strikes 
was limited, and that the stoppages were not triggered by the official 
                                                 
9
 ETUI (2015) Strikes in Europe, Version 2.1, available at: 
https://www.etui.org/Topics/Trade-union-renewal-and-mobilisation/Strikes-in-Europe-
version-2.1-January-2015 (accessed 8 January 2016). 
10
 ETUI (2015) Strikes in Europe, Version 2.1, available at: 
https://www.etui.org/Topics/Trade-union-renewal-and-mobilisation/Strikes-in-Europe-
version-2.1-January-2015 (accessed 8 January 2016);  
ILOSTAT, Days not worked due to strikes and lockouts by economic activity, 
https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/help_home/data_by_subject/subject-details/indicator-
details-by-
subject?subject=&indicator=STR_DAYS_ECO_NB&datasetCode=&collectionCode=YI 
(accessed 8 January 2016); DIEESE (2015) Balanço das greves em 2013, 
http://www.dieese.org.br/estudosepesquisas/2013/estPesq79balancogreves2013.pdf 
(accessed 19 February 2016). 
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mechanics inherent in the national labour relations frameworks. And 
yet, they mostly stayed within the confines of national territories.
11
 
2. Constituency: The people on strike often were not part of what is 
often conceived of as the classical union constituency of 
permanently employed industrial workers. In some cases, the 
overlap was in fact very limited. In Europe as well as in Brazil, 
South Africa and India, significant public sector strikes took place. 
These were carried, among other groups, by civil servants, medical 
doctors and teachers – professions often seen as being “middle 
class” or even “upper middle class”. The fact that the public sector 
has become an important site of strikes in recent years also means 
that the general public is affected in a more direct fashion by 
stoppages, which may be part of the explanation why strikes are 
debated more at the political level even if the numbers have not gone 
up in some countries and regions. Importantly, the changes in the 
constituency of strikes does not just reflect a shift from the private to 
the public sector. If the strikes occurred in more traditional, 
industrial sectors, precarious and contract workers were often the 
protagonists, for example automobile workers in India, miners in 
South Africa, and migrant workers employed in the industrial sector 
in China. These workers in many cases managed to forge close links 
with permanent workforces during their actions. 
3. Relations of representation: The shift in the constituency of strikes 
was accompanied, in various countries, by tensions between the 
established trade union bureaucracy and the strikers, who called into 
question the legitimacy of existing unions and their claim to 
represent workers. This pattern is observable in particular in the 
global south, for example in Brazil, China, Egypt, South Africa and 
Vietnam, but also, to some extent, in Europe: the railway strike in 
Germany was carried by a small, “professional” union that is not 
part of the DGB, the big union federation in Germany. 
  
                                                 
11
 An exception is the wave of political strikes in the countries hit by the Eurozone crisis: 
there was an awareness of workers in other countries taking similar actions and, in the case 
of the Iberian general strike on 14 November 2011, at least one instance of a transnational 
strike. 
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4. Repression: Violent crackdowns have always been part and parcel of 
the repertoire with which state authorities have tried to deal with 
stoppages, but there seems to be an escalation in recent years, both 
in terms of how repressive state apparatuses have intervened in 
strikes, and in terms of recent developments concerning the right to 
strike at the legal and policy level. In Spain and France, several trade 
unionists are standing trial and facing prison because of their 
involvement in strikes and protest against dismissals; in Brazil, the 
national guard was called on several occasions to repress strikes of 
construction workers in 2011 and 2012; India witnessed the 
imprisonment of almost 150 workers at the carmaker Maruti in July 
2012 and the arrest of more than 40 workers at the Honda plant in 
Thapukhera in February 2016; and the Marikana massacre in South 
Africa in August 2012 also stands out. This is flanked by active 
attempts to restrict the right to strike, both at the level of the ILO and 
at the level of national governments. The employers represented at 
the ILO have been pushing for an interpretation of convention no. 87 
that does not include a right to strike. In Britain, a trade union bill 
has been passed in the House of Commons that creates a new 
threshold for ballots, making it exceedingly difficult for unions to go 
on strike. In Germany, a bill has passed parliament that bars 
“minority” unions from going on strike. 
5. Political context: The political conditions under which strikes take 
place have changed significantly. In an environment of repression, 
strikes take on a political dimension almost by default because they 
defy the authorities; if they happen in the public sector, this is also 
the case because the government is the employer or controls the 
employer directly.  
All in all, we contend that what we are witnessing is a return of the “mass 
strike” broadly in line with Rosa Luxemburg’s understanding of the term. 
Apart from mass participation, she argued that mass strikes veer between 
economic and political goals and have a discernible impact on the political 
scene; that they have a mobilising character for the working class as a 
whole; and that they are not controlled by union bureaucracies and spread 
beyond their geographical starting point or the sector where a strike was 
called. In a nutshell, a mass strike lays bare the class antagonism and the 
class domination inherent in any capitalist social formation by creating a 
situation of polarisation between labour and capital: “What results is a huge, 
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colourful image of a general confrontation between labour and capital, 
which reflects (...) the variegation of the social whole in its entirety”.12 
Importantly, however, the working classes in many countries around the 
globe seem to be on the defensive in the current conjuncture – which is 
different from the historical context of Luxemburg’s analysis, the Russian 
Revolution of 1905. The mass strike for Luxemburg was the lightning rod of 
the revolution; what we are seeing today is the attempt by workers to 
respond to the offensives of capital launched across the globe in the wake of 
the crisis. This calls for the renewal of a materialist theory of the mass 
strike, which sheds teleological assumptions about its revolutionary 
character and takes on board the qualitative shifts observed.  
 
 
                                                 
12
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ntroduction 
The 2008 economic and financial crisis added to the intensification of 
global-scale disgruntlement, swelling a protest wave that shook the world.
1
 
Following an early rise of contention, protests and demonstrations 
intensified from 2010 on, with opposition to austerity policies as a 
mobilizing cause and championing, in particular, claims related to economic 
justice, the welfare State and labour. In Portugal, the first signs of 
mobilization came from the labour movement, although the emergence of 
new actors allowed the movement to widen its social influence. Two 
tendencies were witnessed: the innovation of repertoires, including the 
introduction of new forms of collective action, but also retrieving, in 
renovated fashion, old instruments of struggle – namely, strikes; and a 
relevant growth of mobilization, namely by picking common dates for 
actions or working to expose the role of international political and financial 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
Central Bank (ECB) or the European Union (EU). 
This article reflects on the 14 November 2012 transnational general strike in 
order to examine the role of general strikes in this wave of protests. The study 
of this episode
2
 aims to explore its insertion in this period's contentious politics, 
                                                 
1
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2
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regarding its transnational dimension
3
 but also concerning the relationship 
between different actors – particularly between trade unions and new political 
actors. This event has been defined differently as to its nature and scale – 
general strike,
4
 European general strike
5
 or even “an internationalist impulse 
emerging with the Iberian general strike (…) and the extraordinary social 
mobilizations throughout Europe”.6 The analysis derives from the following 
questions: To what extent did it represent a new strategy for the actors 
involved? What are the limits and potentials of this strategy? Did it represent a 
mere sum of national protests or was it a transnational European protest? What 
were its impacts on socioeconomic conflicts in contemporary Portugal, and in 
the framework of the EU? 
To render an account of the specificity of the new protest cycle, we chose to 
consider approaches from two fields of study that have been traditionally 
disassociated – union studies, on the one hand, and social movements 
studies, on the other. Singular approaches have accomplished very little in 
contributing to renovating social critique and considering the increasingly 
porous and intertwining nature between kinds of collective action and social 
conflict. Thus, this article begins by addressing the shifts in the power bases 
of organized labour, aiming to identify their strategic challenges and 
possibilities for the renewal of collective action. Moreover, the authors 
present an overview on the politics of contention in Portugal, on the eve of 
and during the anti-austerity protests which took place between 2010 and 
2013, and highlight some of the main traits of the political, economic and 
social context in which they occurred. Lastly, this article will seek to 
contribute to clarify the nature of this episode, raising issues that can deepen 
the study of the role of general strikes as a strategic instrument for the 
working classes.  
  
                                                 
3
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2. Shifts in power bases of organized labour 
Unions are a historic product of the dominance of waged-labour as a basis 
for the organization and structuring of social relationships in the capitalist 
mode of production. They emerged, broadly speaking, during the death 
rattle of the “The Springtime of the Peoples” in 1848, as part of an anti-
systemic movement,
7
 founded on class struggle. They took an increasingly 
important role during the last three decades of the nineteenth century and 
first half of the twentieth century, as lead actors in the struggles for the 
decommodification and self-protection of society. (New) social movements, 
on the other hand, can be traced back to the emergence of rifts and sources 
for social conflict, previously concealed, which have taken on a more 
significant role since the 1960s, especially in the central capitalist countries.  
May 1968 can be viewed as a pivotal moment. It comprises three dynamics 
possessing a differentiated range and temporality: the beginning of the 
United States' long decline in the inter-state system; the end of an 
extraordinary economic growth cycle that commenced after the Second 
World War; and the depletion of traditional anti-systemic movements which, 
in central capitalist countries, were associated to the “Old Left”.8 These 
countries were based on so called “affluent” societies wherein, due to an 
unprecedented combination of democracy and capitalist economy,
9
 their 
conflicts would no longer be governed by the conditions which had 
characterized the nineteenth century. However, these societies were not free 
from criticism and contradictions. The late 1960s and early 1970s formed a 
period marked by a phase of strong collective mobilization, which lost its 
momentum roughly around 1973, but nonetheless left an indelible imprint.  
Zooming in on labour, during the period between 1968 to 1973 there was a 
simultaneous peak in labour conflicts and grassroots militancy, often taking 
place outside of the institutions of industrial relations, accompanied by open 
criticism of traditional union leaderships. As a consequence, the 
heterogeneity of the working class was made evident, as was the 
protagonism of social critique and artistic critique, and sometimes its fusion, 
even in sites of production.
10
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The consensus around democratic capitalism had been shattered by the 
critique of the institutional “Old Left” - including the trade unions. 
Nonetheless, this also concurred with freeing the right wing from this 
commitment to the consensus. The first response by the employers was a 
reinforcement of negotiation mechanisms with unions, on a company level, 
and the development of neo-corporatist arrangements, at a macro level. Yet 
additional costs attributable to the concession of new benefits to workers, 
together with an ever-increasing difficult economic situation, lead to a 
search for new solutions that would restore profit rates. It was within this 
context that neoliberalism arose as a political alternative, which implied a 
great deal of “creative destruction” and the rise of a new subjectivity.11  
A key element towards neutralizing social critique was the weakening of 
organized labour. Economic globalization reasserted the classical 
disjunction between capital mobility and labour localization
12
 while the 
“new spirit of capitalism” was built by incorporating elements from the 
artistic critique, creating a second individualist revolution.
13
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a consolidation of these processes. 
Deconstructing the Fordist wage relation led to a weakening of the power 
bases of the unions: the restructuring of production contributed to the 
demise of big industrial concentrations, thanks to spatial and technological 
fixes, the accelerated economic shift to the service sectors went along with 
particularities which rendered collective workers' organization harder; and 
pressures for the flexibilization of labour relations increased. Overall strike 
activity declined
14
 and the public sector became the new “bulwark” for 
unions.  
Although it was not a process of historical decline, the crisis of a specific 
type of unionism – industrial/national15 – moved the unions’ capacity for 
strategic reflection and change to the top of the agenda in order to regain the 
ideological initiative, enlarge the playing field
16
 and regenerate solidarity to 
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overcome fragmentation and the radicalization of differences.
17
 It is within 
this scope that new strategies for union revitalization
18
 were experimented 
with, focusing, among other things, on organizing, on coalition building and 
on international solidarity.  
Portugal is usually seen as an intermediate-developed or semi-peripheral 
society. The democratic advent of the 25 April 1974 was the historical 
turning point which lead both to the end of Portuguese colonialism and to a 
break with a nearly five-decade long authoritarian political regime. This had 
made Portugal a country with a late and incipient industrialization process, 
an economy dependent on the colonies’ raw materials and markets, the 
restriction of public freedoms, unions controlled by the corporatist regime 
and a practically non-existent welfare system. In the next 40 years, but in a 
more concentrated fashion during the first fifteen years of democracy, 
Portugal lived through a historical short-circuit in which different types of 
social regulation were rehearsed during a short period of time: from the 
fascist corporatist state it transitioned to socialism, then to Fordist regulation 
and, since its 1986 membership in the European Union, to neoliberal 
regulation.
19
 The institutional changes associated with the integration in the 
Economical and Monetary Union (EMU) and the financialization of the 
economy
20
 precipitated a process of “peripheralization” in relation to the 
centre of Europe and particularly Germany. Similar mechanisms have been 
verified in such processes in other Southern European countries.
21
  
Portuguese unionism also developed in a counter-cyclical fashion in relation 
to the central countries of Europe, but followed the same temporal pattern of 
Spain and Greece: 1) it experienced a period of rising collective 
mobilization in the 1960s and 1970s in an authoritarian regime; 2) during 
the second half of the 1970s, while tripartite social negotiations were the 
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common rule in Europe and mass layoffs started in the industries of central 
European economies, Portuguese unions were experiencing their greatest 
moment of collective mobilization and action under the influence of a class-
oriented discourse; 3) “old” social movements were young, having been 
established after the democratic advent, while the arising “new” social 
movements were weaker; 4) finally, since the 1980s – when macro-
economic regulation mechanisms fell into crisis, neoliberal discourse 
emerged and the state attempted to deregulate and distance itself from the 
historical compromise of social negotiations – social accords were 
institutionalized in a period where production relations were already 
increasingly flexibilized.
22
 
Portuguese unions have been historically divided by a political and 
ideological schism. The majority of the trade union movement is affiliated 
to two central trade unions: the General Confederation of Portuguese 
Workers (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses – CGTP) and 
the General Workers’ Union (União Geral de Trabalhadores – UGT). CGTP 
displays a profile of classist unionism. It was created as its predecessor 
Intersindical, still during the “Estado Novo” (“New State”) dictatorship in 
1971, and is strongly influenced by the Communist Party (PCP). The UGT, 
on the other hand, favours a social partnership unionism, seeking to promote 
workers’ social integration. It was created in 1978 by a group of unions 
which drifted away from the CGTP, with links to the Socialist Party (PS – 
Partido Socialista) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD – Partido Social 
Democrata).
23
  
As to international affiliations, both are members of the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC), established in 1973. UGT became, shortly 
after its birth, a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions ICFTU (1979), the ETUC (1983) and later the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC). As for the CGTP, it has kept close ties to the 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), although it was never formally 
a member. The trade union’s membership in ETUC was attained only in 
1995
24
 and it has so far not joined the ITUC.  
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Union membership and union density achieved their peak in 1978. Union 
density fell from 54.8% in 1980 to 32% in 1989 and, during the 1990s, the 
drop was less drastic due to the increase in public sector union membership. 
According to OECD data, between 1999 and 2000 union membership rates 
fell from 22.5% to 19.3%, rising again to 20.5% in 2012. The CGTP is still 
the largest trade union, claiming 537,000 members in 2008, compared to 
UGT's 210,000 members.
25
  
Strikes are one of the fundamental elements of a trade unions’ collective 
action repertoire. Halting production – or threatening to do so – is the 
ultimate instrument to act against an unfair situation and to exert pressure on 
behalf of a favourable solution for workers. The right to strike was gradually 
recognized, not without resistance, and embedded in the national system of 
industrial relations. Formal restrictions to its exercise have been increasing 
and its use has been made more difficult thanks to the growing informality 
and precariousness of labour relations. This does not signify that strikes 
have not occurred, even outside the legal framework. Protests and political 
general strikes, on the other hand, have largely targeted the state when it 
instituted changes corresponding to a significant shift in labour and 
production relations. 
Portugal saw strikes reach their historical apex in 1981, decreasing from 
then on to the historical minimum in 2007, although the available statistical 
data underestimates the numbers by excluding public sector strikes. The 
years after 2010 witnessed a growth in labour conflicts, noticeable with the 
rise in the number of strikes and of striking workers, in what might 
constitute an inversion, albeit temporary, of the historical tendency to 
decline.
26
 Between 1975 and 2009 there were only five general strikes: on 
12 February and 11 May 1982, both called by the CGTP alone; on 18 March 
1988, by both trade unions; 10 December 2002 and 30 May 2007, called 
solely by the CGTP.
27
 Resorting to political general strikes has characterized 
the unions’ action in the age of austerity in Portugal and other Southern 
European countries, albeit with a mainly defensive character.
28
 When the 
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strike is carried out in the traditional way of paralyzation at the entrance to 
the factory, it is limited by the increasing difficulties in using its structural 
and associational power
29
 due to the exclusion of a growing number of 
people from formal wage relations.  
The “new” social movements, fragile or nonexistent in the 1960s and 1970s, 
also saw an upsurge in Portugal in a counter-cycle when compared with the 
central countries of Europe. Although it already had a long story, the 
feminist movement increased its social weight from the 1990s onwards
30
 
and achieved an historical victory (through a referendum) when abortion 
was decriminalized in 2007 – i.e., on the eve of the financial crisis. The 
same can be said for the LGBT movement which, having been marginalized 
for several decades, was able to emerge at the turn of the millennium, as a 
way of practicing a sexual citizenship.
31
 Anti-racist mobilizations, which 
had gained momentum when confronted with skinhead attacks in the early 
1990s and the discrimination against gypsy populations, was, meanwhile, 
faced with a new and thriving grassroots immigrant movement, against 
“Fortress Europe”, which demands, as it does all across Europe, “papers for 
all”. An anti-systemic ecologist movement also arose, mobilizing against 
genetically modified organisms and denouncing the climate crisis. 
Europeanization, as a project of the elites, was met with increasing pressure 
from bellow,
32
 a fact that was also reflected in domestic activism and 
politics. Propelled by the new internationalism born somewhere between 
Chiapas and Seattle, transnational mobilization reached a peak in Portugal 
with the movement against the war in Iraq in 2003. And, similarly to what 
happened across Europe, it was in counter summits and social fora that the 
Global Justice Movement (GJM) aimed to nourish its social bases. This 
process was not without its contradictions and was characterized by the 
simultaneous emergence, vitally, of two types of significant tensions in the 
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reticular logic of the “Movement of movements”33: local vs global and unity 
vs diversity. The incapacity to build unity in diversity involving movements 
with fairly different dimensions, cultures and organizational weight ended 
up in the failure of the Portuguese Social Forum after two editions – 2003 
and 2006.  
This failure resulted in important problems on the side of the trade unions. 
Firstly, because a three-decade long increase in social inequalities and the 
prevalence of individualization-fragilization over individualization-
emancipation
34
 had tabled the urgency to renovate sources of indignation, 
implying mutual recognition and alliance-building capacity. Secondly, 
because it left a blurry dispute between “class” and “identity” which recalls 
the persistence of the problem in demarcating borders in the formation of 
class identities
35
 – a particularly noteworthy issue when political, economic 
and social changes had destabilized the prior identities.
36
 So the 
“reencounter” of both trade unions and new dynamics of collective action in 
contentious anti-austerity politics had problematic contours and was not at 
all taken for granted by the actors involved. 
 
3. Anti-austerity protests, 2010-2011. From union struggles to the 
emergence of new actors 
If the financial crisis constituted a factor in the intensification of 
disgruntlement, austerity was the leitmotiv in the mobilizations that shook 
Portugal between 2010 and 2013. After a brief expansionist phase, austerity 
was inaugurated in Portugal in March 2010 by the announcement of the PS 
government to follow a Programme for Stability and Growth 2010-2013 
(PEC-I) which indicated, on the one hand, the constitution of wage deflation 
as a political instrument and, on the other, a radical and impressive 
suspension of public investment and an equally impressive extension of 
privatization.
37
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Unions were active in the first signs of resistance and resurgence of protests. 
Initially, the private sector had taken on a higher profile in protests over pay 
and layoffs.
38
 Yet the public sector still played an important role in 
mobilisation, initially in education, and there were some signs, although 
fluctuating, of an uncoordinated cooperation between unions affiliated both 
to CGTP and UGT,
39
 the most visible being the national public sector strike 
on 4 March 2010. The protests escalated and extended, which was visible on 
the streets, and the 29 May 2010 protest called by CGTP stands out as one 
of the largest demonstrations that has been organized in Portugal so far. At 
this point, in the Portuguese Parliament the austerity packages were strongly 
contested by the left wing parties, the PCP and the Left Bloc (BE – Bloco de 
Esquerda). 
Late 2010 and early 2011 were marked by important shifts in the structures 
of political opportunity.
40
 A first factor for such changes arose precisely 
from the field of the unions. Still in 2010, after the summer, a new package 
of measures (PEC-III), to be included in the State Budget for 2011, was 
announced. PEC-III was opposed by CGTP and UGT and constituted the 
basis of the 24 November general strike in 2010 – the second general strike 
called by the two union confederations in 20 years, and the first to be called 
by UGT against a PS government.
41
 This would be the first general strike in 
a series of five in less than three years – from November 2010 to June 2013 
– a number larger than that of all the general strikes that took place in the 
previous three decades (1975-2007). It also reveals the emergence of a new 
cycle of union protests, characterized by the scaling up and spread of labour 
conflicts, the politicization of the unions’ agenda and the emergence of 
internationalist momentum.
42 
By early 2011, there was a new surge of 
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strikes which involved both the public and the private sectors.
43
 
The turbulent internal context was accompanied by the worsening of the 
crisis in the Euro Area and the introduction of new institutional innovations 
aiming to increase budget discipline and control, which, combined with 
successive speculative attacks, intensified the pressure to apply austerity 
measures.
44
 The PS government replied to the double pressure – both 
external and internal – with a dual approach which combined collective 
bargaining and unilateral decisions
45
: the government achieved a written 
compromise with all the employers’ organizations and UGT – leaving aside 
CGTP – on the pact on employment and competitiveness and, on 12 March 
2011, on the day of the “Geração à Rasca” protest, it announced a new 
austerity package (PEC-IV).
46
  
The rejection of this new austerity package by a broad variety of social and 
political sectors, and an increasing division within the political elite 
precipitated a political crisis. On the streets, unions were no longer the only 
ones to demonstrate. The rise of new actors – as seen on 12 March –, even if 
somewhat unclear as to their political standpoint, characterized the 
mobilisation. As to the unions, both confederations opposed the austerity 
package, voiding the mini-agreement made a few days earlier. Lastly, 
contrary to what had happened with previous PECs, the PS government 
could not count on the largest opposition party, the right-wing party PSD, to 
pass a new austerity package. On 23 March 2011, Prime Minister José 
Sócrates had to face the rejection of PEC-IV in parliament and he 
announced his resignation. On 6 April, faced with the national banks’ denial 
to finance the state, the resigning Prime Minister announced he had called 
the European Commission (EC) for financial assistance, as a last chance 
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solution.
47
 The “Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic 
policy conditionality” (MoU), backed by the PS, PSD and the Popular Party 
(CDS-PP, CDS Partido Popular) was signed by the outgoing Portuguese 
government and the “Troika” on 3 May 2011. Thus, Portugal became the 
third country to be subject to a joint intervention of a troika composed of the 
EC, the ECB and the IMF. On the 5 June 2011 Legislative Elections, the two 
right-wing parties (PSD and CDS-PP) achieved a majority in parliament and 
formed a government. 
Considering the shifts that happened during this period, the acute 
reconfiguration in the political opportunity structures must be highlighted 
and how these visibly exposed the consequences of the rise of a political and 
regional system where sovereignty, traditionally based on the nation-state, is 
shared with, or dislocated to, a supranational structure. In that sense, there is 
a special resonance, today, of the question raised in 1996 by McAdam et 
al.
48
: What would the contentious politics in such a structure look like? And 
how would it affect the essential heritage of the consolidated state, the 
national social movement (NSM)? In view of these conditions, the case in 
study – the 14 November 2012 general strike – motivates yet another 
question: since the general strike was directed at the state, what shape can 
that repertoire of collective action take within this framework of a 
reconfiguration of the political opportunities structure, heightened by the 
intervention of a troika comprised of agencies of that same supra-national 
structure (EC, ECB) and one of the main institutions for neoliberal 
globalization (IMF)? Before answering this question, we will explore new 
developments arising in collective action, mainly due to non-union actors.  
  
4. From “geração à rasca” to the anti-troika mobilisations  
The “Geração à Rasca” protest placed Portugal on the map of a new cycle 
of protest and demonstrations
49
 with the emergence of new actors, a 
                                                 
47
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reconfiguration in the demands and organization of the mobilisations, as 
well as an innovation in repertoires of action.
50
 Aside from the large 
influence exercised by the Internet, very open to transnational spaces,
51
 one 
can emphasize the growing visibility of “artivism” where creativity played a 
role in personal and collective awareness raising.
52
  
This cycle of mobilizations resulted in a paradoxical reconfiguration of the 
structures of mobilization. On the one hand, it involved non-union social 
actors who, operating on the periphery of traditional unions and political 
structures, asserted themselves in previous decades based on post materialist 
values and identity-related issues, although what they placed now at the 
centre of their agenda of demands were materialist demands, namely those 
related to labour.
53
 In Portugal, non-union actors turning to labour issues 
began in the second half of the 2000s
54
 – especially due to the onset of an 
alternative May Day celebration and of precarious workers` organizations –, 
but soon grew in social and political impact. For example, one of the first 
initiatives that aimed to continue the debate and action after the “Geração à 
Rasca” demonstration was the launch of a petition against precariousness. 
On the other hand, considering their young age and social basis, with 
categories that unions have displayed less capacity to mobilize – such as 
precarious workers or the unemployed – as well as their impact on the 
Portuguese political scenario, unions had to rethink their relationship with 
these movements.
55
  
The contagion effect of the 15M movement in Spain could be seen in the 
protests’ transnational imprint, which was consolidated through brockage 
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mechanisms.
56
 Transnational connections were simultaneously grassroots 
and mediated by the new media
57
 as in the case of the occupation of 
Lisbon’s main square, Acampada do Rossio.58 A particularly significant 
example was the international meeting, held in Lisbon in July 2011, 
promoted by Acampada do Rossio, which contributed towards the 
preparation of the global 15 October action in 2012.
59
 This involvement in 
transnational mobilization also contributed to a “framing transformation” 
process
60
 making way for a realignment with the Global Justice Movement 
and producing a boundary shift – the 99% against financial elites.  
Immediately after the 15 October demonstration, the movement started 
focusing on a type of claim making that directly addressed the unions – e.g., 
to call for a national general strike and a public demonstration on the same 
day, which was done on 24 November 2011. They also adopted a national 
framework. Despite this convergence in demands, the mobilisations were 
characterized by earlier established mistrust between the different political 
and social actors. After 24 November, the internationalist momentum that 
had been seen throughout this period suffered a significant break. The 
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October 15
th
 Platform (15O) in Portugal went through fragmentation 
processes and internal splits – it ended up, a few months later, as an activist 
group
61
 and despite attempts aimed at promoting cooperation between 
(severely fragmented) groups, there was a period of demobilization.
62
 Large 
mobilizations returned in September, with the 15 September 2012 
demonstration “Que se lixe a troika! Queremos as nossas vidas!” (“Screw 
the troika! We want our lives [back]!”). Called in August by a closed group 
of 29 activists, including artists and public figures, it displayed a more 
focused and strategic organizational plan. Thus, it aimed to avoid the trap of 
never-ending debates that had plagued the organizational process of 15O.
63
 
The goal was not to conquer participants in order to include them in an 
organizational process, but to ensure maximum mobilization for 
demonstrations. Despite this, initiatives taken beyond the organizational 
core grew and multiplied, as defended by the symbolic framing of Que se 
Lixe a Troika (QSLT). Later, in 2013, one of the more significant actions 
were the “grandoladas”, inaugurated during direct actions when a group of 
people interrupted the the Prime Minister by singing “Grândola”, a 
historically symbolic song associated with the 1974 Portuguese Revolution. 
In that sense and in spite of the international references in terms of 
opponents – the Troika – the demonstrations tended to use a national 
framing. A new effort towards the transnationalisation of the protest 
occurred in June 2013, which at that time was in a phase of demobilisation. 
Meanwhile, as the general strike gained wide social support, there was a 
concentrated, but significant coalition formed. 
 
5. General strike: the People's Square, #14N and the European public 
sphere 
When the national council of CGTP decided on 3 October 2012 to call a 
general strike for 14 November, it did not call for a transnational European 
demonstration. The action was aimed at the government, adopting a national 
class identity framing: defending the workers’ and people’s interests within 
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the democratic regime and continuing the achievements of the April 1974 
revolution. The EU was only superficially mentioned, as a part of “the 
foreign troika” with whom the memorandum, “truly a program of 
aggression against the workers and the People”, was signed. The call was 
strategically inclusive and aimed to encompass, without mentioning them, 
the new emerging actors and forms of action that surpassed the space of 
production: male and female workers, the retired, young people, the 
unemployed and various sectors, “along with all of those who, through their 
action in the workplace and presence in the streets, avenues and squares 
throughout the country, strengthen and give substance to the struggle”, 
which had “as its main goal to put an end to this policy and this government, 
before this government and this policy put an end to the country”.64 
Declaring their class identity, CGTP simultaneously addressed the society in 
general, the “People”, in what became the “symbolic footprint” of collective 
action of this period.
65
  
The European framing arose about a fortnight later, with the decision by the 
executive council of the ETUC to also schedule on the 14 November a day 
of action and solidarity, aiming to mobilize the European union movement. 
The call was far less antagonistic than CGTP’s, stressing the need for social 
dialogue and collective bargaining, but it paved the way towards a unique 
process of transnationalisation of a general strike, which had a very 
significant impact on contentious politics. The ETUC’s initiative placed the 
conflict on a multi-sector level, charging the EU and IMF with 
“miscalculation” which would have “an unmeasurable impact on daily life 
of workers and citizens that ETUC represents” and questioning the austerity 
policies promoted by the Budgetary Treaty and the Troika.
66
 The Spanish 
Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) and the Confederación Sindical de 
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Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) soon responded to the European call, 
announcing the first Iberian general strike in history.
67
 Expectations for new 
endorsements by other organizations grew, allowing speculation as to the 
scale of the “general strike”. On the day of the protest, 40 unions from 23 
countries, according to ETUC, endorsed the action although, other than in 
the Iberian dimension, there was no clear mobilization of organized labour 
that would make an European general strike out of this episode. This, 
however, did not stop the protests to become known online by the tag #14N 
– EUROPEAN STRIKE – with all the symbolic and relational weight that 
“online” had in this cycle of mobilization. 
In Portugal, this process of transnationalisation of protests was important 
enough to widen the basis of social and political support for the use of this 
instrument of collective action. In fact, and despite the deepening of the 
anti-labour element in the troika’s program that justified the intensification 
of the struggle, the previous general strike, which had occurred in March 
2012, had had few endorsements, and was criticized by several political and 
union sectors, particularly from the UGT, and included episodes of tension 
and mistrust. Additionally, the new emerging political actor (QSLT) had not 
taken the initiative to call for a general strike in September, as 15O had done 
in the previous year. Subsequently, after the CGTP had called the 14 
November general strike, QSLT did not take a stand on the subject.  
UGT at first declared that the strike of November 2012 called by CGTP was 
divisive and sectarian, but the evolutions in transnational collective action 
forced the UGT to reevaluate its stance, in a curious contortionistic exercise: 
it “will not join this CGTP strike”, but would support the day of action and 
solidarity. Defining “austerity for austerity’s sake” as the line that separates 
the terms of confrontation, it chides a government that is often “more troik-
ist than the troika” and the pressures of the presidents of the IMF and 
France.
68
 More than reasserting the transnational trait of the conflict, UGT’s 
declaration seemed to point towards a strategy of externalizing the strike by 
introducing external targets. Nonetheless, there was an undeniable widening 
in the basis of support to the strike. In all, fourteen unions and four 
federations, members of UGT, and even its Secretary-General, João 
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Proença, joined the strike.
69
  
The way QSLT ended up connecting with the general strike’s contentious 
politics is particularly interesting. Using Angela Merkel’s visit to Portugal as 
an opportunity, scheduled for two days prior to the strike, QSLT addressed 
an open letter to the German Chancellor, declaring her to be persona non 
grata. Resorting to a specialized and legally defined term used in diplomacy 
constituted an ingeniously creative way to turn the tables in the game of 
restraining transnational protest, usually played by the government: in this 
case, it was the social movement and not the government or the EU that 
defined who should be allowed in or stopped at the border. Moral legitimacy 
in this public statement was framed nationally, as the Chancellor was 
accused of “interfering with the decisions of the Portuguese state, while not 
democratically mandated by its inhabitants”. Nonetheless, it did not derive 
from any nationalist or much less any chauvinist claim. The public 
statement connected concerns about democracy with economic worries, 
exposing the neoliberal agenda of the Chancellor and her business 
entourage. And, recalling how the so called “German Miracle” was built 
historically on debt relief and a brutal wage reduction, it constituted a salute 
to kindred European peoples to stand up and strike, collectively, against “the 
governments that betrayed the trust placed in them” and against austerity, 
imposed by the troika. The open letter, which was translated into Spanish, 
German, French, Greek, Italian and English and widely disseminated, also 
contributed to the expectations for a politicization of the conflict, placing it 
in the European public arena.
70
 The document contends, therefore, that: 
Your entourage may try to ignore us. The European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank may try to 
ignore us. But we are more and more, Mme. Merkel. Here and in all 
countries. Our protests will be stronger and stronger. We become more 
aware of reality every day. The stories you have all told us were always 
awkward and now we know they were full-out lies. We are awake, Mme. 
Merkel. You are an unwelcome guest.
71
 
The 14 November 2012 strike was defined by CGTP as “one of the greatest 
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Days of Struggle undertaken in our country until today and, surely, the 
largest General Strike in this century”.72 As mentioned above, after the 
historical low point of 2007, regarding the numbers of strikes and of striking 
workers, this tendency was reversed in subsequent years. In 2012, these 
numbers had grown back to the highest level since 1994. Reports confirmed 
the official strike numbers. In fact, the extent and dimension of mobilization 
for the strike on the 14 November was very comprehensive, indeed massive 
in all public sectors, but also quite significant in the state’s private and 
entrepreneurial sector. In the public transport sector, it was a record-
breaking strike, with more than 85% of workers in the main urban centers 
on strike.
73
  
However, the distinctive and unique element here was the wide social 
support for the strike. Besides the unions and QSLT, new and old actors, 
from the most diverse sectors, supported the strike, whether in the 
mobilization process – featuring, notably, the affirmation of a strike not only 
as a legitimate right, but also as a citizen’s demand –, or in the great variety 
of actions that connected the space of production to public space, a hybrid 
public space, to adopt a concept used by Castells.
74
  
The Internet became an essential means for sharing and spreading 
information. Numbers, statements, photos and videos were published and 
spread within a viral logic that is uncommon in the classic repertoire. 
Practical information on how to participate in the strike and scheduled 
actions were shared, coercion and repression were exposed and numbers of 
strikers and strike related actions in multiple locations – from all European 
countries where the action and solidarity days were promoted – were 
presented. 
Strike pickets, involving the solidarity and participation of activists from 
various social sectors, were held in many workplaces, from the night before 
the strike until mid-morning. This effort to cooperate was not new to this 
cycle of mobilization, as it had been tried the year before, but it was now 
broadened. The public space was occupied through the innovative 
combination of several repertoires: from strike pickets in workplaces and 
itinerant pickets on the streets to a march in Lisbon that aimed to bring 
                                                 
72
 CGTP. Greve Geral afectou todo o país. Comunicado de Imprensa N.º 095/12. 19 Nov 
2012, 2012b. [http://www.cgtp.pt/informacao/comunicacao-social/comunicados/5838-
greve-geral-afectou-todo-o-pais]. 
73
 http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=2884947&page=1. 
74
 ESTANQUE, E.; COSTA, H. A.; SOEIRO, J. “The new global cycle of protest and the 
Portuguese case”. Op. Cit.  
The November 2012 general strike and anti-austerity protests – analysis from the 
Portuguese case 
35 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
unions and several political actors together. 
Efforts to limit the right to strike appeared before the 14 November with the 
government imposing a malicious interpretation of minimum services. 14 
November saw a more violent type of repression, as police intervention 
affected several strike pickets and the itinerant picket on the streets of 
Lisbon. At the end of the day, in front of the Parliament, in a strange 
scenario of contention, and responding to a group of about ten people 
throwing stones at the police barrier for more than half an hour, riot police 
began a general “sweep” operation over two kilometers, which resulted in 
several injured people – including elderly people – and the arrest of 120 
persons. It remains unclear what the exact premises and circumstances were 
that led the police’s action during this episode, as well as who has political 
responsibility for the legal and police abuse of power.
75
 But the episode had 
a tremendous impact on the politics of contention, feeding the fear and 
damaging opportunities for articulation between CGTP and other social 
actors for action in the public space.  
 
6. Comments and conclusions 
This article analyzed the 14 November 2012 general strike aiming, with 
reference to the Portuguese case, to explore its insertion into this period’s 
contentious politics in regard both to its transnational dimension and the 
relationship between actors – particularly between the unions and new 
political actors involved. The unions’ perception of their weaknesses and of 
the ability of new collective actors to organize massive mobilizations 
against austerity transformed the political opportunity structure and 
encouraged a shift in union strategy and action. Although resistance often 
walked separate paths, they sometimes converged, drawn together by two 
elements: the importance, for the new actors, of material claims and the 
recognition, although ambivalent, of these new actors by the unions. 
General strikes were times of convergence. In these moments of encounter, 
contention was expressed not only in the workplace but also in public 
spaces, resulting in common “symbolic frames”, crossing different 
collective action repertoires and generating “symbolic power”.76 
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in 2015, acknowledged that there were “abuses” and illegalities, including the fact that 
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with trauma. Many young people were taken to police stations, searched and locked in cells 
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Nevertheless, these moments were not without reciprocal tensions and it is 
an open question whether this represents a sporadic collaboration or a 
possibility to generate structured and sustained alliances in the future. 
Whereas it is hard to evaluate, in the short term, the impacts and results of 
this episode of collective action, to evaluate it in the medium and long terms 
is a particularly complex operation. The authors do not seek to definitely 
address these questions in this article, but formulate some theoretical and 
empirical questions for future study. 
From a call that was clearly referenced to national political opportunity 
structures – affected by a “foreign troika” –, the strike went on to hold an 
international and, to a certain extent, transnational dimension. The result 
was a combination of various actions, including general strikes in the four 
Southern European countries of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, although 
only Portugal and Spain witnessed an actual general strike on the day.
77
 If it 
was not an European general strike, it surely fits with the definition of 
transnational European protest elaborated by Tarrow,
78
 and was one of the 
more significant events, on a European scale, of the capital-labour conflict 
since the beginning of the economic and financial crisis. 
Thus, in the short term and on the national level, it would not be unwise to 
state that its importance was historical, not only due to the number of 
participants, but also due to the social support it rallied. The strike also had 
an immediate outcome, which should not be belittled: it put an end to the 
government’s plan to lower the employers’ social security contribution – 
through a Single Social Tax –, which had been one of the sparks that lead to 
the widening of the ‘5 September’ QSLT demonstration, a project 
abandoned after the general strike. Multiple references to identity were 
articulated again in the flows of conflict dynamics, amplifying the social 
and political bases of collective action, within and outside the nation-state. 
The “we” side assumed a nationally framed class identity – the People's 
Square, a reference to Lisbon’s “Palace Square” (Terreiro do Paço) –, which 
was later confronted with the need for a social contract in Europe. It then 
took on the shape of an Iberian alliance in the field of organized labour, 
albeit embedded in the transnational cycle of protests – the ‘#Nov14.’ open 
letter by QSLT placed the conflict in a structure of multi-level opportunities, 
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more complex than in CGTP’s approach, yet more salient79 to the lives of 
the people to be mobilized than ETUC’s proposal. 
Furthermore, it introduced a new element, connecting economic worries to 
democratic concerns within the logic of the politicization of the public, 
supra-national and European spheres. 
A medium and long term evaluation points to a more strategic analysis. The 
most intense period in this cycle of protests came to an end in mid-2013, 
with the joint general strike – rallying CGTP and UGT – of 27 June 2013. 
The strategy aiming to topple the government was unsuccessful and unions 
and social movements were corroded, which led to a process of social 
demobilization. Since then, with the blocking of political opportunity 
structures, there has not been a regrowth of collective action. 
The PSD/CDS coalition government stayed in office and it led a speedy 
implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding, instating an 
austerity society.
80
 In fact, a year after the MoU was negotiated, the situation 
had drastically worsened and the memorandum’s effects were fairly 
noticeable. Besides its effects in job destruction and the rise in 
unemployment – unemployment rates had climbed to 16.9% in the fourth 
quarter of 2012, peaking at an historical 17.7% in the first quarter of 2013 –, 
the memorandum's plan imposed beggar-thy-neighbour policies resulting in 
a reconfiguration of the employment regime. It encompassed three breaks – 
on wage policy, on collective bargaining and on job and unemployment 
protection,
81
 likening it to a liberal regime. 
Enforcing the MoU led to a further deepening in the country's 
peripheralization process within the Economic and Monetary Union,
82
 
simultaneously adding to the national-European tensions, particularly 
because “the center demonised the periphery”.83 Likewise, since then, a new 
European transnational protest, marked by labour issues, has not been 
attempted. Thus, nowadays, we are living in an apparent paradox: “The 
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balance of power between capital and labour has been shifted towards 
capital and the Commission at the expense of labour and national 
legislators”.84 However, “the new supranational EU regime”, consolidated 
since 2011, has also nationalized social conflict.
85
 So struggles are 
nationalized, taking on the aspect of a national rebellion against European 
institutions (the most emblematic case being Greece), while the limits of 
merely national collective action become clear. 
The current situation raises significant strategic debates, which should draw 
conclusions from the 14 November 2012 general strike. On the one hand, in 
a context where organized labour is being weakened, the emergence of new 
social mobilizations needs to go from a mere “meeting” logic to building 
social alliances between unions and (new) collective action movements, 
raising the levels of coordination.
86
 On the other hand, there are substantial 
difficulties in forging, on a European scale, a “common discursive frame of 
reference” that will provide a strong interpretation for coordinated collective 
action.
87
 Overcoming the North-South divide, replacing the commonsense 
narrative that penalizes the periphery by adequately framing and 
constructing connections between the attacks made by the European 
institutions and national governments to the working classes of different 
countries is certainly necessary, but difficult. Despite the difficulties, it is 
certainly necessary to build multi-scalar articulations and mobilizations, 
with both trade unions and new dynamics of collective action. 
The space for national action is unquestionable. Nonetheless, any 
political strategy aiming to enforce alternatives to austerity can hardly 
advance without the capacity to forge transnational solidarity – that 
recognizes, a priori, the periphery’s specific difficulties – and without 
significantly altering the power relation on a European scale.  
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The uneven development of (mass) strikes in France and 
Spain 
Maria Gorosarri and Luciole Sauviat 
 
 
ntroduction  
Each economic crisis can lead people to question capitalism and has, 
therefore, the potential to demonstrate that capitalism could end. One of the 
possible historical roles of mass strikes is to lead to this end. In the current 
finance-driven over-accumulation crisis, however, this is not what is 
happening. So far, the mass strikes and protest movements have only been 
demanding the withdrawal of austerity measures, and this has been ignored, 
on the whole, by governments and decisions-makers at the European level. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that class struggles cannot be measured 
solely by establishing whether demands were fulfilled. It is important to 
take into account their contribution to the development of class 
consciousness, which also occurs in situations of partial defeat. Rosa 
Luxemburg stated that mass strikes are “the method of motion of the 
proletarian mass, the phenomenal form of the proletarian struggle in the 
revolution”1. Consequently, defeats can turn out to be steps in the direction 
of a revolutionary struggle. 
In order to assess the crisis protests in Spain and France, we will proceed as 
follows: firstly, we will explain general features of general strikes and mass 
strikes and will lay out the framework of our analysis. Secondly, we will 
present the union landscape in the two countries. Moreover, we will 
recapitulate the development of the most important class struggles in France 
                                                 
1
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and Spain between 2010 and 2014, as well as the attempt of an EU-wide 
strike in 2012. Thirdly, we will assess which of the characteristics of mass 
strikes are visible in the class struggles in France and Spain. Finally, we will 
compare the development of the working class struggles in both countries. 
 
1. Mass and general strikes 
Luxemburg saw three attributes of mass strikes that are relevant for the 
crisis in the EU. Firstly, she stated that political and economic demands 
come together. Secondly, she underlined that defeats are also significant for 
the working class becoming aware of its interests. Finally, she highlighted 
the need to go beyond national borders, pointing out that workers should 
consider revolutions in other countries as “a part of their own social and 
political history”.2  
Importantly, Luxemburg meant more than a general strike when she spoke 
of a mass “strike”. In her view, a mass strike occurs if labour unrest is 
accompanied by a wave of small and big economic and political strikes.
3
 
However, general strikes are undeniably part of the mass strike because they 
carry, most of the time, a revolutionary imaginary. Even if she did not see 
the mass strike as the “big evening” before the revolution – as the French 
syndicalists did, at the end of the nineteenth century, with the general strike 
– she conceived of it as a time when the working class organises itself to 
prepare for the revolution. This suggests that both the mass strike and the 
general strike have a role to play in processes resulting in a break with 
capitalism. Nevertheless, there are different types of general strikes and – 
although they all carry a revolutionary imaginary – they are not meant, in 
Western Europe in this period of crisis, to bring down bourgeois democracy. 
Rather, they aimed at demanding that certain decisions in fiscal politics be 
withdrawn. 
In this text, we use the term general strike as it is used in the countries we 
are looking at. In France, for many foreign observers, a general strike broke 
out in 2010. But for the French working class, no such thing happened. The 
general understanding is that a general strike involves all economic sectors, 
and that a substantial share of workers participate. The same understanding 
of general strike applies in Spain, and we use the term as it is employed by 
the unions when they call for strike mobilisation. 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., pp. 16-30. 
3
 Ibid., pp. 18-23. 
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In order to define the mass strike we use Luxemburg’s defining features of a 
mass strike as selected by Jörg Nowak and Alexander Gallas: 
First of all, they disrupt political life, affect public discourse and provoke 
massive responses from governments or other state bodies. A second 
central aspect is the mobilizing character of mass strikes for the working 
class: Workers experience the power that goes along with collective 
action, gain experience in political struggles and see the need for 
organization.
4
 
The second defining feature is what is best translated as class consciousness 
and can develop in the course of mass struggles.
5
 It is one of the most 
difficult features to observe, and we aim to assess it through the 
development of struggles in Spain and France from 2010 onwards. 
Furthermore, we add a feature also emphasised by Luxemburg, which we 
consider central: The fact that a mass strike cannot be declared from above 
by a union or a party. In other words, it cannot be switched on and off as 
desired and cannot be steered into a preferred direction.
6
 
 
2. Case studies: France/Spain (2010-4) 
Labour unions are, of course, important actors in strikes. In our two 
countries, they share similar features: French and Spanish unions are 
characterised by a low level of institutionalisation and, in particular, by a 
divide according to political and religious orientation.
7
 The low level of 
institutionalisation is expressed, for example, in a lack of opportunities for 
collective bargaining and the non-existence of strike funds. Additionally, 
unions in both countries are supported financially by the state.
8
 A 
difference, however, can also be noted: whereas union density is notoriously 
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7
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Dominique. “Retraites: les faux-semblants d’un mouvement social”. Le Débat. Paris: 
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low in France (7.7 per cent), it roughly reaches the OECD average in Spain 
(17.5 per cent).
9
  
Historically, the biggest unions in both countries have been dominated by 
the Communist Party: in Spain, Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and in 
France, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT). Their main 
competitors are unions linked to the Socialist Party: in France, Force 
Ouvrière (FO) and the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail 
(CFDT), and in Spain, the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). In the 
1990s, a left-wing union was founded in France that criticised both the CGT 
and the social democratic unions: SUD Solidaires. Specific to Spain’s union 
landscape are several syndicalist unions and two syndicalist federations of 
notable size: the CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) and the CGT 
(Confederación General del Trabajo). 
In France and Spain, strikes compensate for the low level of institutionalised 
collective bargaining. They are often used as “a weapon of protest and 
demonstration” and usually are based on mass mobilisations aimed at 
demonstrating the power of the unions.
10
 Therefore, we can expect mass 
strikes to occur quite easily in the two countries. Finally, traditional unions, 
as in the rest of Western Europe, are on the defensive and have lost 
structural power in recent decades due to the relocation and shrinking of 
industries.
11
 
A last point needed to comprehend the current situation is that Spain, in 
2010, along with Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Greece was one of the most 
indebted countries of the EU and could have been bankrupted. In this 
respect, France is better off. Nevertheless, there have been discussions to 
add France to the list. Moreover, the EU Commission has been imposing 
austerity measures on several EU countries simultaneously.
12
 Some 
countries are more affected by the crisis and more prone to the emergence of 
resistance movements, but Spain and France are also even in their uneven 
development: they have to implement so-called cuts and privatise state-
owned companies in order to attract capital.  
                                                 
9
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2.1 The Protests in France 
In 2009, the first “day of action” (a one-day national strike accompanied by 
demonstrations) related to the crisis took place in France.
13
 Well-known 
forms of resistance, namely “bossnapping” and sabotage, also reappeared 
that year. These methods are mostly used against mass dismissals and are 
effective because there is no need to mobilise a large number of workers or 
to wait for the union’s approval. Moreover, “bossnapping” grabs the 
attention of the media and helps workers to pull their weight at the 
negotiation table (there are dismissals, but people obtain big 
compensations).
14
 According to the Institut Supérieur du Travail,
15
 the new 
forms of resistance have replaced mass action. At the same time, the 
opposite tendency, that is, to see the inability to cope with pressures caused 
by exploitation as an individual failure, is also strongly developed in France, 
as the recent increase in work-related suicides demonstrates.
16
  
In June 2010, nationwide protests started after the decision of the 
government to increase both the retirement age and the minimum age for a 
full pension. This decision was part of the measures taken to reduce public 
debt and thus related to the management of the crisis. Almost immediately, 
all the major unions started protesting against the new pensions law. The 
protest gained in intensity in September after the summer holiday break and 
declined rapidly after the positive vote of the Parliament on 27 October 
2010. However, the mobilisation of different sectors and generations, as 
well as the fact that economic blockades took place, gave the impression 
that France was entering an unprecedented period of mass strike. So what 
happened? 
First of all, two new elements dominated the protest wave. One of them was 
the concerted action of the intersyndicale: a committee where the unions 
decided the course of action together. The intersyndicale gained legitimacy 
during the 2009 days of action.
17
 The other element was that people 
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expected “strong sectors” like the refineries to strike for them. Workers in 
the refineries were aware of their role: “We block for those who can’t 
strike”.18 The idea of a strike “by delegation” was coined during the 1995 
strikes against the pensions and social security reforms and gained new 
momentum in 2010, with “external” blockades of sites with key economic 
importance. We can assume that in an era of unemployment and 
precariousness, strikes at the workplace are not the main strategy anymore; 
in contrast to those strikes, blockades allow members of the non-employed 
working class to get involved.
19
  
The mobilisation was widespread and showed some characteristics of a 
mass strike. Before the strikes in the refineries and the ports around 
Marseille, demonstrations were the most important mode of action. They 
attracted an average of one million and – according to the CGT and the 
CFDT – peaked at up to three million participants.20 Several strike types 
took place alongside the days of action in different sectors. For instance, on 
the eve of 11 October – one of the days of action – the media reported that 
244 demonstrations had been registered. Furthermore, there were strikes in 
public transport, the ports, the postal service, telecommunications, job 
centres, power plants, refineries, education, car factories, etc. Nevertheless, 
even if some of these strikes were – in the French terminology – 
“extendable”, none of them were unlimited. While strike attendance was 
very high in the refineries, in other plants the strikers were in the minority.
21
 
In the course of the protests more people became active, and the demands 
were widened: they now addressed the duration of working life and working 
hours, hardship caused by wages and working conditions, inequalities in all 
its dimensions, precariousness and the lack of perspectives for young 
people.
22
 Additionally, striking school canteen workers, street cleaners and 
truck drivers raised specific issues such as wages and working conditions. 
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In economic terms, the key element was the strike in the energy sector: in 
early September, there were stoppages at six French refineries (out of 
twelve overall), as well as at the port of Fos and at some petrol depots. 
Many participants saw disrupting the entire economy as an aim of the 
protest and supported the strikes by blockading the entrances to the sites. Oil 
depots were soon requisitioned by the Government; police special forces 
“de-blockaded” them on 15 October.23 Nevertheless, the sites stayed on 
strike and oil tankers were therefore “stuck” at sea. Meanwhile, all refineries 
in France were on strike, and the lack of petrol was beginning to become an 
issue. It was even the case that the struggle started to internationalise. At the 
Grandpuits refinery, workers got in touch with Belgian unionists, who in 
turn blockaded a Belgian petrol depot in order to stop petrol from being 
transported France.
24
 However, the main French unions were not ready to 
leave the negotiation table and, at the last meeting of the intersyndicale, 
most unions declined to support the blockades.
25
  
On 22 October, President Sarkozy requisitioned the Granpuits refinery.
26
 
Once the state sent police Special Forces to end the blockade, other workers 
and neighbours tried to secure the site. In this situation, the CGT 
collaborated with the police and employers, helping workers prepared to 
break the blockade to access the site. At the same time, the union took 
symbolic action, which aimed at deploring the end of democracy.
27
 In other 
refineries such as Le Havre, workers were mobilised after these attacks and 
were ready to defend themselves.
28
 Nevertheless, in the end, the new 
pensions law was passed. Some demonstrations persisted, but eventually 
faded away. 
As we have shown, there were rank-and-file initiatives such as the solidarity 
blockades. At some point, the protests could have been expanded into a 
mass strike. However, there are two major reasons why there was no lasting 
movement: firstly, the protest was coordinated by the unions, which tend to 
mediate between workers, the state and capital. Accordingly, strikes took 
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place by delegation, which meant that only a small portion of the working 
class gained experiences of a collective struggle to build on. Secondly, the 
movement was weakened by the fact that there were going to be presidential 
elections in 2012, and that the victory of a socialist candidate was within 
reach. Indeed, the socialists would win the election in the end; in 
expectation of their victory, the unions did not want to exert too much 
pressure.
29
  
Even if, after a probation period, the unions and parties to the left of the 
Socialist Party decided to show their opposition with anti-austerity protests, 
the movement remained weak and nearly invisible. What became visible, 
however, was the reactionary movement against gay marriage and gender-
sensitive school education. Admittedly, nationwide protests erupted in 2014 
in reaction to the murder of the environmental activist Rémi Fraisse by the 
police. But this was erased from the collective memory with the attacks on 
Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher supermarket. The huge demonstrations 
in response to the attacks reinforced the national spirit and may therefore 
have weakened expressions of class antagonism. 
Despite these highly visible, predominantly citizen-oriented protests, we 
should not forget that workers have indeed been organising around specific 
issues, often as a reaction to public expenditure cuts, layoffs and plants 
closures. Just to mention a few conflicts: from 2009 onwards, workers at 
Continental organised wildcat strikes and a strike with their German 
colleagues against the relocation of their workplace. In 2014, the so-called 
precarious culture workers (technicians, artists etc.) organised themselves 
against cuts to their unemployment benefits system and went on strike. 
After years of occupying a relocated tea factory called Fralib, workers won 
a high severance pay and a fund of 20 million Euros from Unilever, which 
allowed them to start a workers’ cooperative in the abandoned factory. 
Nevertheless, these disparate strikes did not generalise into a larger 
movement. Additionally, in a situation where conservative forces are able to 
act as a mass opposition movement, it is difficult for some sections of the 
working class to organise protests. Indeed, in this period of crisis and 
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protests, France, similarly to Germany, is seen by an observer as “becalmed 
in the eye of the European storm”.30  
The defeat of the working class after the protests against the pension reform 
did not lead to a reorganisation of struggles. Against this backdrop, we are 
unable to identify a process of consciousness development. On the contrary, 
many of the people involved in protests ended up relying on electoral 
politics. Furthermore, there are at least two movements that moved in a 
different direction: on one hand, the ultra-nationalist and sexist protests; on 
the other hand, the wildcat strikes, the bossnapping practices, the self- 
organisation of precarious marginalised workers (for example in the culture 
sector and by the ‘Sans Papiers’). All of the latter are defensive actions that 
do not express the intent to move beyond capitalism. 
 
2.2. Spain: Mobilisations beyond the unions 
In 2008, Spain was hit hard by the financial crisis. As the crisis first affected 
the building sector, many workers in that sector faced wage reductions and 
layoffs. Unemployment benefit payments constituted the biggest part of 
social expenditure; nevertheless, the socialist government denied the 
existence of the crisis until the end of 2008.
31
 After cuts to public 
expenditure in education and welfare, the socialist government passed a first 
labour law reform in May 2010. 
Under the new law, employers could lay off workers not just when they 
suffered losses, but even when they simply predicted them. Furthermore, the 
government found a way to allow employers to pay smaller dismissal 
compensations. Similarly, the labour law reform undermined collective 
bargaining. Around the same time, the government also adopted fiscal 
adjustment measures such as freezing pensions and reducing salaries of 
public employees. 
As a response, the main trade unions called for a general strike, which was 
planned for September 2010. Although the labour law reform and the fiscal 
adjustment measures had already been approved, the unions believed that 
the general strike would be more successful after the summer because of the 
“lack of mobilization of civil servants in previous strikes” and the 
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possibility of the strike taking place alongside demonstrations in other 
European countries.
32
 Prime Minister Zapatero announced that the 24-hour 
general strike deferred to September would not influence his politics. The 
deferral, however, undermined the potential of union mobilisations. 
In total, the unions called three 24-hour general strikes between 2010 and 
2014. Whereas the socialist government only faced one general strike (29 
September 2010), two strikes against tax reform took place during the first 
year in office of conservative prime minister Mariano Rajoy (29 March 
2012 and the EU-wide strike day on 14 November 2012). According to 
UGT and CCOO, the number of participants increased with each general 
strike. The last mobilised about 1 million workers.
33
 However, UGT and 
CCOO did not keep up the fight against the labour law reforms and stopped 
calling for strikes and actions. 
The economic crisis in Spain gave an impulse to peripheral nationalist 
movements. In the Basque Country, the unions called three additional 
general strikes (27 January 2011, 26 September 2012 and 30 May 2013). 
Moreover, the Basque unions also supported two of the Spanish general 
strikes, but refused to join in the Spanish call for the European Strike.
34
 
Furthermore, large demonstrations for independence took place in 
Catalonia: in 2013, 20 per cent of the population took part in a human chain. 
The crisis did not just lead to 24-general strikes, but to new ways of 
protesting. On 15 May 2011, just before the local elections in Spain, a 
demonstration demanding “real democracy” took place. The demonstrators 
occupied a central square in Madrid for almost a month – despite attempts 
by the police to evict them – and called for the formation of local assemblies 
to spread the so-called 15M movement.
35
 This was the starting point of a 
wave of revolts especially against cuts in education and healthcare. In the 
process, different movements converged, for example, the fight against 
evictions (Plataforma por la Hipoteca [PAH]). An important result of the 
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15M movement was the increase in political consciousness of people who 
had not been involved politically before.
36
 Police repression against the 15M 
movement seemed disproportionate and encouraged people to reoccupy 
public spaces after they had been dispersed.
37
  
The roots of the 15M movement have been analysed in the light of 
“citizenism” – an approach to politics suggesting that democracy is able to 
oppose capitalism and to correct its excesses. In other words, it replaces 
class struggle with citizens’ political participation.38 ‘Citizenist’ activism 
generates “bubbles of lucidity” by occupying the public space: “Each 
mobilizing opportunity establishes an intensely lived truth, where the 
nightmare of production relations, family units and structural servility of our 
daily lives has vanished for a few moments or even days.”39  
Against this backdrop, continued mobilisation becomes essential in order to 
keep an open space to facilitate shifts in consciousness.
40
 The plea for 
deeper democracy is not only the point of convergence where political and 
economic issues meet, but the also the starting point of further struggles. 
‘Citizenists’ defend the democratic political system of bourgeois liberalism, 
but importantly, also defend that the working class needs democracy, 
“because only through the exercise of its democratic rights, in the struggle 
for democracy, can the proletariat become aware of its class interests and its 
historic task”.41  
On 19 June 2011, Democracia Real Ya called for a demonstration against 
the Euro Plus Pact, which aimed at enhancing the “competitiveness” of 
southern European workers. More people joined this new demonstration 
than those who took part in the 15M movement.
42
 After this event, the 15M 
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movement was only visible in the struggles against cuts in healthcare and 
education.
43
  
Other strikes also became relevant once others sectors were hit by cuts. 
Power generation from coal faced investment cuts of 65 per cent; in 2012, 
the closure of several mines was announced. Workers protested violently in 
May 2012 and later led a march from Asturias in the north of Spain to 
Madrid. When the miners arrived at their destination, many joined them in a 
demonstration that eventually mobilised over 15,000 participants as they 
saw these protests as protests against austerity. The police once again 
attacked the demonstrators, but the action succeeded in defending the jobs 
in the mining sector and became an important point of reference for the 
Spanish workers’ movement. 
After M15 lost momentum, a new movement arose. The Marches for 
Dignity were organised by three social movements: the SAT (Sindicato 
Andaluz de Trabajadores),
44
 Frente Cívico – Somos Mayoría45 and the 
assemblies of unemployed.
46
 A total of 150 collectives supported the call for 
the Marches such as local M15 assemblies, assemblies of factory workers, 
associations of migrant workers, anti-eviction activists, local political 
parties (Equo, Izquierda Anticapitalista), unions (CNT, CGT) and 
grassroots Christian movements. The Marches for Dignity showed a more 
developed class consciousness than 15M itself: participants considered 
themselves workers, not citizens, and voiced their opposition to 
exploitation. Unlike the people involved in M15, they did not commit 
themselves to peaceful protest only. This can be interpreted as a recognition 
of the fact that bourgeois democracy is limited and violent. 
In March 2014, eight “columns” of workers marched all over the Spanish 
state to converge in Madrid in a demonstration, demanding “bread, work, 
and shelter for all”. During the marches, the columns showed solidarity with 
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workers’ struggles, such those taking place at Coca Cola47 and Panrico.48 In 
correspondence with the coverage of the 15M movement, the media ignored 
the marches until a demonstration was held that had two million participants 
according to the organisers.
49
 The Marches for Dignity issued a call for 
another demonstration to be held on the 29 November 2014. Surprisingly, 
the traditional unions UGT and CCOO appealed to their members to 
demonstrate on the same day, but they did not openly support the Marches. 
The UGT and the CCOO are still not involved in the Marches, but 
numerous collectives called for a general labour, social and consumption 
strike to be held on 22 October 2015. The Marches are prepared to go 
beyond the previous demonstrations in so far as they are now calling for 
general strikes without the support of the main unions. In fact, they have led 
to more workers gathering than at the demonstrations during the general 
strikes organised by the UGT and the CCOO. Presently, these grassroots 
movements seem to be more successful in terms of mobilising the working 
class. Since they are not dependent on state funding, they are less likely to 
accommodate to government interventions or state institutions. In sum, a 
new social actor has emerged. This is not surprising if the general political 
situation is considered: the traditional unions stopped taking actions based 
on broad mobilisation after the attempted EU-wide strike (see below); the 
M15 movement has lost the urban squares, and the management of the crisis 
by the government and the EU continues to harm people’s lives. Crucially, 
the Marches respond to this situation by integrating both the economic and 
the political side of the struggle. 
 
2.3. The First Attempt of a European Strike 
The crisis is international; therefore, an international or at least a European 
strategy of resistance is required. In the context of the struggles against 
austerity measures, two Portuguese unions (CGTP, STE) had called a 24-
hour general strike for the 14 November 2012. In response, the Spanish 
unions UGT and CCOO proposed turn this stoppage into an “Iberian 
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strike”.50 This opened up an opportunity for a European general strike. In 
this situation, other unions from southern Europe declared their support for 
the strike, including the Spanish unions CNT and CGT, and the Italian 
union CGIL. The Greek unions GSEE and ADEDY supported the European 
strike too – despite the fact that they already had called for a 48-hour strike 
on 6 and 7 November. Finally, the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) published a formal statement calling for a day of action and for 
solidarity on 14 November. In the countries that were not hit so hard by the 
crisis, solidarity actions took place. The French unions, for example, called 
for mobilisations, but did not go on strike because they were waiting to see 
what the government agenda of the recently elected socialist President 
François Hollande was going to be.
51
 
The European strike seemed to be a step forward, as it was the first EU-wide 
strike coordination in history. However, it did not fully succeed in 
transcending the national borders, because it was called by national unions 
in every country. In fact, nationalist feelings overlapped class consciousness 
when, for instance, the unions in the Basque Country decided not to support 
an “Iberian” strike. Since then, there has not been a call for any other 
European general strike. 
 
3. Elements of Mass strikes in Spain and France? 
We focused in this article on the defining elements of the mass strike 
according to Luxemburg in order to assess the strikes in France and Spain. 
The first one is the fact that a mass strike is a “movement of the people” that 
cannot be triggered at the flick of the switch by a union, a party, or any 
other organisation. Both in France and Spain, the numerous general strikes 
and days of action were all controlled by unions. Their duration was 
determined in advance (one day strikes), and they were thus small 
demonstrations of power. The same can be said of the EU-wide strike and 
even of the Marches in Spain, which were also coordinated by several 
organisations. In the French case, there were some protest forms that were 
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not controlled by organisations, for example the blockades, the 
bossnappings and some of the economic strikes, but they were separate from 
each other, and did not converge into a mass strike movement. In the 
Spanish case, the M15 movement was not led by an organisation. Post-M15, 
the decision-making structures of political parties and trade unions were 
much criticised. This and the formation of the Marches could be a hint that 
workers want radical democratic organisations and are willing to continue 
the struggle even without the unions. 
It is quite clear that the second element of the mass strikes – “they disrupt 
political life, affect public discourse and provoke massive responses from 
governments or other state bodies” – applies to the pension protests in 
France. For nearly two months, the media reported nonstop, and the state 
and the government had to react to the protests and did so by requisitioning 
workers and sending armed police forces to the strike sites. In this situation, 
workers defended themselves and learned to struggle. 
The 15M movement in Spain erupted just before local elections took place, 
showing that people did not expect much from formal democracy. Through 
the eyes of the mainstream media, political life seemed to be disrupted. 
They focused on the 15M movement, partly because of the presence of 
previously “non-political” people, partly because of the colourful images it 
provided. The Marches for Dignity, however, were omitted in the news until 
the last big demonstration in Madrid in March 2014. Against this backdrop, 
it can be said that 15M was able to influence the public discourse. Two 
important consequences of 15M were the development of a political 
consciousness of previously non-engaged individuals and the emergence of 
opportunities for new cooperation networks. As a result, the “remnants” of 
15M became active in the Marches for Dignity. Nevertheless – and in 
inverse proportion to the media attention – the “Marches” triggered the most 
violent response from the authorities. 
The third element, the mobilisation of the working class and the 
development of its consciousness through struggles as well as the formation 
of workers’ organisations, throws up questions to which we cannot provide 
definite answers in the French case. There were large demonstrations with a 
wide geographical dispersion, but only a small section of the working class 
actively blockaded economic processes and thus gained experiences of the 
struggle – a kind of vanguard. It is very likely that this minority and some of 
the other people involved discussed the question of organisation because 
they had to develop forms of resistances (blockades) that were suitable for a 
strike by delegation in the context of an international economic crisis. 
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Nevertheless, as we have seen, there is no proof of a continuation or a 
rebirth of an organisational consciousness in the French case. The Spanish 
case shows that it is through concrete struggles and the assessment of 
defeats that the working class develops consciousness and creates new 
forms of organisations. 
In both cases, in the course of the struggles, workers saw the need to 
organise across national borders: international solidarity was a practical 
reality for French and Belgian workers – and Spanish workers participated 
strongly in the EU strike. Despite all the limitations of these attempts, the 
struggles had a momentum where the working class could see that struggles 
in other countries are part of their own history. 
 
Conclusion  
First of all, what we can see from the comparison of the two case studies is 
that they tell us different stories. Whereas in Spain two protest movements 
existed in parallel – the union-led general strikes and the social movements 
(in which some of the syndicalist unions participated), in France there is no 
significant anti-austerity social movement even if radical labour conflicts 
are occurring without union control. In Spain, it is when the unions do not 
organise general strikes any more that the movements “innovate” with the 
workers’ marches. Notably, the Marches call for “work, social and 
consumption” strikes. This form of action is adapted to a situation of high 
unemployment and shows that they try to overcome the separation of the 
spheres of production and consumption. This separation was not overcome 
by M15, which concentrated on the political side of the crisis. A mass strike 
has only come fully into existence when the working class is capable of 
overcoming these separations in their struggles.
52
  
It is true in both countries that unions with limited bargaining power are 
more vocal on the street, but are nevertheless interested in being social 
partners of the governments. It is in this respect that an important similarity 
between both countries comes to the fore: unions were more cautious to go 
on the street when socialist parties were in power. 
In France, the far-right conservative forces took advantage of a situation in 
which the non-parliamentarian left as well as a left government could not 
solve the economic situation. In Spain, even if nationalism is reinforced by 
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the crisis, there is more social movement-driven political innovation. It is a 
less hierarchical organisation, the Marches for Dignity, that gained 
considerable support within the working class. How struggles will develop 
in the next years remains unknown, but we have to stay cautious, since 
reactionary forces are on the rise. 
All in all, we are in a situation where a peripheral southern European 
country (Spain) comes close to a mass strike situation and a centre-southern 
European country (France) is far away from anything close to a mass strike. 
Nevertheless, whereas centralism and nationalism in Spain could prevent 
the development of a full mass strike situation in the future, a more 
international strategy would strengthen class consciousness. 
Everywhere, we should discuss the strategic challenges connected to 
emerging mass strike movements: how to include the jobless and workers 
from all sectors in a strike? Are mass strikes about broadening democracy as 
the M15 movement believed? Do they serve to protect at least parts of the 
welfare state? The last two questions indicate that the gains to be made in 
many cases may not be as big as the mobilisation efforts put into a mass 
strike movement. If mass strikes were about building a new Europe or 
breaking with the roots of the crisis, then they would fulfil their historical 
role. But in order to get there, we have to develop innovative forms and 
contents of struggles. Up to now, a new kind of movement likely to bring 
about a full mass strike has not yet been born. 
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Authoritarian defence of the German model? 
Conflicts over the freedom of collective bargaining and militant 
strikes in the German railway sector 
Stefanie Hürtgen 
 
 
ntroduction 
In 2014 and 2015 Germany faced a wave of strikes in the service sector. 
While for some scholars these strikes represent evidence of an on-going 
deep crisis, i.e. the end of a supposedly regulated, economically successful 
and socially inclusive German model of capitalism,
1
 others promote the idea 
of the supposed “ongoing existence” of that model, despite some 
“transformed dimensions”.2 This debate is having an immediate political 
impact given that the German case, especially during and after what is 
called the European fiscal crisis, seems to represent a model that combines 
both economic strength and social welfare.  
In this paper, I take the railway sector as an example of industrial conflict to 
illustrate firstly the social crisis of the German model of capitalism, and, 
secondly, the fact that this crisis is being neglected by important actors of 
what Gramsci calls the ruling bloc: employers, government (where the role 
of the Social Democrats is especially important), large parts of the 
traditional and large trade unions, such as IG Metall, and finally most 
academics and journalists. As this article will show, the neglect of the 
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growing social crisis is the basis of what Ian Bruff calls the “mask of 
‘success’” of the German model, and its propaganda for competitive 
solidarity as its motor.
3
 At present the denial of growing social tensions in 
German society culminates in a labour law reform that targets explicitly 
more militant and demanding trade union activities, asserting that they are 
organized by “small” and clientelistic, and thus particularistic, 
organisations. The industrial conflict in the railway sector mirrored many of 
these important developments and concluded with an important success, one 
that created opportunities for bypassing this new labour law for at least the 
coming years in that sector. Nevertheless, one should not be too optimistic 
concerning the general impact of that victory.  
 
Railway strikes and big and small trade unions in German capitalism 
In 2014 and 2015, the German Train Drivers’ Union (Gewerkschaft 
Deutscher Lokführer or GDL) organized an industrial conflict that lasted 
almost one year. In that time, it went on strike nine times, each time 
successfully blocking the traffic of passengers and goods for several days. 
Even when in absolute and relative terms these strikes did not change 
significantly the relatively low average of 16 strike days per 1000 
employees in Germany (France, for example, is 139
4
), their economic and 
political impact was considerable and the trade union ultimately achieved a 
remarkable success. This success is even more significant given that the 
Train Drivers’ Union is a so-called “small” union, i.e. not part of the 
traditional confederation DGB (confederation of German Trade Unions). It, 
in fact, organized not only against the employers, the Deutsche Bahn AG 
(German Railway, a state owned stock corporation under private law) and 
the media and government – but also against the traditional DGB-trade 
unions, first of all the direct competitor in the railway sector, the EVG 
(Railroader and Traffic Trade Union). The GdL has roughly 35,000 
members; in contrast, the “big”, DGB-affiliated trade union EVG has 
200,000 members. The historic success of the GdL strike actions has two 
dimensions: the agreement includes the recognition to represent on-board 
staff, in addition to engine drivers, and secondly, the union is now able to 
bypass the new, restrictive law against small, and above all militant trade 
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unions, pushed through by the Social Democrats in the grand coalition with 
the Christian Democrats.  
Corporatism and social partnership at the company and national level is 
considered the heart of the so-called German model of capitalism. “Big” 
trade unions representing more than two million members (such as IG 
Metall or ver.di, the trade union for services) appear to demonstrate the 
extraordinary strength in involving workers’ interests in economic and 
political development. Trade unions in Germany in principle are not 
politically divided as is typical, for instance, in France. In fact, after the end 
of the Second World War, the conception of a unified and sectoral labour 
union prevailed as a structural feature of the German model of industrial 
relations. Labour unions are often characterized by political “neutrality” 
(even if de facto they have always been very close to the Social Democrats).  
Yet for some time now small trade unions have become an essential part of 
the landscape of industrial relations in Germany and it is important to note 
that these smaller unions play different (key) political roles: some small 
trade unions regularly function as an instrument for employers to downsize 
demands as is the case with the “Christian trade union confederation”; some 
act as purely professional pressure groups for highly qualified workforces 
such as physicians or pilots (these professional associations are at the heart 
of the public rhetoric about “clientelism”, see below); yet others stand for a 
less-compromising and more militant bargaining policy, as is the case with 
the anarcho-syndicalist trade union FAU, a small trade union that is 
organized in some institutions in big cities such as Berlin or Frankfurt and 
typically pushes and radicalizes industrial conflicts. In 2010, the German 
Supreme Court strengthened the position of the small unions by 
accentuating the freedom of the right of collective bargaining in the 
constitution. But already before that date some of the smaller trade unions 
could enforce their position or even change their status from a pure lobby 
organisation to a bargaining trade union (this was the case especially for 
professional-oriented associations
5
) or they could defend their position, as 
was the case for the anarcho-syndicalist FAU in Berlin.
6
 
The socio-political differences within small trade unions are important to 
note because, as we will see, the labour law reform, which is called “law for 
                                                 
5
 GREEF, Samuel; SCHROEDER, Wolfgang. New labour competition: How processes of 
deregulation and privatisation affect industrial relations in Germany. Paper for the 16
th
 
ILERA Wordl Concress, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, 2-4 July 2012. 
6
 BOEWE, Jörn. “Koalitionsrecht verteidigt”. Junge Welt. 11. June 2010, p. 5. 
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the unity of collective bargaining”, officially argues that it intends to push 
back the influence of “small” trade unions, but in fact targets more militant 
ones. 
 
The demands of GdL and the negotiations with the employer 
The GdL can be described as a hybrid in this political landscape of small 
trade unions. Thus, it questions the overall stated need of rising 
competitiveness and the related rising social costs de facto, but not 
programmatically. In fact, the GdL’s tradition is not a very progressive one; 
indeed it is far from that. It has a rather conservative institutional history 
(for instance, there was a merger with Christian and functionaries’ unions in 
1963
7), but what is more important is the union’s position on crucial social 
and political questions: the idea, for example, that different levels of 
qualification must correspond to different pay-levels is deeply grounded in 
the union, which regularly attacked its opponent from the DGB for politics 
of “egalitarianism”. The GdL pursues this approach up to the present day.8 
To strengthen a lower income in relation to a higher one is thus not part of 
the GdL trade union tradition. Fighting “egalitarianism” was also an 
argument against the financial contributions to the public old age pension 
schemes. Instead, the GdL proposed the enlargement of private capital-
based pension schemes – completely in line with the dominant policies that 
aim to privatise social security.
9
  
But nevertheless, the trade union became an important player by organizing 
long-lasting and militant strike activities. Already in 2007-2008 it initiated a 
long (almost one year, similar to 2014-2015) and ultimately successful 
labour dispute with unusually high wage demands (30 per cent), and the 
important claim to organize not only train-drivers, but also on-board staff.
10
 
In both cases, the “other side” of the conflict consisted of the employer, but 
also the dominant DGB-affiliated union in the railway sector. The latter is 
afraid of intensified competition over union membership, but represented, 
                                                 
7
 GREEF, Samuel; SCHROEDER, Wolfgang. “New labour competition: How processes of 
deregulation and privatisation affect industrial relations in Germany”. Op. Cit., p.14f. 
8
 KALASS, Viktoria. Neue Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz im Bahnwesen. Konflikt um die 
Gewerkschaft Deutscher Lokomotivführer. Wiesbaden: Springer, 2012; BACHMANN, 
Andreas. “Wer anderen eine Grube... Oder: Wer fällt der Tarifeinheit zum Opfer”. express, 
Zeitschrift für sozialistische Betriebs- und Gewerkschaftsarbeit. Frankfurt am Main, n. 
1/2015.  
9
 GdL 2008: Intelligente Lösungen statt Gleichmacherei. Public statement, 23/08/2008. 
Cited in [http://www.gdl.de/Aktuell-2008/AushangReport-1219484632] 
10
 GREEF, Samuel; SCHROEDER, Wolfgang. New labour competition: How processes of 
deregulation and privatisation affect industrial relations in Germany. Op. Cit. 
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for its part, support for the further privatisation of the railway system and 
emphasised the need to strengthen competitiveness and to save costs (see 
below). In the conflict in the years 2007 and 2008, the GdL transformed 
itself from a professional-based to a sector-based union, and the most recent 
dispute is a direct follow-up in that logic, which aims at strengthening 
bargaining power via a combination of personnel with ‘strong’ structural 
positions (i.e. train drivers) with personnel with a weaker position vis-à-vis 
the disruption of train service (i.e. employees of the on-board bistros etc.).
11
 
In fact, during the strikes, the GdL was faced with a whole campaign against 
its “egoistic clientelism” (see below), with many politicians trying to end 
the strikes by seeking a “real good result” for train drivers, without taking 
into consideration the other parts of the workforce organized in the union. 
But the GdL was remarkably consistent and continued to insist on including 
the other members of the workforce into the agreement with an explicit 
reference to norms of solidarity.  
 
Railway Privatisation: the intensification, flexibilization and 
precarisation of work 
The “pure” social demands of the strike action included wage increases (5 
per cent), reduction of working time (two hours per week) and less working 
time flexibility (only 50 instead of an unlimited number of hours of 
overtime per year), and free weekends (defined as no less than Friday 10 pm 
to Monday 6 am). In this regard, the success was obviously rather modest: 
the agreement included a 3.5 per cent wage increase, a reduction of working 
time of one hour per week from 2016 and some “efforts” to reduce overtime 
and the very flexible working time schedules. But what is important to note 
is that again, as in 2007, the GdL de facto broke a period of heavy silence 
surrounding the high social costs as a result of the ongoing restructuring of 
the former public railway sector. It was these very social costs that were 
discussed as one of the central reasons for a strike wave in the former public 
service sector during the last years.
12
  
                                                 
11
 In 2007/2008, the GdL received the right to organize different workforce categories; in 
20014/2015, the claim was the right to negotiate for all member categories (and not only 
for train drivers). 
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In fact, the politics of “quasi privatisation” and cost-cutting in the railway 
sector are typical for what is occurring in other former public service 
sectors, such as the telecommunications sector. In 1994 the Deutsche Bahn 
(German Railway) started its organizational, economic and social 
transformation from a massive state-owned enterprise into a profit-oriented, 
internationally focused corporation. It thinned out its rail network to make it 
more profitable and invested in markets that seemed to prosper, such as long 
distance routes and international logistics. While doing so, it installed wide-
ranging internal organizational flexibility, covering nine companies 
(responsible for the regions, long distance, services etc.), organised in about 
300 enterprises – all with different and flexible modes of collective 
bargaining, including different rules for new workers.
13
 Accompanying 
extensive job losses (with an estimated 250,000 jobs cut, which constituted 
half of Deutsche Bahn’s workforce between 1994 and 2007).14 The 
company also established a flexible wage and working-hour scheme and a 
system of market-based “self-responsibility” of groups of units of the 
workforce (such as cost-centres) for margins and performance’s results.15 
Thus, strong intensification and flexibilization of work is reported, due to a 
strong “marketization” of performance-control, but also employment with 
“competitive” results (the wages of the on-board bistro staff in the trains for 
example are dependent on their sales). For those with regular contracts, the 
income is located at the lower end compared to most other sectors (from 
1600 to 3,500 Euros before taxes for the elderly), with some wages for 
precarious workers amounting to about half of the median wage; before the 
minimum wage’s introduction even a pay of 4 Euros per hour had been 
documented.
16
 In fact, besides gastronomy and cleaning, the transport sector 
is situated among those sectors with the lowest income level and the highest 
portion of precarious employment.
17
 Subcontracting is common, not only 
via the firm-owned temporary employment company,
18
 but also via many 
“nameless” companies that often exist only for a short time period and are 
                                                 
13
 KALASS, Viktoria. Neue Gewerkschaftskonkurrenz im Bahnwesen… Op. Cit., p.85ff. 
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enmeshed in complex networks of sub-subcontracting.
19
 Temporary work is 
common even among train-drivers, as well as false self-employment.
20
 Both 
the low wages and the extensive bypassing of working-time rules became 
public with the strikes.  
As this paper has already noted, the “big”, DGB-affiliated railway-sector 
union supported the process of privatisation, “modernization” and 
marketization, including its ultimate aim to enter the stock market (for the 
moment this plan has been put on hold). It tried to constructively support 
and to co-design the company’s restructuring in the name of enforcing 
competitiveness in the global and European market (backing its so called 
“socially acceptable manner”). But due to new EU directives, among other 
factors, and the harsh competition on the national and European market, the 
co-design turned out to be a more or less direct acceptance of social 
concessions.
21
 In fact, the railway sector provides a good example for the 
limits established by a trade union’s policy as co-managers, which sees 
itself as a partner for social competitiveness and takes direct responsibility 
for competitive performance and flexibility in the context of harsh economic 
rivalry among, but also within more and more fragmented companies.
22
  
The “small” GdL presented itself for the first time in 2007 as a de facto 
opposition to this development with the demand for a wage increase of up to 
30 per cent – justified with the extraordinary rise of profits and management 
salaries (the latter at more than 60 per cent). Finally, and in complete 
contradiction to the overall stated danger to weaken competitiveness, an 
agreement was reached, leading to a remarkable increase in remuneration of 
11 per cent, a compromise that later included all 135,000 regular 
employees.
23
 When I say “de facto” opposition, it has to be clarified that the 
GdL does not represent an alternative approach to public infrastructure. 
Competition as such is not negative, the union regularly states, but it in turn 
shall not have negative consequences for workers. 
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Public campaigns against egoism and clientelism and labour law reform 
Already in 2007-2008 the conflict between the GdL, Deutsche Bahn and 
DGB trade union EVG was fought out to a great extent in and via the media, 
but this time the public experienced a nationwide, extremely personalized 
campaign that set out to weaken the union and undermine its president, 
Claus Weselsky. Even “serious” interviews or newspapers presented the 
latter as irrational and crazy, indulging dangerously in his passion for 
power, and marked him as a “Rambo” or as an egomaniac – or poked fun at 
him, focusing on his looks or his East German accent. All coverage seemed 
to focus on one thing: “his power over passengers”, and the yellow press 
began populist calls to actively and physically confront him with “people’s 
opinion”. To avoid misunderstandings, I should note that in Germany it is 
common to publicly attack trade unions, especially when they go on strike. 
But this time the hysterical campaign became one of the important historic 
elements of the whole railway strike, and it obviously had two goals (or at 
least effects): the first was to silence concerns over working conditions and 
strong social needs in the railway sector; in fact, the whole conflict was 
presented as a power game and not as a social conflict. The second goal was 
to clearly strengthen the discourse of the dangerous wielding of power of a 
particularistic group of employees (“this mini-trade union”), taking us all as 
hostages (“slapping the face of millions of people”) and thus the need to 
juridically limit their overwhelming power. (And indeed, all the media and 
talkshows had to admit that the trade union was acting entirely on a legal 
basis and was not violating any of the laws regulating strike activities.) 
Actually, it was the Social Democrats and spokespersons of the “big” trade 
unions that demarcated the line of attacks: Sigmar Gabriel, leader of the 
Social Democrats and Minister of Economics, set the tone when he chose 
one of the biggest yellow press newspapers to speak about the “abuse” of 
bargaining freedom by the train drivers’ union, the need to prevent damages 
to “our economy”, and stop “muscle-man behaviour on the back of 
Germany and all employees”. He explicitly differentiated between the “65-
year-old DGB trade union’s principle” to act “responsibly” concerning 
strike activities and the GdL, which he claimed was abandoning that 
consensus. All these statements ended with the call for a juridical reform, in 
order to guarantee “bargaining unity” and to prevent dangerous clientelistic 
movements. In short, the extremely aggressive and personalized campaign 
of employers, Social Democrats (and less offensive, Christian Democrats) 
and most of the DGB trade unions resulted in a change to labour law, and 
due to the breadth of this alliance, alternative positions were barely present 
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(only some very grass-roots activists tried to organise a different public 
debate).  
The labour law reform operates under the title of ‘unity of collective 
bargaining’. In fact, the project is an older one. Already in 2010 the 
employer’s association together with the DGB trade unions initiated a joint 
initiative (which failed at the time) to limit the power of small trade unions 
and target the “erosion of solidarity and economic insecurity”.24 With the 
creation of the new grand coalition between Christian and Social Democrats 
new efforts have been made by the Social Democratic labour minister to 
push through the reform of the labour law, partly parallel to the railway 
conflicts, and it was passed by parliament in the summer of 2015. The new 
law allows only “the biggest” union in a firm, counted by the highest 
number of members, to engage in strike activities and collective bargaining. 
Doubts about this idea were articulated even at the grass-roots level of the 
supporting trade unions,
25
 raising questions such as what does it mean to 
count and name each trade union member officially and under direct 
observation of the employer, or how to define a “firm” today (given the 
common situation of highly fragmented workplaces due to the outsourcing 
and subcontracting described above). At the moment, different lawyers and 
some of the “small” trade unions (including the GdL) have appealed to the 
constitutional court to reject the new labour law, and there are indeed 
widespread doubts that this law is consistent with the constitution. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that the project to weaken “small” (read 
militant) trade union activism will be abandoned (see below), and 
employers, but also some trade unionists, are already speaking out in favour 
of additional sanctions. 
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The erosion of the unity of collective bargaining and social deregulation  
Indeed, there is widespread competition among the trade unions – 
competition that surpasses the confrontation between “big” DGB trade 
unions and “small” ones outside the DGB. The competition between the 
unions rose dramatically for three main reasons: the first is the permanent 
restructuring of enterprises such as outsourcing, subcontracting, relocation 
etc., which includes a permanent re-definition of workforces, structures of 
economic sectors, mandates and so on. Temporary work agencies, for 
example, became the focus of both ver.di, the service trade union, and IG 
Metall. The second reason is the ongoing contradictory transformation of 
the trade unions from classic social democratic bodies into partners for 
social competitiveness (co-managers), which will entail an immediate 
responsibility for competitive performance and flexibility in the context of 
harsh economic rivalry among but also within fragmented companies. To be 
a strong partner for social competitiveness, unions need both the support of 
the rank-and-file as well as the recognition of management.
26
 Thirdly, there 
is a growing anti-union attitude taking hold among many employers and 
thus an increasing risk of unions to be expelled from the shop-floor.
27
  
It is important to note that the rising competition among unions is taking 
place in an environment of increasing deregulation, expanding low-wage 
sectors and an absence of workers’ representation. Already ten years ago 
research showed a dramatic decentralization and widespread erosion of the 
collective bargaining system despite its formal continuation.
28
 Under the 
roof of one wage agreement manifold deviations are common. The 
management, of course, did use and accelerate the rising social and 
organisational fragmentation, not only via the described strategies of 
outsourcing and precarisation, but in addition it often successfully organized 
strong dumping competition via employer-loyal associations (for example, 
the Christian Trade Union Confederation, also a “small” trade union).29  
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In consequence, there was a recalibration and stratification of institutional 
relationships within Germany, preserving traditional arrangements in some 
respects but also predicating their continued viability on practices which 
embodied more unequal relations of power. Key examples here include the 
growing roles for temporary work agencies in recruitment strategies and for 
“opening clauses” in collective bargaining agreements (which allowed 
companies to deviate below the minimum set by the sector-wide wage 
structure). These developments all exerted downward pressure on labor 
costs, especially at the lower end.
30
  
In the service sector and beyond there is “a broad erosion of formal and 
informal wage norms” and “declining wages in large segments”.31 The 
social effects of ongoing deregulation and fragmentation are widely felt. 
Sociological research shows strong feelings of injustice and suffering due to 
deteriorated working conditions, rising stress, low pay and strong social 
uncertainty among the rank-and-file.
32
 There is no doubt that this social 
context led to the remarkably strong support of the railway strike and the 
GdL among the general public (already in 2007 and again in 2014-2015). In 
the middle of the hysterical and personalized smear campaign and even 
when people were affected as railway clients, surveys stated that more than 
a half of the German people “understand” and “support” the strike activities 
of the GdL. But the widespread unwillingness to discuss the social 
degradation is still reflected in (even leftist) academic literature where this 
public support mostly appears as a sort of populist attraction,
33
 which 
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neglects the importance of the “new social question” as an outcome of 
competition-led fragmentation and social downgrading. 
 
The call for competitive solidarity – strengthening the German path of 
capitalism 
Both political elites and most academic observers create the picture of a 
need to strengthen and defend the traditionally good working German social 
partnership model (i.e., the DGB trade unions) against the particularism 
coming from the small professional unions.  
In fact, also in academic debates – as in the public – small trade unions are 
regularly reduced to professional associations. Their actions are portrayed as 
representing “aggressively […] their own [highly skilled] members outside 
established channels”34 and further trying “to poach in foreign terrains”.35 
Professionally oriented unions, in this conventional argument, follow an 
“exclusive understanding of solidarity”, whereas the big industrial 
federations represent the principle of inclusive or “universal” solidarity.36 In 
contrast to the big, DGB-affiliated trade unions, the “particularistic 
associations”37 ignore the wider social and economic context and the given 
constraints (the “objective analytical criterion”, as Jürgen Hoffmann and 
Rudi Schmidt put it).
38
 It is assumed that a certain “redistribution mass” 
(Verteilungsmasse) exists, which suggests that the “small” professional 
unions outside the DGB reduce the income level of employees as a whole.
39
 
Due to that, and because they can homogenize members’ demands much 
easier and translate them into radical requirements, above all better pay, 
they are perceived as a populist danger to both the inclusive big unions and 
the concerned companies.
40
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What we see here is an a priori understanding of universal solidarity as 
solidarity under given economic constraints. Particularism is assumed to 
question the so-called economic necessities (ökonomische Sachzwänge). 
The private interest in profits is regarded as the general interest (because it 
“creates” income and employment), and the goal is to strengthen 
competition-oriented social compromises. But unlike what is still celebrated 
as the well-functioning social model of German capitalism
41
, for the 
protagonists it is quite clear today that in an environment of harsh economic 
competition, concession bargaining is what is needed. The call for universal 
solidarity – in this framework – turns out to be a call for concessions in a 
highly fragmented, competitive economy and society. It aims to further 
political acceptance of measures like cost-cutting and deregulation, which 
are taken in order to strengthen competitiveness, not only at the national 
level, but on all scales of the firm and society.  
This is exactly what can be seen in current public debates, and also in the 
text of the reformed labour law. In the latter, the main focus is on 
“employees in key working positions”.42 The text makes clear that they have 
much power (due to their positions), and thus there is a risk of its “abuse”. – 
The argument goes that when “employees in key positions” bargain 
separately, this weakens the representation of all the others workers.
43
 But a 
closer glance shows that the concern is not about the separation of 
bargaining units, but about obstacles to flexible concession bargaining at the 
firm level (especially, as the text puts it, in “times of crisis”): 
Social partnership is of special importance in times of economic crisis –  
this is what the experiences have shown that have been made during the 
financial und Eurozone crisis. In such times, the social partners often have 
to find all-embracing compromises to maintain employment levels, which 
are, in the end, in the interests of all employees. The competition between 
diverging wage agreements can obstruct such all-embracing compromises.
44
  
                                                 
41
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42
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The argument is that “successful bargaining” could be disturbed by 
employees in key positions if they minimize the (given) scope for 
distribution (Verteilungsspielraum) at the firm level.
45
 The “firm-level 
community” would be weakened, and this would pose a threat to “industrial 
peace” or more precisely the “pacification function” of collective 
bargaining.
46
 Moreover, “The employer cannot rely any longer on the 
validity of a collective agreement and thus a relatively peaceful cooperation 
during its duration”; instead “he can be faced at any time with a multitude of 
further demands”.47  
In short, ‘bidding wars’ (Überbietungskonkurrenz) and the destabilisation of 
a peaceful procedure for the imposition of cuts are the main concerns. Anger 
within the “firm-level community” due to ongoing pressure from the 
employer’s side is not mentioned. Solidarity itself is based on the 
fundamental acceptance of a firm’s needs in the context of worldwide 
competition. Even more: solidarity as such is a priori defined as something 
to be situated within firms; there is no talk about broader social solidarity in 
society.  
Thus the political project behind the “Unity of Collective Bargaining” act 
aims to ensure a competitive social partnership model via eliminating those 
who question this path. Explicitly, the grand coalition aims to avoid 
‘bidding wars’ whereas dumping competition is not even mentioned, even if 
empirically it is much more important.
48
 The competitive social partnership 
model is presented as something successful, and in turn widespread 
precariousness, fragmentation and social suffering are neglected. Poverty, 
precarious working and living conditions, extreme flexibility of working 
time etc. do not appear as the systematic outcome of this model.
49
 Instead, 
small unions are accused of “egoistic” or “clientelistic” behaviour, which is 
said to attack a well-running system. This amounts to denying and 
neglecting not only the social reality, but also the behaviour of the train 
drivers’ trade union. The GdL was attacked heavily for professional 
clientelism, but for its part it wants to be recognized as a sector-wide union 
– contrary to bargaining only and separately for “employees in key 
positions”.  
                                                 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
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Herausforderung. Ein Beitrag zur Debatte um die Tarifeinheit”. Op. Cit. 
49
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Conclusion  
The irony is that the GdL indeed questioned de facto the inherent need for 
competitiveness, but not programmatically. Its resistance to the ruling bloc 
of employers, government and the big trade unions is heroic, and the 
possibility to bypass recently passed legislation (at least up to the year 2020) 
is historic. There is no doubt that the strong backing of the “small” trade 
union by the public has to be analysed as the expression of widespread 
suffering at work due to deregulation and strong social degradation. But 
until now there has been no attempt to expand this dynamic, to bring it 
together with other industrial conflicts, especially in the public sector, to 
argue for a social infrastructure in society or to enlarge the request for 
“dignity” at work. The latter is the slogan that had been put forward in both 
the railway conflict, but also, and even more loudly during a strike wave in 
the education and social work sector. For the moment, those kinds of efforts 
to push for a more general debate about any perspective of a wider social 
transformation with regard to social needs, living and working conditions or 
even questions of democracy are generally absent. Thus the neglect of the 
growing social crisis in Germany by the ruling bloc is not actually 
challenged and as a result the “mask of ‘success’” continues to function. 
From outside, but ironically also from within, Germany seems to combine 
successfully economic “strength” and social inclusion – a myth that puts the 
finger on questions about capitalist development as a whole.  
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Class coalitions or struggles within the working class? Social 
unrest in India and Brazil during the global crisis 
Jörg Nowak 
 
ntroduction  
In the past five to ten years many of the emerging economies experienced 
considerable social unrest – a fact that sits awkwardly with the success 
stories of rising powers from the global south that were promulgated by 
numerous social scientists, among them left-wing and progressive ones.
1
 In 
this text, I will look closely at the relationship between mass strikes and 
street protests and its implications for class politics, focussing on the recent 
protest movements in India and Brazil. Both countries are emerging global 
powers with high rates of economic growth that have experienced huge 
social protests in recent years. While the street protests in both countries 
attracted a lot of international attention, the mass strikes have only been 
covered in the national media. 
Two things are striking about my cases: first, they go against John Saul’s 
claim
2
 that whereas strikes are organised by the working class, street 
protests are forms of resistance used by precarious workers, the underclass 
and the lumpenproletariat. The working class was indeed responsible for 
organising mass strikes, which often included violent outbursts. However, 
more precarious strata were at their forefront. In contrast, the street protests, 
which were more ambivalent in a political sense, were carried 
                                                 
1
 SCHMALZ, Stefan; EBENAU, Matthias. Ebenau. “Brasilien, Indien und China: 
Unterschiedliche Transformationspfade in der Krise“. In: NÖLKE, Andreas; MAY, 
Christina; CLAAR, Simone (eds.). Die großen Schwellenländer. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 
2013, pp. 43-60; MAY, Christian. “Die Dissoziation der BRICs im finanzialisierten 
Kapitalismus“. Peripherie, n. 130/131, 33. Jg, 2013, p. 264. 
2
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afrikanischen Aussichten”. Peripherie. N. 136, 34. Jg., 2014, pp. 487-507. 
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predominantly by the middle classes.
3
 Second, my cases contradict the 
dominant descriptions of the recent protest movements by “progressive” 
intellectuals, who largely ignore the strike movements.
4
 In fact, there is a 
stark contrast between recent events and the period of the late 1960s. Then, 
middle-class students started protests, which were most marked in the US, 
Mexico, France, Germany and Italy. The working class followed suit in 
some countries with major strike movements, predominantly in France, 
Germany and Italy, but also in Portugal, Spain and Brazil. In the 2010s, this 
pattern was reversed: huge strike movements preceded street protests of the 
middle classes in Egypt, China/Hongkong as well as India and Brazil. It is 
only recently that accounts of the recent waves of protests have emerged 
that capture this dynamic.
5
 
My aim in this text is to establish the differences between strikes as working 
class protests and interclass street protests dominated by the middle class, in 
particular the diverging processes of organisation and politicisation 
connected to them. In contrast to authors like Saul,
6
 I do not intend to make 
a general trans-historical statement on which different groups and classes 
are using which means of political mobilisation.
7
 Instead, I discuss protest 
movements in a specific historical conjuncture in two countries in order to 
show that general and transhistorical assumptions about means of 
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4
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“Class, Crisis, and the 2011 Protest Wave. Cyclical and Secular Trends in Global Labour 
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(eds.). Overcoming Global Inequalities. London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 184-200. 
6
 SAUL, John S. “Neue Formen des Widerstands. Proletariat, Prekariat und die 
afrikanischen Aussichten“. Op. Cit. 
7
 South Africa is Saul’s country of reference. Obviously, certain groups of precarious 
workers in the country have recently been organising street protests while others took part 
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mobilisation do not hold. In other words, my analysis refers exclusively to 
two countries in a specific conjuncture. 
Nonetheless, this conjunctural analysis is based on certain non-conjunctural 
theoretical assumptions: in this respect, I distinguish between a structural 
class determination and classes as political forces.
8
 With reference to 
Becker, I contend that classes as structural formations can become the basis 
for classes as political forces, but that this is not always the case. Political 
articulations are determined by structurally inscribed class positions, but 
nonetheless they may constitute themselves as religious or cultural conflicts 
or may be over-determined by other processes of political formation. I agree 
with Erik Olin Wright that the largest part of waged workers belong to the 
working class, but that there are also middle classes existing alongside the 
bourgeoisie in the classical sense, which have a contradictory class position: 
the middle classes are not only composed by small entrepreneurs, but also 
different groups of white-collar workers and engineers with leading 
positions both in the private and the public sector.
9
  
The thesis put forward in this text is that the contradictory class position of 
the middle classes has an effect on their choice of forms of protest. Middle-
class protests are more short-lived, but often more visible than the protests 
of the working class. Importantly, the middle classes tend to sway between 
radical left and conservative political orientations – in often surprising 
twists and turns. Connected to this is an assertion that is backed up by the 
results of my fieldwork: the protests of the working classes appearing 
mainly in the form of strikes show a greater degree of consistency and 
coherence. The different characteristics of the forms of protest explain why 
working and middle classes find it hard to forge permanent political 
coalitions. 
In order to gather information on the mass strikes in India and Brazil, I 
started a research project in the summer of 2013. The information I found is 
from media reports, secondary literature, and political writings. 
Furthermore, I conducted 60 interviews in India between October 2013 and 
January 2014, and 75 interviews in Brazil between July and October 2014. 
In the following, I will first present a detailed overview on the strike and 
protest movements in each countries and describe their specific contexts. 
                                                 
8
 POULANTZAS, Nicos. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: New Left Books, 
1975; BECKER, Uwe. “Zum Status der Klassentheorie und der klassentheoretisch 
fundierten Politikanalyse – heute“ (1984). In: THIEN, Hans-Günter (Hg.). Klassen im 
Postfordismus, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2010, pp. 23-45. 
9
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After that, I will spell out the implications of my findings for class politics 
and class theory. 
 
India: Revolts in Automotive Factories and “India Against Corruption”  
Liberalisation and the rise of Hindu nationalism 
India has been witnessing a twin development since the early 1990s: in 1991 
the domestic market of India was opened, which led to processes of 
liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. Around the same time, the 
mass mobilisations of the Hindu nationalists began, predominantly 
organised by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP). These mobilisations escalated into the destruction of the 
Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya and the Mumbai riots in December 1992, 
in the course of which more than 2,000 people were killed. Thus, the 
economic liberalisation and the ascent of Hindu nationalism ran in parallel. 
The BJP won a considerable number of additional seats in the parliament 
during this period of community-level polarisation, jumping from 85 to 182 
seats (out of a total of 545) in the lower house (Lok Sabha) between 1989 to 
1998. In the same period, economic liberalisation was accompanied by 
considerable GDP growth, and the trade unions and the Indian left were 
weakened significantly. During the first government led by the BJP between 
1998 and 2004, the party refrained from triggering further religious 
polarisation; however, it continued to pursue an aggressive, neoliberal path 
of economic development. Its plan for a wide-ranging flexibilisation of the 
labour market caused a protest wave in 2003 that was the basis for the return 
of the Congress Party into national government in 2004, where it remained 
for the next ten years. On the whole, the Congress Party continued with 
employer-friendly politics. Nevertheless, it introduced social transfers for 
the rural population for the first time, most importantly the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA, 2005), which is supposed to 
guarantee a minimum wage and a form of limited unemployment insurance. 
The development of wages in India can be characterised by two 
contradictory tendencies: while the median income has been rising, 
inequality between different regional states as well as within regional states 
has been increasing massively since the year 2000. 
Between 2005 and 2009, widespread labour unrest occurred in factories in 
the industrial belt south of New Delhi, primarily in motorbike and 
automobile factories. In June 2011, protests against corruption and strikes at 
the biggest passenger car producer Maruti Suzuki were escalating at the 
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same time. The BJP won the national elections in spring 2014. The main 
causes of discontent with the Congress-led government were the economic 
recession in 2013, price hikes in electric energy and vegetables and new 
revelations concerning corruption. Today, the BJP holds 281 seats in the 
lower house, which represents, for the first time in the history of India, an 
absolute majority for this party at the national level. Over the medium term, 
the increasing flexibilisation of the labour market appears to have concurred 
with the ascent of the BJP, which displays an image of a right-wing, 
religious and market-friendly party.  
 
Revolts in car factories 
During recent years, employment of contract labour has become a 
contentious issue and a key reason for the increasing labour unrest. While 
strikes and protests are common global phenomena but violence and 
killing is not at all justifiable under any circumstances as it is a pure case 
of disruption of law and order situation. This surge in violence disturbing 
industrial relations has become a concerning situation for all. 
All India Organisation of Employers, November 2012 
 
The automotive industry in India saw a rapid development in the 2000s: 
production rose from 1.3 to 4.1 million cars per year between 2001 and 
2012.
10
 Today, India is the sixth biggest producer of passenger cars and 
utility vehicles worldwide. Moreover, the country is in second position after 
China in the production of motorcycles, with an output of 14 million bikes 
per year. During the period in which the production of passenger cars 
quadrupled, the medium real wage in the industry decreased by about 25 per 
cent.
11
  
What had happened? The restructuring in the Maruti company explains the 
process behind it: India’s biggest producer of passenger cars, Maruti Suzuki, 
had been a joint venture between the Indian government and the Japanese 
multinational corporation Suzuki; since 2007, it has been under majority 
                                                 
10
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control of the Suzuki Motor Corporation. In 2000-1, there was a conflict at 
Maruti Suzuki in its sole factory at that time, which was located in Gurgaon 
south of New Delhi. This conflict set the future path of the industry. Several 
thousand workers were offered a “voluntary” retirement scheme – to which 
they reacted over several months with strikes and assemblies in front of the 
factory. In the end, the corporation prevailed and installed a subservient 
trade union in the factory, so that the number of contract workers rose 
rapidly.
12
 This model of labour relations was established throughout the 
industry in the course of the 2000s. Today, permanent workers in the 
automotive industry represent about 30 to 50 per cent of the workforce; in 
ancillary industries, the number is only 3 to 5 per cent. In 2005, the first big 
conflict of a new cycle of struggles occurred in the factory of Honda 
Motorcycles (HMSI) in Manesar, a new industrial area at that time. This 
strike was supported both by permanent and contract workers; however, it 
ended with wage hikes for permanent workers while contract workers did 
not see a betterment of their conditions. In the period between 2005 and 
2009, the initiative of the contract workers proved decisive for strike 
movements, and the division between contract and permanent workers 
remained quite effective. This situation emerged in a de facto alliance of 
management, traditional trade unions and permanent workers. It was the 
strike at Maruti Suzuki in 2011 that disrupted this pattern of conflict. 
The labour unrest that has been taking place at Maruti Suzuki since 2011 is 
widely regarded as the peak of industrial militancy in the car industry, but it 
was accompanied by other confrontations elsewhere. In 2007, production 
started in a second Maruti factory, which was located in the Industrial 
Model Town (IMT) Manesar. In this factory, workers were younger than in 
the mother plant, and 70 per cent were contract workers, trainees or 
apprentices – all in all, 4,000 workers who are all male. The wage difference 
between permanent and contract workers was narrower than in other 
factories: in 2011, contract workers earned around 6,000 Rupees a month 
(85 Euros), and permanent workers 12-14,000 Rupees (170 to 200 Euros). 
There was wide-spread discontent among workers due to the high work 
speed in full automatic production (a car leaves the assembly line every 45 
seconds) and health problems caused by a lack of adequate breaks. They 
founded a new trade union, the Maruti Suzuki Employees Union (MSEU). 
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Importantly, the registration of a new union in the regional state of Haryana 
requires approval by management (as an informal rule) – despite the fact 
that this is illegal. Furthermore, permanent and contract workers are not 
allowed to be members of the same trade union, due to the Trade Union Act. 
If the contract workers form a separate union, they will only be able to 
negotiate with their contractor, not with the principal employer. 
In this situation, the bosses of Maruti Suzuki tried to force the workers to 
become members of a puppet union called Maruti Udyog Kamgar Union 
(MUKU) that had been installed in the first plant in Gurgaon. As a reaction, 
3,000 workers went on strike on 4 June 2011. Notably, the strike was a joint 
action of contract and permanent workers, although the conflict was about 
the union of permanent workers that contract workers could not join. Part of 
it was the occupation of the factory. On 17 June, the factory occupation 
ended with a compromise, and the management assured the workers that 
their trade union could be registered.  
However, in early October 2011, a second occupation took place when more 
than 1,100 contract workers were locked out. This time, the permanent 
workers fought for the contract workers. Workers also occupied three other 
Suzuki factories located nearby. At around 15 suppliers, workers joined the 
strike for two days. In order to avoid violent confrontations, the workers left 
the factories after two weeks, but continued with their strike in four factories 
until 21 October. While a second agreement with management was 
negotiated, the leadership of MSEU was bought out under the threat of 
prison charges. 
Finally, in March 2012, it was possible to register the new union, which was 
called Maruti Suzuki Workers Union (MSWU). Negotiations between the 
MSWU and management followed, but were broken off on 14 July because 
the employers refused to make concessions. A fight between a foreman and 
a worker over break times triggered an uprising in the factory, which left 
more than 50 managers hospitalised. Furthermore, parts of the factory were 
set on fire, and one manager died in the flames. 
After the confrontation, the factory remained closed for a month, and 
management dismissed 1,800 contract and 500 permanent workers in an 
arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, the police arrested 147 workers, some of 
whom were on holidays or were off sick on the day of the uprising. All 
these 147 workers including the union leadership were under arrest until 
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spring 2015, for almost three years. Until January 2016, 35 workers 
remained in jail.
13
  
After the Manesar plant reopened, the wages of permanent workers were 
increased significantly – to around 30,000 Rupees. The bulk of contract 
workers is no longer employed with one of the 60 sub-contractors that used 
to operate at the plant, but with Maruti. Their wages have risen to 12,000 
Rupees. Importantly, the difference between the wages of the two groups 
has grown considerably. It seems that the management aims for a closer 
relationship with permanent workers. 
The conflicts that occurred at Maruti Suzuki reveal a transformation of 
working-class struggles in the industrial belt around New Delhi. The 
workers understood that only a common resistance of contract and 
permanent workers could lead to success, and that occupations exert more 
pressure than strikes in front of factory gates: 
It was a constant class war. Permanent workers were an organised force 
but the contract workers always remain insecure about their job. And the 
management tried very hard to intimidate a section of contract workers 
using all sorts of tricks. But the uniqueness of the Maruti Suzuki struggle 
was that we could strike a unity between contract workers and permanent 
workers. That scared the management because this practice is all over 
India. They divide the contract and permanent workers. So there is an 
emerging unity between contract and permanent workers, it is a sign of 
upcoming danger for capitalists.
14
 
In addition, the workers were able to build networks with workers from 
other factories that often formed part of the same supply chain. However, 
they did not succeed in mobilising workers at the second plant in Gurgaon. 
Furthermore, the MSWU remained under the influence of more established 
unions like AITUC during the occupations in 2011: 
None of the trade unions helped us fully. They supported us half-
heartedly. They just kept assuring us of help but practically did 
nothing”.17  
Maruti union was an independent union but we didn’t have any 
experience of trade union activities. Initially we didn’t know the character 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed analysis for the conflicts at Maruti Suzuki, see NOWAK, Jörg. “Strikes and 
Labour Unrest in the Automobile industry in India - the case of Maruti Suzuki India 
Limited”. WorkingUSA. Vol. 19, N. 4, 2016, in print. 
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of these big trade unions like HMS and AITUC. They supported us and 
we too accepted their support. But later on there were some compromises 
with the company and they were handled by these unions. Later on we 
could see the double game of these unions. (...) We think an independent 
union is fine. (...) It is better to remain independent.
18
 
Eventually, the MSWU became more and more independent from the 
central trade union federations and increasingly favoured broad coalitions. It 
has good links to company unions in Gurgaon, but also to intellectuals like 
Arundhati Roy and to other social movement actors like radical student 
groups, Maoist organisations and parties, Bolshevist trade unions of rural 
workers, etc. The union managed to instigate the creation of networks all 
over the Indian subcontinent: in the course of 2013, two national days of 
action for the Maruti workers were held in more than 20 cities. All in all, the 
union pursues a social movement unionism strategy that does not fit into the 
established patterns focussing solely on negotiations with management. The 
success of this political approach to mobilisation is also reflected in the 
results of the union elections that took place at the two Maruti plants in 
April 2014: the MSWU received the absolute majority of votes in both 
factories, and gained 11 out of 12 seats on the workers’ committee in 
Manesar, and five out of six seats of union representatives at the other 
factory in Gurgaon. 
After the uprising at Maruti Suzuki, other mobilisations in the sector 
followed: in the summer of 2013, the second biggest motorbike producer in 
India, Bajaj Auto, saw a 50-day strike in Pune. In the spring of 2014, Toyota 
Kirloskar, which is located close to Bangalore, experienced a one-month 
strike. However, in neither case, the workers made real gains. Two longer 
occupations in the industrial belt of New Delhi occurred, one in three 
factories of Napino Auto ended with a wage agreement, and another at 
Shiram Pistons & Rings in April and May 2014 ended with police 
interventions and mass arrests. New protests of contract workers at Maruti 
Suzuki in Manesar flared up in September 2015. All in all, workers have 
only achieved small improvements. Given a food price inflation of 20 per 
cent and an official rate of inflation of about 6.5 per cent from 2011 
onwards, the wage hikes at Maruti for contract workers translate into a 
modest increase of real wages, but not into a qualitative leap. In contrast, the 
new forms of cooperation of workers across different companies and union 
federations can be regarded as a leap at the organisational level. 
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In conclusion, the driving force of strikes since the mid-2000s have been 
contract workers who cannot be represented by unions of permanent 
workers because of the Indian system of industrial relations, which 
reinforces existing divisions in the workforce. It was predominantly the 
strikes in the automobile sector that became an object of public debate due 
to massive police interventions and violent protests of workers. The political 
significance of labour unrest increased with the strike at Maruti thanks to it 
being a multinational enterprise and the biggest passenger producer 
nationwide. The arbitrary arrests by police and the inaction of labour courts 
were discussed in mainstream newspapers, which highlighted the fact that 
the law was bent in favour of the employers in the wake of the conflicts at 
Maruti Suzuki. 
 
‘India against Corruption’ and a new political party 
In November and December 2010, a number of corruption scandals roused 
the public: the irregular access of military veterans to housing (the “Adarsh 
Housing Society scam”), the irregular access of wealthy individuals to real 
estate credit and faked auctions of mobile communication licenses (the “2G 
spectrum scam”). In late December 2010, 20,000 people demonstrated in 
New Delhi against corruption. A month later, protests against corruption 
took place in 52 Indian cities, and in mid-January 2011 top managers like 
Keshub Mahindra voiced their disapproval of corruption in an open letter. 
On 27 February 2011, 100,000 people gathered for a protest in New Delhi. 
The most prominent leader of the movement, Anna Hazare, had been 
fighting against corruption in Maharashtra since the 1990s, initially 
targeting the right-wing parties Shiv Sena and BJP in 1997-8 and later 
conducting a death fast against the centre-left Nationalist Congress Party, a 
split-off from Congress. In 2011, Hazare voiced his support for the 
presidential candidate of the BJP, Narendra Modi, but later withdrew it. His 
tactics resemble those of his idol Mahatma Gandhi, but have been criticised 
frequently by Dalits and leftists for their association with “upper caste 
Hindu values” and the urban middle class.19 
In April 2011, Hazare staged a public hunger strike in the centre of New 
Delhi and demanded a Jan Lokpal Bill – a law that establishes a control 
commission monitoring corruption, composed of government and civil 
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society representatives. Support for the movement came both from the BJP 
and from left parties, but for Hazare the distance from all political parties 
was an integral part of his protest. Soon after, the Congress Party gave in 
and integrated five leaders of the movement into a committee tasked with 
discussing the implementation of a Jan Lokpal Bill, among them Hazare and 
Arvind Kerjriwal. 
In early June 2011, another important leader of anti-corruption protests, the 
TV yoga teacher Baba Ramdev, invited people to join a 40-day protest in 
Ramlila Square in New Delhi. He demanded a confiscation of black money 
of Indian companies that are allegedly deposited in bank accounts in 
Switzerland. On 4 June, the day when Maruti workers occupied their factory 
in Manesar for the first time, 65,000 of his supporters filled the square and 
erected a camp. On the following night, 10,000 policemen with teargas and 
batons attacked the protesters at 1am. All political parties except for the 
Congress Party protested against the violent suppression of the protests. In 
2014, Ramdev voiced his support for Modi, the BJP candidate. 
In December 2011, a watered-down version of the Jan Lokpal Bill passed 
the lower house of parliament. A revival of the protests in spring 2012 
against it failed, and in late 2012 Kerjriwal parted ways with Hazare to 
found the Aam Admi Party (AAP, the party of the common man).  
Kerjriwal and others tried to transform the support for the movement into a 
permanent political force with the new party. In December 2013, the AAP 
reached second place in the New Delhi state elections with 28 out of 70 
seats. It received a large number of votes from middle-class and poor 
neighbourhoods alike. Contrary to a previous announcement of non-
cooperation with established parties, the AAP formed a coalition with 
Congress. When AAP tried to pass a Jan Lokpal Bill in the regional 
parliament, BJP and Congress denied approval. Because of this failure to 
implement the bill, the AAP left the government after only 49 days. The 
quick retreat from power has been widely regarded as a tactical move ahead 
of national elections. But AAP only managed to win four seats in the lower 
house in the national elections, and thus failed to achieve its goals. 
The first climax of the anti-corruption movement coincided by chance with 
the factory occupation of the Maruti workers, but the connection between 
both movements remained vague. It was a weakness of the anti-corruption 
movement that it did not succeed to develop a political agenda beyond the 
demand for a Jan Lokpal bill. The AAP also encountered difficulties with 
creating a clear-cut political identity and proved unable to capitalise on the 
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wave of sympathy that had carried them to office in December 2013. 
Nonetheless, the AAP reorganised itself in 2014 and won a landslide victory 
in new elections for the city of New Delhi in February 2015, gaining 67 of 
70 seats. 
The anti-corruption movement had been an interclass movement from the 
start, receiving support both from influential CEOs, the middle classes and 
the poor. Its ideology and its leaders represented the moral values of the 
new middle class whose economic base is in the private sector – in contrast 
to the old middle class, which is tied to the public sector.
20
 The attitude of 
Hazare, its most prominent leader, to reject political parties altogether, 
resembled the “anti-political” political forces that have gained influence in 
several European countries in the wake of the economic crisis, such as the 
Pirate Party in Germany or the Five Stars Movement in Italy. The party 
political arm of the movement avoided positioning itself along the left-right 
axis – presumably out of fear of losing the image of a novel force in politics. 
 
Factory struggles and India Against Corruption – relationship of a non-
relation 
It was purely by chance that the conflict around the Manesar factory of 
Maruti Suzuki occurred at around the same time as one of the huge 
mobilisations against corruption. Both protest movements remained largely 
unconnected; however, after the uprising in 2012, some of the leaders of 
“India against Corruption” and high party officials of the AAP expressed 
their solidarity with the Maruti workers.
21
  
The working-class struggles that preceded the street protests reflected, to a 
large degree, the interests of the contract workers, who can only afford basic 
amenities that do not include regular access to water or electricity.
22
 The 
common interests of permanent and contract workers emerged from the 
shared experiences on the shop floor – the lack of proper breaks and a high 
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work speed.
23
 Even in cases of bereavement or weddings, the workers did 
not get any leave without losing a significant share of their wage. The 
contacts between the different groups of workers did not only intensify at 
work, but also in the neighbourhoods and while they were commuting on 
the transport provided by the employer. Since the presence of traditional 
left-wing parties such as the Communist Party of India and the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in urban life has been dwindling in recent 
years and the party leaderships are over-aged, a situation emerged in which 
working-class movements operated in a political vacuum. The militant 
workers did not build a platform representing their interests at the political 
level. But the anti-corruption movement reflected the popular anger that had 
built up with the strikes, and as with other strata of society acted as a 
platform for integrating working-class interests due to the absence of other 
alternatives. Nonetheless, the practical relationship between the strikes and 
the anti-corruption movement remained vague – despite the fact that 
workers share sympathy for some of the leaders of this movement like 
Hazare. 
There is a stark contrast between the medium-term mobilisation and 
organisational formation of the industrial workers during the last decade and 
the rapid surge and decline of the protests of the anti-corruption movement, 
which is based on parts of the middle classes, the urban poor and the 
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bourgeoisie. The anti-corruption movement emerged out of protests against the 
illegitimate access of party or corporate elites to various forms of resources. It 
was at times articulated with a pro-poor agenda, for example when the AAP 
demanded cuts to energy and water prices. At the same time, the AAP 
responded to demands to implement one of its manifesto pledges, that is, the 
abolition of contract labour, with repression. This was the case both when a bus 
drivers’ strike took place in January 2014, and when the contract workers in the 
Delhi Metro mobilised in the spring of 2015. Some commentators saw the anti-
corruption campaign as a struggle within the middle class: the new corporate 
middle class mobilised (or was mobilised by CEOs) against the old “corrupt” 
middle class in the public sector. Thus, the movement can also be seen as a 
warning given by new corporate elites to established state elites to follow their 
course, since big corporations have not been at the centre of the corruption 
scandals that were targeted by the movement. 
With the consolidation of the AAP in 2015, the anti-corruption movement 
has established a political platform, but it also revealed its limits in terms of 
its preparedness to change labour relations. At the same time, the unrest in 
factories in the Delhi area has continued. A proper political formation of 
workers is not yet in sight, although advances in the organisation and 
coordination of workers have been achieved. 
 
Brazil: Mass strikes at construction sites and street protests against 
ticket fare hikes 
The Lula and Dilma Presidencies 
The presidencies of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, both 
from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT), seemed to be 
amazingly successful, combining economic growth with an expansion of 
social security: extreme poverty decreased from 36 to 16 per cent between 
2003 and 2012, the median income rose, the minimum wage saw 
considerable increases, informal employment went down in favour of 
regular jobs, and unemployment decreased to six per cent.
24
 But since the 
onset of the global crisis, economic growth in Brazil plunged and has yet to 
pick up again. Since 2010, the growth rate has remained significantly lower 
than in other emerging economies, reaching only 0.2 per cent in 2014. Since 
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the end of Lula’s presidency, there is a double movement away from the PT: 
both employers and workers are more sceptical towards the government. 
When Dilma Rousseff entered the presidency, growth numbers were already 
quite low, and those parts of the middle class that had been a traditional base 
for the PT began to distance themselves from the party.
25
 The traditional 
hatred of the middle class towards the poor saw a comeback since domestic 
employees started to expect higher wages, and the new lower middle class 
entered social locations that had been the exclusive domain of the old 
middle classes – expensive restaurants, airports, luxury goods shops, etc. 
The strike wave since spring 2011 allowed for an increased visibility of the 
radicalisation of the low waged sections of the working class. The PT 
government found itself in a sandwich position between the new demands of 
workers and the waning support of the middle classes. After Dilma Rousseff 
won the presidency in the autumn of 2014 with a close vote, right-wing forces 
started demonstrations demanding a coup d’état by the military, and these 
demonstrations became mass protests in 2015 that focused on the corruption at 
the state-owned oil company Petrobras and on opposition to the president. 
It was and is a constant problem of the PT that it has remained far from 
obtaining a majority in the lower and the upper house. As a result, it has 
entered into coalitions with parties that stem from the old clientelist elite 
and usually does not hold more than a third of the seats in parliament that 
these coalitions possess overall. In light of this, it is grossly misleading to 
refer to the Lula and Rousseff governments as “PT governments”. The PT is 
forced to make compromises that diminish its popularity among the 
subaltern classes. 
 
Mass strikes of construction workers and urban employees 
One of the central objectives of the Lula and Rousseff governments has 
been the industrialisation of the north and northeast of the country, where 
the medium income is about a third of that in the economic centres of Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo. The migration of workers from the northeast to the 
southeast has been a dominant pattern of internal migration in the past, 
which also drove the strikes of metal workers in 1978 to 1980 in the region 
of São Paulo. These strikes established Lula as a political leader, and 
provided the basis for the emergence of the PT in 1980 and the trade union 
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federation CUT in 1983. Importantly, they showed that there are limitations 
to the control of the military dictatorship over civil society.
26
 The practical 
basis for the industrialisation of the northern regions is the programme for 
an acceleration of growth, Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, 
(PAC). PAC started in 2007, and continued with PAC 2 in 2010. PAC 1 
consisted of an investment of 150 billion Euros between 2007 and 2010, 
about half of it for energy infrastructure; PAC 2 has a volume of 500 billion 
Euros. The bulk of the funding comes from state companies like Petrobras 
and the Brazilian development bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Económico e Social (BNDES). The PAC programme includes the 
construction of hydroelectric plants, refineries, steel plants, petrochemical 
complexes as well as traffic infrastructure like highways and railway lines. 
The mass strikes since 2011 occurred to a large extent at the PAC 
construction sites, most of which were run by multinational Brazilian 
construction companies like Odebrecht, Camargo Correa and Andrade 
Gutierrez. In February 2011, a strike wave at smaller construction sites in 
the state of Bahia occurred in which 80,000 workers participated. In mid-
march, the strike wave moved to the PAC construction site in Pecém close 
to Fortaleza in the state of Ceará. Many workers from Bahia were employed 
at this site. In 2009, a consortium comprising the Italian company Maire 
Tecnimont and the Portuguese company Efacec had started constructing a 
thermoelectric plant for the energy companies EDP (Portugal) and MPX 
(Brazilian, but with a significant stake of the German energy company, 
E.ON). 6,000 construction workers organised the strike without the 
involvement of trade unions and set parts of their dormitories on fire. After 
a few days, the strike extended to the construction site of Jirau, 3,800 
kilometres away from Pecém. In Jirau, in the state of Rodônia, 20,000 
workers were building a hydroelectric plant. The strike there became a 
landmark for Brazilian industrial unrest since the fierceness of the riots and 
the level of property destruction were exceptional, and the government 
immediately resorted to tasking the National Guard (Força Nacional) with 
the suppression of the strike. Shortly after, the strike wave reached nearby 
Santo Antonio, where 15,000 workers constructed another hydroelectric 
plant, and two construction sites for a petrochemical complex in Suape close 
to Recife. There, 35,000 workers struck. Some of them set on fire large parts 
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of the infrastructure, and the government also ordered the National Guard to 
intervene. During February and March 2011, 180,000 construction workers 
were on strike. In the entire year of 2011, the number was 580,000 strikers. 
In all of 2012, 500,000 people participated in stoppages. 
The rapid geographical expansion of the strikes without any central 
organisation can be explained, on the one hand, by the importance of 
migrant work in the construction sector: most workers are employed on a 
project basis; thus, construction workers travel across the country and 
acquire trans-regional contacts. On the other hand, communication with 
mobile phones and social networks has facilitated the activation of these 
contacts to a considerable extent. The problems, demands and patterns of 
protest of workers at different construction sites resembled one another: bad 
food that led to food poisoning, inadequate housing conditions, poor or non-
existent transport facilities, low wages and spatial isolation due to work in 
sparsely populated areas and rigid holiday regulations. The patterns of 
protest, for example in Suape in August 2012 and in Belo Monte in 
November 2012, consisted in considerable damage to property, and in 
pelting stones at trade union officials and management. These patterns of 
protest have remained unmodified since the 1980s. They are about the 
conditions of work and the responses of the state, which consist in the quick 
intervention of the military or other special forces.
27
 But there are also 
historical novelties: the number of strikes in the construction sector is much 
higher than in the 1980s, and the strikes taking place since 2011 were based 
on simultaneous activities in several regional states. 
More construction sites – like the biggest single construction site for a 
hydroelectric plant and dam construction in Brazil at Belo Monte with 
35,000 workers (September 2014) – were affected by the strike wave in 
2012. In Belo Monte, the striking workers formed alliances with the 
manifold social movements opposed to the construction of the dam. These 
movements have been mobilising since the 1980s and are composed of 
indigenous peoples, fishers and women, ecologists and other social groups 
affected by the construction.
28 
In order to increase the pressure against this 
alliance, the federal government installed a permanent squad of 500 soldiers 
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of the National Guard at the construction site in the summer of 2012. This 
was made possible by a special decree by President Rousseff. The squad had 
an official order to protect the construction site against actions of social 
movements opposed to the dam, but it was also used to suppress strikes.
 29 
Belo Monte became the third big focus of militant strikes at construction 
sites alongside Suape and Jirau.  
In 2014, the construction site of the petrochemical complex COMPERJ in 
the state of Rio de Janeiro entered the scene – private security guards had 
shot at striking workers – and a new construction site in Pecém also became 
a conflict zone: the South Korean steel giant POSCO used strike breakers in 
response to a 35-day stoppage of workers demanding wage rises. As a 
result, scuffles with striking workers broke out, and the strikers burned two 
company cars and a vehicle of the military police.
 30
 The military police 
arrested 68 workers.
31
  
The strikes at the construction sites were without doubt the most severe 
labour conflicts in Brazil in the past years – due to the large number of 
participating workers at the construction sites, the rank-and-file character of 
the strike movements and the militant forms of struggle. All in all, those 
years saw an increase in the total number of strikers compared with the 
years before 2010, but the biggest total number of strikers came from the 
public sector. The public sector strikes remained less visible than the strikes 
in construction – the exception being the national public sector strike in 
August 2012. After the protest movement in the summer of 2013, bigger 
strikes occurred in the urban centres, in many cases opposed to the 
established trade unions: among them were the strike of the teachers in Rio 
de Janeiro and the protests of oil industry workers, which both took place in 
the autumn 2013, as well as the strike wave of bus drivers in Rio de Janeiro, 
Sao Paulo, Recife, Belém and Fortaleza during 2014. The strike of the street 
sweepers in Rio de Janeiro during the Carnival of 2014 received special 
attention and a wave of sympathy from the broader population. In 2015, 
recurrent strikes in automobile factories against dismissals, long strikes of 
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school and university teachers and a strike at the state company Petrobras 
against casualisation and the privatisation of the company took place. 
The strikes of the construction workers have been a quite consistent and 
sustainable movement over the course of several years. They are led by 
strata of the working class that were excluded from the social mobility 
experienced by other strata in the 2000s. The fact that most of the 
construction sites connected to the PAC programme were public projects in 
which the government agencies did not enforce legal provisions for secure 
working conditions nor take adequate care of social and technical 
infrastructure in settlements close to construction sites created outrage 
among the workers. Villages like Pecém that had been inhabited by a few 
thousand people until recently were suddenly faced with the doubling of the 
number of inhabitants without additional means of transport, medical 
assistance, financial services, etc. In light of this, the workers saw many of 
these conflicts, to some extent, as conflicts with the state.
32
 In Pecém, it was 
obvious that state institutions did not intervene into the illegal employment 
of hundreds of Korean strikebreakers
33
 but they did intervene immediately 
when the workers downed the tools. 
As a result of the strikes in the construction sector, there were several 
rounds of wage hikes above inflation and improvements to the 
infrastructure, predominantly in the areas of transport, accommodation, 
holiday regulations and lodging. Concerning the forms of organisations of 
workers, it is significant that no major network of workers emerged from the 
strikes beyond the existing trade union federations, Força Sindical and 
CUT. The Trotskyite trade union federation Conlutas supported the strikes 
in a conspiratorial manner, but only at some of the construction sites.
34
 The 
lack of self-organisation of workers in the form of visible organisations is 
connected to the overall marginalisation of construction workers (reflected 
in low levels of education, etc.) but also to the short-term perspectives of 
workers due to the migrant nature of construction work.  
Nonetheless, it is a new and remarkable phenomenon that construction 
workers – who are seen as non-qualified workers by the public – were able 
to launch a sustained wave of strikes over a number of years without any 
formal frame of organisation. Thus, the construction workers became a 
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reference for workers in other sectors. The tense relationship that the 
striking workers maintained with the PT as the main government party hints 
at the inherent contradictions of the political project pursued by the Lula and 
Dilma presidencies since 2003. The industrialisation of new parts of the 
country is supposed to generate more material well-being overall, but it is 
replicating the uneven forms of development dominant in the country with 
adverse working conditions and low wages for the construction workers 
who erect the industrial complexes. 
 
The street protests in the summer of 2013 – Fare hikes and police violence 
The PT-led government soon found itself in a sandwich position – between 
the protests from below and a middle class that increasingly revived its old 
class prejudice. This constellation of forces left its imprint on the street 
protests that began in June 2013. The left-wing movement in favour of free 
public transport led by anarchist and student activists had been attacked 
massively by police forces at a rather small demonstration in São Paulo. 
This led to outrage and solidarity from other social groups. A key role for 
the dissemination of these protests was played by the right-wing mainstream 
media that entertained a hostile stance towards the government. Thus, the 
significance of the street protests grew due to an informal alliance between 
left-wing activists and right-wing media. But the demands that dominated 
the protests had been the classical repertoire of the Brazilian left: better 
funding for public education and health services, and a cheaper and more 
integrated public transport infrastructure.
35
 The street protests expanded 
rapidly all over Brazil. In some places, the PT and other left parties 
participated in their organisation; in others the protests were mainly 
organized by anarchist groups. After one week, the demands of the protests 
were subject to change and the issue of corruption took centre stage. In Rio 
de Janeiro and São Paulo, members of traditional left organisations were 
violently attacked during this second phase of the protests, both by right-
wing forces and by anarchists. Elisio Estanque emphasises that the 
participation of well-educated people from rich neighbourhoods was 
growing in São Paulo when the demonstrations got bigger
36
; it was also 
during this period that the attacks against left-wing protesters occurred. The 
                                                 
35
 GOHN, Maria da Glória. “A Sociedade Brasileira em Movimento: vozes das ruas e seus 
ecos políticos e sociais”. Caderno CRH. Vol. 27, n. 71, 2014, pp. 431, 433.  
36
 ESTANQUE, Elisio. “Rebeliões de classe média? Precariedade e movimentos sociais em 
Portugal e no Brasil (2011­2013)”. Op. Cit. p. 71. 
Class Coalitions or struggles within the working class? 
 
91 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
social composition of the demonstrators in São Paulo mirrored those across 
the country. According to several surveys,
37
 the participants in the 
demonstrations were disproportionately well-educated compared to the 
overall Brazilian population.  
Notably, the anarchist activists perceived the PT and the other left-wing 
parties as their “main enemies”.38 Nevertheless, all the existing political 
currents from left to right tried to benefit from the protest movement, even 
the government. President Rousseff and the PT attempted to embrace and 
suffocate the movement. Both the small, Trotskyite parties PSOL and PSTU 
and the right-wing opposition voiced their support. The anarchists tried in 
vain to maintain the upper hand in the movement. Traditional popular 
organisations like the landless workers’ movement (Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, MST) and the homeless workers’ 
movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto, MTST) represented 
the core organisers of demonstrations in many cities. Later in 2013, the 
protests were directed against the Confederations Cup, which preceded the 
football World Cup held in 2014. The World Cup was a symbol for the 
alliance of the left party PT with the old elite because the World Cup 
construction projects (which had also been part of PAC) were profit 
machines for the sizeable Brazilian construction companies that had 
emerged during the military dictatorship. The World Cup was also the 
reason why new roads were built and slums were cleared. 
Brazil saw a broad debate about the existence of a new middle class due to 
the rising income of a sizeable part of the working class.
39
 Estanque regards 
the protests in the summer of 2013 as an encounter of middle class and 
working class people who all tend to see themselves as part of the middle 
classes due to similar levels of consumption – despite the fact that the living 
conditions of working class people in terms of their continuous access to 
median-level incomes are more unstable due to short-term labour 
contracts.
40
 He highlights that the enormous fragmentation of the working 
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class, “fruit of the metabolism of global capitalism”41, was reflected in the 
fragmentation of the mass movement that had emerged: for Estanque
42
 the 
various elements of this movement were only able to forge precarious, 
temporary, and partly non-existing alliances. During a teachers’ strike in 
Rio de Janeiro in September 2013, which was directed against a 
conservative governor, new modes of action such as black bloc tactics
43
 
were employed, for the first time, in a sectoral labour conflict. This 
contributed significantly to the visibility of the strike. Similar alliances 
emerged, for example, during the strike of street sweepers in Rio de Janeiro 
in February 2014 and during the metro drivers’ strike in June 2014. 
The street protests articulated a lack of satisfaction with the government. It 
had achieved improvements for the poorest strata of society since 2003. 
However, it did not address the elite dominance of national politics and did 
not manage to trigger a more profound transformation of property and 
power relations. The alliance of the PT with big capital created crucial 
strategic constraints – and the problems in public transport were a symptom 
of more profound problems: the rise of medium wages led to an increase 
and partial collapse of individual car traffic because more people were able 
to afford passenger cars. In big cities like São Paulo, the poorer inhabitants 
are more dependent on public buses since their neighbourhoods are not 
connected to the underground or to suburban trains – which means they 
suffer most from an increase of individual traffic. A lack of investment and 
delays in the construction of public train systems led to long commutes in 
most major cities. The younger generation has grown up with the PT-led 
governments. It has pushed forward new demands that go beyond the 
eradication of absolute poverty. Faced with meagre economic growth and 
the questionable compromises of the Lula and Dilma governments, they 
have been driven by the dissatisfaction that a further improvement to the 
conditions of everyday life seems out of reach. 
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The interaction between the strikes and the street protests 
In Brazil, the two forms of protest, street protests and mass strikes, were 
articulated more closely than in India. During the protests against the 
Confederations Cup in summer 2013, the World Cup became a symbol of 
both the adverse working conditions that led to many deaths of workers and 
of the “wrong” priorities of development projects pursued by the 
government. Labour issues were not openly discussed by the demonstrators, 
but the public welfare system was a central issue. While the social 
composition of the two protest movements differed to a large extent, and 
there were few immediate references to the other side, a common direction 
seemed to emerge between September 2013 and June 2014 when the strike 
movements and street protests came together in some of the major cities, 
most visibly in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. But in the months after 
Rousseff won the presidential elections in October 2014, it was mainly the 
right-wing opposition that benefitted from the momentum of the protests. It 
was able to launch a conservative protest movement against Rousseff that 
peaked in March and April 2015. While the “Fora Dilma” protests 
dominated the Brazilian mass media (which is quite selective in its 
coverage), it was the series of strikes in automobile factories, educational 
institutions, banks and the state company Petrobras that triggered a strike 
movement that was more stable than the conservative protests. The strikes 
escalated when 15,000 automobile workers of Volkswagen blocked the 
central highway in the industrial hub close to São Paulo in January 2015 
(which led to their demands being met), and when striking teachers in the 
state of Paraná were attacked by police forces with teargas and water 
cannons in April 2015. In September and October 2015, various street 
protests were held against the austerity programme of the government, 
mainly led by the MST, the MTST, the CUT and by striking teachers. Thus, 
one could say that one current of the 2013 street protests joined the 
conservative movement while another current united with the strike 
movements and established an “anti-austerity” front. In contrast to India 
where the street protests led to the creation of a liberal left party, the mixed 
composition of the street protests in 2013 ended in a polarisation into two 
camps, one of which established links with the strike movements. The 
“progressive” wing achieved sustained mobilisation in Brazil in 2015, but 
was not able to dominate the national political scene in the same way that 
the 2013 movement had. Currently, there is a stalemate between the two 
camps. Importantly, the conservative wing is backed by a larger number of 
politicians and the powerful elite, which controls vast amounts of wealth, 
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has considerable political influence and owns most of the productive assets 
in the country. 
 
Conclusion: India and Brazil – Similar patterns of organisation, 
different political contexts 
In India and Brazil, the sequence and social composition of the protests 
show some resemblances: the street protests witnessed a strong participation 
of the middle classes. They were preceded by long-lasting strike movements 
of industrial workers. It can be assumed that the social movements emerging 
in the workplace during strikes resonated with the middle classes who 
voiced their dissent in street protests that are ambiguous politically. The 
recurring claim that precarious sections of the working classes organise in 
street protests
44
 does not hold in the two cases examined: they were the 
driving forces of the mass strikes in India and Brazil.  
Beyond these common features, there are also crucial differences: the 
workers in the automobile sector in India are far more politicised due to the 
influence of Maoist and Bolshevist organisations, and they established much 
more coordinated modes of action compared with the construction workers 
in Brazil. This is facilitated by a stronger tradition of independent trade 
unions in India – some of these independent unions are apolitical business 
unions or launched by management, but this model of organisation does also 
allow for leftist variants. In contrast, the political consciousness of the 
construction workers in Brazil is more ambiguous. This is the result of their 
high degree of marginalisation, their low level of education and the migrant 
nature of construction work. The supremacy of the right-wing trade union 
federation Força Sindical in the big construction works reinforces this 
tendency towards depoliticisation. The often remote and isolated locations 
of big construction units impede the interaction with other sections of the 
working class, and the exchange of ideas. Nevertheless, construction 
workers tend to engage in militant forms of action. Some of the urban strike 
movements were able to connect and interact with the more leftist sections 
of the street protests in Brazil since 2013. In contrast to that, the rather loose 
connections between strikes and anti-corruption protests in India did not 
extend to cooperation – in fact the opposite occurred, the striking contract 
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workers in urban transport in Delhi were threatened and attacked by the 
government of the new anti-corruption party, AAP. 
The street protests in India were far less politicised than in Brazil, since they 
had an exclusive focus on corruption as the presumed basic flaw of Indian 
society. In the Brazilian street protests in 2013, corruption was one among 
many topics – ticket prices in public transport, police violence and public 
services were other issues that linked the demands with the ideas of an 
extension of the welfare state. Both variants of street protests had in 
common that they did not last very long compared to the strikes – they 
emerged as quickly as they vanished. In Brazil, the street protests came back 
in 2015, but had split into two radically opposed currents. The strikes in the 
Brazilian construction sector, but also those among urban workers, 
expanded throughout the country. The same can be said about the street 
protests. In India, strikes and street protests were focussed more strongly on 
the capital region around New Delhi. 
Regarding the class-specific forms of articulation of the strikes and protests, 
the mass strikes are characterised by a war of position with episodic 
outbursts of violence. The workers make small advances, but they expect a 
lot more. With waves of dismissals after strikes and the intervention of state 
security forces against striking workers, a deadlock emerged. It would have 
only been possible to bypass this deadlock if a unified national strike 
movement had formed. However, such a movement is hard to organise. 
There are splits between union federations and a lack of a combative 
attitude among some of the unions. What is more, two cleavages emerged in 
the Brazilian and the Indian case: a cleavage between workers and their 
traditional unions, and another one between workers and the traditional left 
parties like Congress and the PT. In both cases, the root causes lie in the 
alliances and compromises of political parties and unions with capital. In 
India, the unions and Congress made compromises with big capital already 
in the 1960s and 1970s. These compromises have become more neoliberal 
and less social democratic since the 1990s. In contrast, the compromise of 
the PT with big capital is a more recent phenomenon, which has emerged 
since 2003. All in all, the conflicts between workers and trade unions only 
rarely affected the biggest trade union federation CUT, but rather the 
conservative union federation Força Sindical or other smaller trade unions. 
The street protests of the middle classes exhibit a different profile. One 
could say that while the working class got organised, the middle classes 
were mobilised for short periods: the latter called for quick political changes 
and were prepared to delegate responsibility for reform projects to 
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politicians, which explains the rapid decline of the protests and the fact that 
demands were less focused and uniform. In the case of the Indian anti-
corruption movement, the demands were focused on a specific law project, 
the Jan Lokpal Bill. After a watered-down version had been passed in 
parliament, the movement lacked a clear-cut objective beyond demanding 
amendments. 
The street protests in both countries revealed that the participants demanded 
a higher quality of life and a fair distribution of wealth – not a radical 
transformation of society. For the Brazilian case, Gohn captures this 
sentiment in an apt phrase: “They do not attack the state, they demand a 
more efficient state”.45 It is one aspect of this political abstinence that a 
central feature of a new social movement as defined by Alan Touraine, the 
common identity, was completely absent in the case of the Brazilian street 
protests.
46
  
What are the implications of this new and messy situation for a Marxist 
theory of class? One can of course argue that in Marx’s times the class 
composition of society was rather messy and not clear-cut, but this does not 
relieve one of the task to redefine and re-evaluate central concepts. Estanque 
uses the concept of the “middle classes”, but questions it at the same time, 
since he states that today it does not refer to the small property holders that 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels referred to.
47
 In his view, the concept of 
middle classes should refer to former workers that have climbed up the 
ladder by successfully leading class struggles for a welfare state, enabling 
them to reach a level of consumption similar to that of the old middle 
classes. However, these new middle classes do not share the elitist attitude 
of the old ones and are increasingly facing an insecure status due to high job 
rotation and the casualisation of labour relations.
48
 According to Estanque, 
these new middle classes constitute something similar to a labour 
aristocracy – and due to their past and their lack of income security, they 
have a disposition to acts of rebellion. At the same time, they are not able to 
assume the position of a vanguard or a voice of the subaltern groups as a 
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whole.
49
. Nonetheless, it has to be underlined that these new middle classes 
exhibit some commonalities with the old ones that were discussed by Marx 
and Engels: first of all, there is a lack of political orientation. Estanque 
locates the root causes for this in the fragmentation and precarisation of 
labour relations and a specific pattern of movement formation where 
movements rise rapidly, seem to be very determined and then disintegrate 
with the same speed.
50 
Another commonality between the old and new 
middle classes is the relevance they attach to ethics and values.
51
 And third, 
there is the tendency to oscillate between left-wing and right-wing positions 
as is perfectly illustrated by the Brazilian case.
52
  
In any case, the differences between the social movements, strikes and street 
protests are noteworthy. A rigorous separation of “proletariat” and 
“precariat” as proposed by some social scientists does not hold if applied to 
the recent protests in India and Brazil.
53
 After all, the bulk of the working 
classes is exposed to informal and unsecure conditions of work even if they 
work in formal jobs. Formal employment is embedded in a larger context of 
informality, resulting in discontinuities in terms of the regular and complete 
payment of wages, a lack of security, a high exposure to health risks at work 
and a lack of job security. While a strict separation of “proletariat” and 
“precariat” does not conform to the social reality in much of the Global 
South, the same can be said of the claim that there is a unified “precariat”. 
We cannot deduct from the cases of Brazil and India that certain parts of the 
“precariat” do not engage in strikes. The challenge lies in doing justice to 
the differentiated nature of classes in contemporary capitalism without 
losing sight of the big picture. Obviously there are many street protests 
triggered by the “precariat” in South Africa, but it is not legitimate to 
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conclude from that that other groups of precarious workers in South Africa 
and in other countries refrain from going on strike, for example, the contract 
workers in mining. 
At the level of social action, it makes sense to define a second bloc of the 
middle classes, apart from the different layers of the working class. This 
second bloc is composed of public employees, urban employees with 
degrees, and technical and IT engineers. For this bloc, it makes perfect sense 
that a part of these middle classes are objectively a part of the working 
class.
54
 But the issue of social status does play a major role at the political 
level for this group. It is much more fragile on the level of social action than 
the working class and its political identity is much more diversified and 
blurry, and thus often almost impossible to grasp. Sitapati detects four 
ideological currents as the defining features of the anti-corruption 
movement in India
55
 while Estanque and Grohn underline the extremely 
ambiguous nature of the street protests in Brazil. Thus, there is not only a 
lack of a proper encompassing progressive narrative that would bind 
working and middle classes together, but also income differences and 
ideologies of social status that keep both classes apart from each other. 
Although income differences between a construction worker in Brazil and 
an office clerk might be small, the clerk will ascribe a higher status to her 
work and position in society. At the same time, both workers share the 
insecurity of overall conditions of work and life. A political force that can 
bind both classes, or at least segments of both classes together, would have 
to address this overall feature of insecurity. 
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Labour conflict in Argentina and Brazil: challenging an 
alliance? 
Luis Campos and Bruno Dobrusin 
 
ntroduction  
During the last decade, Latin America, especially the countries of the 
Southern Cone, has witnessed a change in socioeconomic policies, as a 
consequence of elections that brought left and centre-left political forces 
into office. The changes in government politics were a result of the 
profound crisis that arose after more than two decades of neoliberal policies 
that left the majority of the population in a position of marginalization and 
poverty. This essay analyzes the government policies of Argentina and 
Brazil during the last decade, with a focus on recent increases in labour 
conflicts. After a period of economic bonanza and political conditions 
oriented towards social dialogue, the stage has moved towards one of 
increasing tensions, as measured in the numbers of strikes that increased in 
both countries from 2011 onwards. This paper does not look at these 
governments in all their aspects and periods of government, but focuses on 
the transition that began in 2011 as a consequence of the international 
economic crisis and also due to internal disputes regarding macroeconomic 
and socioeconomic policies, many of which remain unresolved. 
In the last decade, both Argentina and Brazil witnessed significant 
socioeconomic improvements, based on the revitalization of internal 
markets as well as on improvements of the terms of trade – a positive trend 
throughout Latin America during the 2000s.
1
 The redistributive bonanza in 
the terms of trade was supported by an inward redistributional policy, based 
on welfare policies and a strengthening of labour markets by increasing real 
wages and enhancing labour market institutions. 
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This model of economic development has been defined in different ways,
2
 
mainly depending on how the overall performance of the governments is 
evaluated, especially in terms of challenging the neoliberal agenda. There 
are several common features among the governments in Brazil and 
Argentina elected in the last decade, a central one being the return of the 
state as a central player in organizing the main economic and social 
policies.
3
 Even though the reinforcement of the state has challenged a 
fundamental neoliberal paradigm – the need for state to retreat from the 
economy – some of the main developmental characteristics of the economy 
have remained untouched: the export of primary commodities as the main 
source of income and the increasing dominance of financial capital in the 
overall economy.
4
 This combination of redistributive policies, such as Bolsa 
Família in Brazil and the Asignación Universal por Hijo in Argentina, and 
the model of economic growth – characterized by its dependence on the 
export of primary commodities to the world market – has been coined the 
“commodities consensus”.5 The consensus requires measures of 
redistribution in order to overcome the contradictions emerging with 
extractive industries, especially in terms of their environmental impact, their 
territorial dislocation and the control of the process gained by transnational 
corporations.
6
 
In line with Armando Boito’s analysis, this paper categorizes the 
governments of Argentina and Brazil as neo-developmentalist. A neo-
developmentalist model reinforces wealth redistribution targeted towards 
consumption through increases in minimum wages, the implementation of 
vast social programs and the expansion of credit. At the same time, it 
reinforces the development of the large bourgeoisie, both industrial and 
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extractivist, with the central aim of generating economic growth.
7
 At the 
center of this process is the state, creating an alliance between a local – 
internal – bourgeoisie, organized labour and even the subaltern classes. The 
“neo” element is based on a reconsideration of the developmentalist 
strategies of the 1970s, in which the strengthening of internal markets and 
the creation of “local industries” played an important role in producing high 
levels of economic growth. The neo-developmentalist model, however, 
produces lower economic growth than the classic models, giving less 
relevance to the internal market and local industry, accepting the 
international division of labour and redistributing income at a slower pace. 
In the neo-developmentalist model, growth strategies are dominated by a 
fraction of the bourgeoisie that is not necessarily “nationalist”, rather one 
that is closely tied to the multinational corporations.
8
 The neo-
developmental strategy is in fact based on the “commodities consensus” 
outlined by Svampa, since a central element in economic policy is the 
capacity to export primary commodities to global markets.  
This model of neo-developmentalism, including the class alliances that it 
involved, relied heavily on the international boom of commodities and on 
the capacity to generate economic growth. From 2011 onwards, both these 
pillars – high commodity prices at the world level and national economic 
growth – began to decline, leading to major conflicts in the class 
compromises that the model entailed. The lower economic growth, adding 
to political fatigue – both countries were under administrations with nearly a 
decade in office – contributed to changing the pattern of labour-state 
relations from one of overall cooperation towards one of increasing conflicts 
both locally and nationally. This essay focuses precisely on these growing 
conflicts and analyzes them as a consequence of the limitations of the 
development strategy previously outlined.  
The first section of this paper presents a brief synthesis of the periods 
governed by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, PT) in Brazil 
from 2003 onwards, and the Frente para la Victoria (Victory Front) in 
Argentina starting in 2003. In the first section, we include economic and 
labour market information that allows us to establish government-labour 
relations in the period. The second section deals with the main aspects of 
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labour conflicts in both countries during the last decade, highlighting the 
last three years in particular. Finally, in the conclusion, the paper provides a 
comparative analytical look at both processes and the challenges ahead for 
labour organizations.  
 
2. The centre-left governments in the Southern Cone  
2.1. The Kirchner era 
In order to understand the socioeconomic conditions experienced at the 
moment in Argentina, it is necessary to examine the breakdown of the 
convertibility regime – the Argentine peso pegged to the US dollar – which 
took place at the end of 2001 and produced a profound economic crisis. At 
the time, the devaluation of the local currency, joined by the decreasing cost 
of labour and the high number of idle industries, allowed for the 
implementation of economic policies that put the country on the path to 
growth after a four-year recession, reviving internal markets. This was 
coupled with a booming commodity export (led by soybeans), which has 
continued – in terms of trade – to this day. 
After the high point of the crisis in December 2001, the local currency was 
devalued by more than 60 per cent, the medium real wage fell 24 per cent in 
2002 compared with the previous year (and 34 per cent compared with 
1994),
9
 and unemployment and underemployment soared to over 20 per 
cent. At the same time, the utilization of installed capacity in the industrial 
sector in 2002 was below 60 per cent. This availability of unused labour and 
industrial capacity at a substantially lower cost than before the crisis 
allowed Argentina’s economy to recover in late 2002 with the help of a new 
cycle of rising international prices of primary products. This improved the 
terms of trade almost 20 per cent between 2001 and 2004. 
As a consequence of this process, Argentina witnessed an annual economic 
growth rate of 9 per cent between 2003 and 2007, becoming the backbone 
of the political consolidation of Nestor Kirchner’s administration. The 
economic recovery went along with significant changes in the labour 
market, which was reorganized after the critical years of the socioeconomic 
crisis. During these four years, unemployment fell from 20 per cent to 8 per 
cent, real salaries grew by 21 per cent and informality decreased from 49 to 
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39 per cent. On top of this, these years also witnessed the strengthening of 
historic tools for labour market regulation, such as collective bargaining and 
the minimum wage council. The minimum wage increased by 82 per cent in 
real terms during that four-year period, having remained flat during the 
1990s, and real average wages jumped more than 20 per cent in the same 
period.
10 
From 2007 onwards, the Argentine economy began to face major obstacles 
that continue to this day and have been a main source of conflict. The 
growth levels of the post-convertibility decade were drastically reduced in 
2008-2009, increased again in 2010-2011 and diminished once more in 
2012-2014. In this sense, the last available data indicates that by 2014 the 
GDP was 4.2 per cent higher than in 2011, while the GDP in the 
manufacturing sector had decreased by 2.7 per cent during the same period. 
It is worth noting that the obstacles which the Argentine economy is facing 
today emerge in a context in which the terms of trade are at a historic high. 
In fact, the relationship between export and import products was 63.5 per 
cent higher in 2011-2014 than the average registered for the 1990s.  
The noteworthy drop in economic growth during the last two years was 
accompanied by an increasing inflation rate, which has continued to rise 
since 2009, reaching its highest annual rate in 2014 at 36.5 per cent. The 
persistent increases in inflation impeded a major recovery of salaries, which 
only in 2011 reached the pre-economic crisis levels, even though real 
economic growth had been much higher during that time. As presented later 
on in this paper, the increases in inflation levels had an immediate impact on 
labour conflicts, which were increasingly directed towards obtaining 
nominal increases that could maintain workers’ purchasing power.  
These major difficulties expressed above also had an impact on the labour 
market. In effect, the unemployment rate in the second semester of 2014 
was around 7.5 per cent, one of the highest values since 2010. At the same 
time, the rate of economic activity and employment also witnessed a 
pronounced drop, reaching the lowest levels of the last decade.
11 
  
                                                 
10 
For a detailed analysis of labour markets during the last decade and its relation to the 
neoliberal period, see CAMPOS, Luis; GONZÁLEZ, Mariana and SACAVANI, Marcela. 
“El mercado de trabajo en los distintos patrones de crecimiento”. Realidad Económica. 
Issue. 253, 2010, Buenos Aires.  
 
11 
The rate of employment in the second trimester of 2014 was 41.4 per cent, the lowest 
since 2005. At the same time, the economic activity rate was 44.8 per cent, the lowest since 
the last methodological changes in 2003. 
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Chart 1: Selected macroeconomic variables in Argentina 2005 – 2013 
 
 GDP growth 
rate 
Manufacturing Inflation Real wage 
(2001 = 
100) 
Terms of 
trade (2004 
= 100) 
2005 9.23% 9.29% 9.6% 89.2 97.0 
2006 8.38% 9.77% 10.3% 95.4 101.3 
2007 7.97% 8.08% 18.3% 97.3 107.4 
2008 3.07% 3.22% 27.1% 93.7 120.7 
2009 0,05% (-1.56%) 14.6% 97.7 121.5 
2010 9.45% 11.39% 23.1% 97.2 125.8 
2011 8.39% 11.44% 23.4% 100.6 139.3 
2012 0.80% (-1.59%) 23.9% 103.0 144.7 
2013 2.89% 0.26% 25.4% 102.7 135.1 
2014 0.46% (-1.34%) 36.5% 98.8 131.6 
Source: Authors’ own calculation using data from National Institute of Statistics and 
Census (INDEC). From 2007 to 2014, the inflation rate is provided by the provincial 
institutes of statistics due to conflicts with the national data.  
In short, the existence of increasing tensions in the labour market, combined 
with persistently high inflation, constitute the backbone over which labour 
conflicts have been developing in recent years, which will be analyzed in 
the next section.  
 
2.2 Brazil, from Lula to Dilma 
The government of Lula da Silva represented a significant change in 
Brazil’s socioeconomic conditions, in particular in the area of labour 
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rights.
13
 Firmly supported by the trade union movement and the largest 
workers’ confederation in the country, the Central Única dos Trabalhadores 
(CUT), Lula arrived in office in 2003 – elected in October 2002 – with a 
personal history of leadership as a metal workers’ union leader and therefore 
a promising candidate for the labour movement in Brazil. The Lula 
administrations can actually be divided in two phases, the first one (2003-
2005) being more fiscally conservative; and the second one (2005-2010) 
characterised by major changes in socioeconomic policy and labour market 
regulation.
14
 Towards the end of the first four-year term and more 
pronounced in the second, the government shifted away from orthodox 
macroeconomic policies towards more heterodox forms, which included the 
implementation of vast social programs and the strengthening of labour 
market institutions (including trade union regulation). Towards the end of 
the first term in office and following the corruption scandals of the 
mensalão,
15
 there was a considerable rupture between the policies of the 
former Cardoso administration and Lula’s novel heterodox approach. This 
change in policy was significant in creating a mass of followers and 
consolidating the popular vote for the PT, especially in the poorest regions 
of the North-East.
16
 
Among the most relevant policies produced under Lula were those focused 
on macroeconomic issues as well as a specific set of policies directed 
towards the strengthening of the institutional arrangements of trade unions, 
especially as these were recognized as fundamental actors in the 
development process.
17
 The improvements in macroeconomic terms were 
tightly related to the revalorization of the minimum wage, the constant drop 
in unemployment levels, the reinforcement of collective bargaining, the 
expansion of direct cash transfer programs (mainly the Family Fund, Bolsa 
Família) and the growth in formal employment.
18
 These policies are 
essential in explaining two elements that became a characteristic of the time: 
                                                 
13
 KREIN, José; DOS SANTOS, Anselmo and TARDELLI, Bartira. “Trabalho No Governo 
Lula: Avanços E Contradiçoes”. Revista Abet. Vol. 10, n. 2, 2011, pp. 30-55.  
14
 SAAD-FILHO, Alfredo. “Mass Protests under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June-July 
2013”. Critical Sociology. Vol. 39, n. 5, 2013, pp. 657-669.  
15
 A scheme devised to buy votes in parliament by the Partido dos Trabalhadores to get 
support from allied parties for government policies.  
16
 Andre Singer traces to this move the origins of “lulism” as a political force beyond PT. 
See SINGER, Andre. Os Sentidos do Lulismo. Reforma gradual e pacto conservador. São 
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2012.  
17
 KREIN, José; DOS SANTOS, Anselmo and TARDELLI, Bartira. “Trabalho No Governo 
Lula: Avanços e Contradições”. Op. Cit.  
18
 BALTAR et al. “Moving towards decent work. Labour in the Lula government: 
reflections on recent Brazilian experience”. GLU Working Paper, n .9, 2010.  
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the increased confidence and strengthening of trade unions
19
 and a common 
alliance between major union confederations in support of the government, 
which included participation in the Council for Economic and Social 
Development.
20 
These policies contributed to significant improvements in the overall 
socioeconomic situation of the country. However, there was a specific 
emphasis placed on the role of the minimum wage that was fundamental in 
achieving these improvements, starting with pressure exerted by the trade 
union movement. In a concerted effort of the major labour confederations in 
2004, the government promoted a policy of “valorization of the minimum 
wage”, in which the level of the minimum wage was adjusted according to a 
combination of inflation levels and GDP growth. This equation increased 
the minimum wage beyond the average wages, from 260 Real in 2004 to 
724 in 2014, implying an increase in real terms of 67.5 per cent. However, 
when looking at the curve, the largest increase occurred between 2004 and 
2010, with a brief stagnation in 2010-2011 and then a boost from 2012 
onwards.
21
 
Increasing the minimum wage consistently has pushed social security 
benefits up since a constitutional arrangement sets the basis for these in 
national minimum wage levels. This was supplemented by an increase in 
formal employment in 2004-2011, which grew by 38 per cent, leading to a 
sharp decrease in informality.
22
 Similarly, unemployment levels fell from 
12.4 per cent in 2003 to 6.7 per cent in 2010.
23
 Average wages during the 
same period increased by 29.3 per cent in real terms,
24
 and were joined by 
                                                 
19 See GALVÃO, Andréia; BOITO, Armando and MARCELINO, Paula. “Brasil: O 
movimento sindical e popular na década de dois mil”. In: MODONESI, Massimo and 
REBÓN, Julian (eds.) Una década en movimiento. Luchas populares en América Latina en 
el amanecer del siglo XXI. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2010, pp. 153-182.  
20 
Created under Lula, the Conselho para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (CDES) 
was a consultative platform between civil society and the executive branch, integrated by 
the major confederations in the country (CUT, Força Sindical, UGT, CTB, NCST). Outside 
of this council and in firm opposition to the PT governments remained two splits from 
CUT, the CSP-CONLUTAS and Intersindical. These alliances begin to shift towards the 
end of Dilma’s first term, with Força Sindical taking a more confrontational stance against 
the government.  
21 DIEESE. “A política de valorização do Salário Mínimo: persistir para melhorar”. Nota 
Técnica. n. 136. 2014.  
22
 KREIN, José; DOS SANTOS, Anselmo and MORETTO, Amilton. “Trabalho no Brasil: 
evolução recente e desafios”. Revista Paranaense de Desenvolvimento. Vol. 34, n.124, 
2013, pp. 27-53. 
23 
Ibid.
 
24 
Ibid. 
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an intense pace of economic growth, averaging 3.5 per cent in 2003-2006, 
and 4.5 per cent in 2007-2010.
25
 
 
Chart 2: GDP, unemployment and minimum wage in Brazil 2004-2011 
and 2012-2013 
  2004-2011  2012-2013 
GDP growth rate (average)  3.9  1.7 
Unemployment rate 
(average) 
 8.1  5.5 
Minimum wage (annual 
rate) 
 5.4  5.1 
Source: Author’s own calculation using data from ECLAC, IBGE and DIEESE.  
By the end of Lula’s presidency in 2010, Brazil had witnessed overall 
economic growth during both terms (2003-2007 and 2007-2011), a 
revitalization of state regulation of labour relations and an improvement in 
socioeconomic conditions for the majority of workers, resulting in lower 
poverty levels, (partial) wealth redistribution and increases in wages and 
formal employment. When Dilma Rousseff of the PT was elected president, 
the relationship with the trade union movement became more strained and 
macroeconomic challenges began to surface. The multi-class compromise 
that had existed during the two previous PT mandates began to crumble in 
view of changing economic conditions. This in turn led to changes in the 
dynamic of relationships between the national government and the trade 
unions and also within the trade unions themselves, including a higher 
number of labour conflicts both locally and nationally, bringing unresolved 
issues to the forefront – issues that had been “side-tracked” to a degree 
under Lula through overall economic improvement. Some of these issues 
included so-called “second generation demands” like better public services 
– a crucial demand during the June 2013 rebellion – and others had to do 
with the overall management of macroeconomic policy, in particular 
demands that targeted the economic and political power of financial capital 
and its role in determining the overall policy through an indirect control of 
                                                 
25
 KREIN, José and DOS SANTOS, Anselmo. “La formalización del trabajo en Brasil. El 
crecimiento económico y los efectos de las políticas laborales”. Nueva Sociedad. n. 239, 
2012, pp. 90-101. 
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Brazil’s Central Bank.26 The increasing conflict between the government 
and the labour movement at different levels is the central focus of the 
following section.  
 
3. Recent labour conflicts 
3.1 Labour conflicts in Argentina 
The reappearance of traditional labour conflicts and their relation with 
political disputes has been one of the most important changes in the system 
of labour relations during the last decade in Argentina. After the 2001 crisis, 
in a context of deep economic and political changes, industrial action, 
particularly collective bargaining and labour conflicts, became the norm for 
workers and unions once again.
27 
However, the pattern of labour conflicts did not evolve in a linear fashion 
during the last decade. First, the trade unions faced an accumulation process 
in which their own strategies matched the objectives of the national 
government. The latter needed to build up political legitimacy, not only 
because of the small amount of votes president Néstor Kirchner had 
obtained in the 2003 presidential election, but also because of the need to 
strengthen the state apparatus in itself and increase its acceptance among 
Argentine society after the 2001 crisis. 
In order to restore state legitimacy, Néstor Kirchner’s presidency 
implemented a broad set of measures. One central dimension of that strategy 
was to intervene in the labour market, whose figures, particularly wages and 
                                                 
26 
An interesting debate around the challenges for Dilma, centered on macroeconomic 
issues, is presented by MORAIS, Lecio and SAAD-FILHO, Alfredo. “Neo-
Developmentalism and the challenges of Economic Policy-Making under Dilma Rousseff”. 
Critical Sociology. Vol. 38, n. 6, 2012, pp. 789-798. One of the relevant arguments is that 
the growth created during the previous administrations was fragile, and in order to 
consolidate that path there needed to be a rupture with neoliberal policies that were still 
present. The resolution of this dilemma during Dilma’s tenure consisted in maintaining 
those structural constrains instead of pushing the neo-developmentalist agenda further.  
27 
While beyond the scope of this article, it is possible to identify some substantial changes 
in union activity compared to the 1990s, when collective bargaining lost weight as a tool 
for regulating labour relations and social conflict was related to claims for jobs and based 
on territory (instead of industry based). It should certainly not be concluded that the 
working class had no role in such conflicts. Rather there was a change in the main content 
of the demands (from jobs, rejection of state policies, access to public services, and 
working conditions in the public sector, to wage increases and working conditions in the 
private sector) and methodology of action (from social conflicts with wider alliances 
between trade unions and other social organizations, to traditional industrial actions).  
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employment, were at an historic low by 2002.
28
 Indeed, employment and 
real wage recovery became a shared objective for both the national 
government and the trade unions, since both were based on an increase in 
the number of workers and the level of real wages. Plus, this strategy was 
tacitly accepted by fractions of capital which due to their size and 
productivity levels could only operate locally, as it was a necessary 
condition for resuming the path of economic growth after the recession that 
had lasted from 1998 to 2002.  
This confluence of interests could only be sustained in the short term. The 
resurgence of inflation in late 2006 began to demonstrate these limits, which 
were reflected in new challenges for unions that had undeniable impacts on 
collective bargaining and union unrest. This is the starting point for this 
analysis. 
According to the total number of conflicts surveyed by the Ministry of 
Labour, it is possible to identify a period of a gradual increase of labour 
conflicts between 2006 and 2011, while from 2012 that increase showed a 
significant jump.
29
 Indeed, from 2006 to 2011, labour conflicts increased by 
22.4 per cent (from 785 to 961 conflicts). This increase was repeated in just 
one year: in 2012, it jumped by about 26.6 per cent to reach a total of 1,217 
conflicts. This number remained steady in 2013, and jumped again in 
2014.
30 
This increase in labour disputes occurred in both the public and private 
sectors. At the state level, the upsurge of labour conflict amounted to an 
increase of 26.3 per cent between 2006 and 2011 and of 41.1 per cent 
                                                 
28 
This process was coupled by the implementation of measures that had been part of social 
organizations’ agenda against neoliberal policies during the 1990s. Among them may be 
mentioned the changes in the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, supporting trials 
against those responsible for human rights violations during the military dictatorship, and a 
change in international politics that strengthened links with governments of countries in the 
region. 
29 
The series on labour unrest developed by the Ministry of Labour can be found at 
[www.trabajo.gov.ar.] For a description of the methodology and scope see PALOMINO, 
Héctor. “Un nuevo indicador del Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social. Los 
conflictos labourales en la Argentina 2006-2007”. Serie Estudios. n. 7, 2007. Available at 
[www.trabajo.gov.ar]  
30 
Notably, according to the Ministry of Labour, the increase in the total number of strikes 
in the private sector did not correspond with an increase in the number of strikers and of 
working days lost due to strikes. In this regard, less intensive strikes became more 
widespread. They were linked to increasing conflicts at the enterprise level, which jumped 
from 60 per cent of the conflicts in 2006 to 70 per cent in 2013. In contrast, the numbers for 
2014 of strikers and working days lost in the public sector were the highest since 2006. 
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between 2011 and 2014.
31
 Meanwhile, in the private sector the increase was 
14.1 per cent and 34.7 per cent respectively. 
 
Graph 1: Labour conflicts in Argentina 2006 – 2014 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculation with data from the Ministry of Labour.  
The information gathered by the Ministry of Labour is focused on strikes, 
which excludes other forms of labour unrest. In this regard, the reports from 
the Social Rights Observatory
32
 of the Central de Trabajadores de la 
Argentina (Argentine Workers’ Confederation) include these other forms of 
labour unrest, and in principle, allow for similar conclusions. In this 
perspective, we observe that the number of conflicts in the private sector 
increased significantly in 2011 (a 25 per cent increase compared to the 
2007-2010 annual average). 
As for union demands, it is important to point out some milestones that, 
over the recent years, point to qualitative changes. Indeed, labour conflicts 
in the early years of the last decade were fundamentally linked to economic 
                                                 
31 
For a detailed analysis of labour conflicts during 2006 and 2010, see BARRERRA 
INSUA, Federico. “Conflictos salariales y organización sindical en la Argentina post-
convertibilidad”. Programa de Investigación sobre el Movimiento de la Sociedad 
Argentina, Documentos y Comunicaciones 2011-12. 2012. Available at 
[www.pimsa.secyt.gov.ar]  
32 For detailed analysis, visit the Observatory’s website at [www.obderechosocial.org.ar] 
487 
561 544 
574 579 
615 
805 788 
868 
313 298 
326 338 
394 
357 
434 438 
481 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1.000
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Public
Private
Labour conflict in Argentina and Brazil: challenging an alliance? 111 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
demands, mainly wage claims, channelled by the unions at the industrial 
level.
33
 
The rise in inflation rates, which has consistently been above 25 per cent per 
year since 2007 (except 2009), boosted labour conflicts and forced trade 
unions to claim nominal increases around that rate. In turn, this had an 
impact on secondary income redistribution policies, particularly on family 
allowances and the income tax paid by higher-income earners 
(approximately 10 per cent of all workers). Thus, claims to balance inflation 
and demands to modify the mechanisms for a redistribution of resources 
gained presence in the demands put forward by trade unions. 
Moreover, the labour market in Argentina has been exposed to growing 
constraints since late 2006, not only due to rising inflation and its impact on 
the evolution of real wages, but also as a consequence of labour force 
adjustments made by employers. In fact, the pace of job creation in the 
private sector declined considerably since late 2008. There was an increase 
in dismissals and suspensions in some sectors such as textiles, wood, metal 
and construction (see Chart 4). These changes in the labour market caused 
conflicts linked to the defence of jobs, mainly at the level of the workplace. 
 
Chart 3: Formal employment in manufacturing, Argentina 2008 – 2014 
 2008 2014 2008 – 2014 
Manufacturing 1.187.423 1.213.709 2.21% 
Food, beverages and tobacco 324.645 341.204 5.10% 
Textile 153.319 146.658 -4.34% 
Wood 117.917 109.675 -6.99% 
Oil and chemical 168.834 178.541 5.75% 
Metal 136.803 134.252 -1.87% 
Transport equipment 82.021 88.381 7.75% 
                                                 
33 OBSERVATORIO DEL DERECHO SOCIAL DE LA CTA. “Relaciones labourales 
2013. Caída del salario real y crecimiento del conflicto en el sector público”. Annual 
Report 2013. 2014. Available at [www.obderechosocial.org.ar] 
112 Luis Campos and Bruno Dobrusin 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
Capital goods 119.325 129.703 8.70% 
Other industries 84.559 85.297 0.87% 
Construction 414.249 418.898 1.12% 
Source: Author’s own calculation with data from SIPA. 
The information presented here shows that over the last decade, 
developments in the labour market and labour unrest were far from 
presenting a uniform path. On the contrary, it is possible to register three 
stages. First, between 2003 and 2007 (particularly after the December 2001 
crisis), the alliance between the Frente para la Victoria government (FPV) 
and the vast majority of trade unions was based on a process that included 
employment growth and labour conflicts focused on increases in real wages. 
Among the circumstances that helped create a temporary alliance between 
the government, the trade unions and the employers were the low prices of 
production (of both capital and labour), the weakness of the political system 
and its need for re-legitimation. The resurgence of inflation in late 2006 was 
among the first signs of tensions in this process, and this tendency 
accelerated substantially after the international crisis that began in late 2008 
and early 2009. 
The second phase was a period of greater turbulence and accumulation of 
stress which extended until 2011/2012, when the labour market exhibited 
serious difficulties in continuing to reduce the level of unemployment. 
Trade union disputes began to contain a defensive component, either to 
address the impact of inflation on real wages, or to keep jobs. Tensions 
related to the labour market were supplemented, during this period, with the 
reappearance of political conflicts between the national government and the 
country’s biggest trade union, Confederación General del Trabajo (General 
Workers Confederation, CGT). An open conflict emerged on the occasion 
of the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2011, during which the 
union’s demands for higher positions of political power were ignored 
completely by the ruling party. The alliance of the government with the then 
leader of the CGT, Hugo Moyano, broke in the following year after the 
Ministry of Labour intervened in the process of renewal of the CGT 
leadership.
34 
                                                 
34 ESPER, Mariel. “De los conflictos laborales a las huelgas generales. Algunos apuntes 
para pensar su dinámica 2002-2012 en Argentina. Socio. Avances en el estudio de la 
relación entre sindicalismo y kirchnerismo”. Sociohistórica, n. 33, 2014.  
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Finally, the third phase was characterized by heightening tensions as a 
consequence of economic stagnation that coexisted with high inflation. As 
noted above (see Chart 1), the growth of Argentina's economy had stopped 
in 2012, real wages dropped, and inflation stood at its highest levels since 
2002. At the same time, the international context made greater difficulties 
than in previous years, even though the terms of trade were still favourable 
by historical standards. These difficulties in the economic sphere, 
particularly in the labour market, were accompanied by the disruption of the 
alliance between an important part of the trade unions and the government, 
causing an increase in labour disputes recorded in the years 2011-2012. It 
included the resurgence of general strikes as a tool for trade union action 
after more than a decade.
35 
Thus, labour conflicts in recent years have combined economic claims 
(mainly regarding wages and working conditions) with political claims 
(particularly related to tax and income policies) and, more recently, with the 
defence of jobs.
36
 In turn, there was a quantum leap in the conflict cycle 
from November 2012 onwards, when two factions of the CGT and the 
Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) convened for the first 
general strike in a decade, which was then replicated in April and August 
2014 and later in March and May 2015. 
 
3.2. Increasing labour conflicts in Brazil 
Similar to the events witnessed in Argentina – and throughout the continent 
– Brazil has experienced a drop in economic growth since 2011, mainly due 
to the international economic crisis and the drop in the prices of export 
commodities. In 2010, the last year under Lula, growth reached a stunning 
7.5 per cent, and in 2011 there was a drastic fall to 2.7 per cent,
37
 initiating a 
period of consistently low or negative growth. With this trajectory, Brazil 
can be included in the group of countries in the region that witnessed slow 
growth in comparison with the previous decade,
38
 mainly as a consequence 
of the changing conditions for its exports in the international markets and 
the limitations that the model of social compromise had reached. As 
                                                 
35 
Ibid.  
36 
The complaints brought to the state included changes to the regulation of the system of 
family allowances and income tax. Additionally, the unions also protested against a law 
passed by the Parliament in order to reform the reparations’ system against occupational 
diseases and accidents. 
37 DIEESE. “Balanço das greves em 2010-2011”. Estudos e pesquisas. N. 63. 2012.  
38
 CEPAL. “Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe”. Brasil. 
Santiago: CEPAL. 2013.  
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outlined earlier, in order to move forward with the neo-developmentalist 
agenda, Brazil would have needed further redistribution by addressing the 
financial markets and the tributary structure
39
 in depth. The popularity of 
Dilma Rousseff entered into a crisis during her first term and the class 
compromise that had prevailed during Lula began to unravel.
40
 
The flattening of economic growth, coupled with an increasing level of 
inflation – though not as drastic as in Argentina41– led the Dilma 
administration to cap fiscal spending, especially during 2011 and 2012.
42
 
The contraction in current expenses was taken as a precautionary measure in 
the context of a worsening international economic crisis and a 
preoccupation with the increasing levels of inflation.
43
 Conservative fiscal 
policy had already been an element of dispute during the first period of 
Lula’s presidency, mainly in the transition between the Cardoso and PT 
administrations (between 2003 and 2005). It now returned as a cause for 
conflict within the PT and between the party and some of its main allies.  
The condition of low economic growth and budget restrictions during 2011 
and 2012 specifically affected the public sector
44
 and led to increasing 
labour conflicts greater than in previous years.
45
 However, it is also worth 
noting that from 2011 onwards the number of strikes increased significantly 
in comparison with the preceding years. In 2010, the number of strikes was 
446, while in 2011, it grew to more than 500.
46
 In 2012, it reached over 
800,
47
 with a rising trend in the following years.
48
 This increase implies an 
                                                 
39
 On the financial constraints, see MORAIS, Lecio and SAAD-FILHO, Alfredo. “Neo-
Developmentalism and the challenges of Economic Policy-Making under Dilma Rousseff”. 
Op. Cit. and SAAD-FILHO, Alfredo. “Mass Protests under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, 
June-July 2013”. Op. Cit. for the changes that led to the June rebellions, including the panic 
fueled by the main media around rising inflation rates. 
40 
This was especially clear with the main economic players, including the Industrial 
Federation of Sao Paulo and other relevant players that had been part of the equation. 
41 CEPAL. “Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe”. Op. Cit. 
Inflation levels were lower in Brazil and kept under control by the government. However, 
there was a massive campaign by media and major corporations to tighten fiscal spending 
and increase interest rates in order to control inflation.  
42
 BASTOS, Pedro. “A economia política do novo-desenvolvimento e do social 
desenvolvimento”. Economia e Sociedade. Vol.21, 2012, pp. 779-810; DIEESE. Balanço 
das greves em 2010-2011. Estudos e pesquisas. n.63, 2012. 
43
 BASTOS, Pedro. “A economia política do novo-desenvolvimento e do social 
desenvolvimento”. Op. Cit. 
44
 GALVÃO, Andreia. “The Brazilian Labour Movement under PT Governments”. Op. Cit.  
45 DIEESE. “Balanço das greves 2012”. Op. Cit.; BOITO JR., Armando and 
MARCELINO, Paula. “O sindicalismo deixou a crise para tras? Um novo ciclo de greves 
na década de 2000”. Caderno CRH. Vol.23, n.59, 2010, pp. 323-338. 
46 
DIEESE. “Balanço das greves em 2010-2011”. Op. Cit. 
47
 DIEESE. “Balanço das greves em 2012”. Op. Cit. 
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exponential jump from the average, especially when compared to the 
average during the earlier PT governments (as noted in Graph 2). It appears 
that this trend will continue to grow given that the economic situation is 
looking dim in the near future. Even then, it is relevant to note that the 
increasing conflicts have not yet reached the levels of the “strike wave” of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s,
49
 when the union movement was in its most 
vigorous stage. Nor has the current stage witnessed the same level of 
general strikes, called upon by the confederations, as during the “strike 
wave”.  
 
Chart 4: Labour conflicts in Brazil, strikes by sector 
Sector 2011(%) 2012 (%) 
Public 325 (58.7) 409 (46.8) 
Private 227 (41.0) 461 (52.8) 
Both 2 (0.4) 3 (0.3) 
Total 554 (100) 873 (100) 
Source: DIEESE 2013 
 
Graphic 2: Annual number of strikes in Brazil, 1983-2012  
                                                                                                                            
48 
Although DIEESE has not published the official results on the number of strikes for 
2013-2014, informal conversations with researchers at the institute notified that the number 
of strikes would be well over 1000 for 2013.  
49 BOITO JR., Armando and MARCELINO, Paula. “O sindicalismo deixou a crise para 
tras? Um novo ciclo de greves na década de 2000”. Op. Cit.  
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Source: DIEESE 2013 
 
 
Graphic 3: Annual work hours lost due to strikes in Brazil, 1983-2012 
 
 
Source: DIEESE 2013.  
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Several studies have underlined the specific characteristics of recent 
conflicts in Brazil, outlining two main noteworthy issues. Firstly, the nature 
of the demands of the strikes has shifted from predominantly offensive to 
defensive ones. In other words, there has been a shift from demands that 
imply new rights and benefits beyond those already negotiated to struggles 
aimed at defending already established rights and benefits and focusing 
largely on updating wage levels. Even though strikes actually have a 
component of both types of demands, the latest conflicts have increasingly 
focused on the latter type. As indicated in Chart 5, this shift is demonstrated 
when we take into consideration a sample of the strikes in the largest public 
sector union, the state employees, and the largest union in the private sector, 
the metalworkers. In both conflicts, the number of defensive demands 
increased from 2011 to 2012, while the offensive ones diminished 
significantly.  
 
Chart 5: Strikes in Brazil (2011 and 2012) by content, sector (focus on 
industry for the private sector and employees for the public sector) 
 2011  2012  
 Public 
(employees) 
Private 
(industry) 
Public 
(employees) 
Private 
(industry) 
Offensive 81.8 83.2 64.2 67.0 
Defensive 66.2 42.0 74.5 61.2 
 Source: Author’s own calculation with data from DIEESE.  
 
The second relevant aspect of the recent rise in strikes in Brazil (see Graph 
2) was the growing importance of the private sector in those activities. It 
became the sector with the largest number of strikes during 2012 while the 
public sector remained the largest in terms of number of participants and 
duration of the protests. If strikes in the public sector were mainly a 
response to the fiscal adjustments of governments at the federal, state and 
local levels during 2011, the increases in private sector strikes during 2012, 
and the predominance of defensive demands in them, were a clear sign of 
the economic slowdown that has continued over the last three years. These 
strikes also indicate the changing dynamics in the models of negotiation 
between the trade unions, the state and employers. In sharp contrast to the 
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case of Argentina, where real wages have only matched inflation for the last 
rounds of negotiations, two processes have been taking place in the case of 
Brazil in the period of intense conflicts. On the one hand, unemployment 
levels continued to drop, reaching nearly five per cent during 2014,
50
 which 
allowed unions to strengthen their bargaining position during negotiations 
with employers. On the other hand, and perhaps as a result of this last 
aspect, most wage negotiations have produced increases beyond the 
inflation rate, with an average of three per cent above inflation during 
2013
51
 and a similar level during the first semester of 2014.
52
 This indicates 
that labour conflicts, even in the case of a dominance of defensive demands, 
did not imply cuts in real wages, marking a clear difference to the Argentine 
case.  
As outlined earlier in the paper, the capacity to generate economic growth 
was a fundamental basis for the success of the PT governments and the 
maintenance of the class compromises that held it together. The absence of 
that growth led to three significant and interconnected processes: lower 
investment rates and strained economic operations on behalf of the private 
sector; a greater number of conflicts between workers and employers; and a 
fracture in the political alliance between PT and the conservative parties
53
 
that had remained relatively loyal to Dilma Rousseff until then. The labour 
conflicts outlined in this section demonstrate that growing discomfort with 
the economic situation in Brazil has yet to target the national government in 
the form of general strike.
54
 The predominance of defensive demands is also 
an indicator that the situation is changing. The wage hikes satisfied a 
specific aspect of those demands, but as the situation worsens, issues such 
                                                 
50 
DIEESE. “Balanço das negociações dos reajustes salarias do 1º semestre de 2014”. 
Estudos e pesquisas. n. 73, 2014.  
51 
Ibid. 
52 
Ibid. 
53
 This refers to a group of parties that participated in the governing alliance, mainly the 
Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) which has been a governing ally to 
PT and before that to the government of the Cardoso administrations.  
54 
This paper was finished in early 2015, before the rising conflicts of late March, April and 
June in Brazil when several confederations, including CUT, mobilized against the new 
outsourcing law and the conservative economic policy of the government. There have been 
mass strikes in some sectors like construction – especially in the large infrastructural 
projects related to the Growth Acceleration Program –, the transport sector in Rio de 
Janeiro and the banking sector. A significant level of strikes did take place in the 
construction sectors (also in projects related to the World Cup of 2014), but these conflicts 
never reached the level of a general strike and remained constrained to those specific 
sectors. Similarly, the transport workers’ strike in Rio de Janeiro had some relevance to 
national policies, but it was mainly directed at the municipality and at the union leadership 
itself. 
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as layoffs and suspensions in the manufacturing sector will become more 
common.  
 
4. Final remarks 
The analysis presented throughout this paper indicates a significant change 
in labour conflicts – measured by the number of strikes – beginning with the 
slowdown in economic growth in Argentina and Brazil during the period 
2012-2014. Both governing parties, the FPV in Argentina and the PT in 
Brazil, were eager to improve labour relations and constrain labour conflict 
during the largest part of their terms in reaction to the deep economic crises 
produced by the previous, neoliberal administrations. The article has defined 
this as part of a social compromise between a section of the organized 
working class, unorganized informal workers and a significant sector of the 
bourgeoisie. These alliances were not formally arranged and depended on 
three basic premises: first, and most relevant to our understanding, the 
continuation of economic growth; second, leadership on behalf of the 
executive government that could manage the negotiations between the 
sectors; third, a narrative of opposition to neoliberalism. These three pillars 
began to disentangle between 2012 and 2014 for a variety of reasons, some 
of which were outlined throughout this paper. These include changes in the 
international markets – as a consequence of the global economic crisis –, 
new leaderships with a different relationship to labour movements, and the 
usual fatigue of governments in office for more than a decade. The 
combination of these factors makes it more difficult to challenge, as was 
previously done, the dilemma between neo-developmentalism and 
neoliberalism. 
The focus of this paper has been on the correlation between these changing 
dynamics and increases in labour conflicts in both countries over the last 
three years. Even though the level of conflicts is higher in Argentina than in 
Brazil – following a historical trend – there was a clear quantitative increase 
during 2012 for both countries. In the case of Argentina, in just one year 
conflicts increased by over 26 per cent, while in Brazil the same year 
witnessed a 63 per cent increase in strikes. Differences between both 
countries remain, indicated by the distinct responses of the union 
confederations in each country to a similar situation. In Brazil, the majority 
of the trade union confederations remains in negotiations with the PT 
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government,
55
 even while protesting against certain aspects of the 
administrations’ policies. In Argentina, the significant increase in strike 
activity went along with changes in the government-confederation 
relationships, and a significant section of the CGT – led by the truck 
workers’ union leader Hugo Moyano – broke the alliance with the FPV. The 
context of low unemployment and strengthened labour unions is a relevant 
factor that has made unions more comfortable with strike action. 
Particularly important is the fact that even during the worst years of the 
recent economic crisis (2009-2010), unemployment was kept at low levels, 
allowing for an increase in strike activity. In a way, the economic process 
that the labour movement was facing had also provided the conditions for 
that contestation to take place.  
It is also worth mentioning how the differences in local and regional strike 
conflicts were built into national mobilizations in the form of general 
strikes. In Brazil, general strikes are unusual and the confederations have 
resorted to “national days of mobilization” to express discontent. In 
Argentina, general strikes have remained a common tool for trade union 
action to this day. If we look at a medium-term period (1979-2002), Brazil 
experienced seven general strikes, against 39 in that same period in 
Argentina.
56
 This period is not included in this paper, but presents a useful 
comparison in historical terms about the tendencies in each of the labour 
movements. If we look at the period analyzed in this paper, from 2012 to 
2014 Argentina had three general strikes (November 2012, April 2014 and 
August 2014) while Brazil had one (July 2013), which was initiated after the 
massive mobilizations that took the country by surprise in June of that year. 
The reference to general strikes is meant to provide a comparative 
perspective of how trade union conflict at the local level is channelled 
nationally. Even though the increase in conflicts was higher in Brazil, it was 
in Argentina where the centralization of protest in the form of general 
strikes took place. In Brazil, the call for a strike in July 2013 had more to do 
with a late response to social unrest than to specific labour demands. 
Moreover, it is also remarkable that general strikes in both countries took 
                                                 
55 
The main split within the implicit alliance of the major confederations regarding the 
government took place during the national elections of 2014, when a significant section, but 
not all, of Força Sindical sided with the opposition candidate Aécio Neves and began more 
openly criticizing the administration of Dilma Rousseff. As mentioned earlier, other unions 
like Conlutas and Intersindical remained in opposition to PT throughout the decade, but 
they represent a small minority of the overall number of unionized workers.  
56
 CANGUSSU DE SOUZA, Davisson. “Movimiento operario e sindical no Brasil e na 
Argentina: apontamentos para uma analise comparativa”. PIMSA, Documento de Trabajo. 
n.70, 2010.  
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place in non-electoral years, which implies demands beyond specific 
political-electoral intentions.  
Despite the differences between each country, the commonality of rising 
labour conflicts between 2012 and 2014 can be interpreted as a sign of 
changing times in the alliances that had been built in both Argentina and 
Brazil between the centre-left governments and a majority of the labour 
movement. These alliances reached a limit once the model of neo-
developmentalism was faced with serious contradictions and limitations 
especially in terms of the class compromise that sustained it. As Alfredo 
Saad-Filho has asserted,
57
 the continuation of a model of economic growth 
and redistribution in the current international context would have required 
enforcing the neo-developmentalist agenda, especially in terms of regulation 
and taxation of the main economic groups that had benefited throughout the 
decade. Whether due to the correlation of forces at the times of crisis or due 
to the lack of muscle or interest on behalf of the governments to push the 
agenda further, the reality is that the strain on labour relations did take place 
and began to place workers and their organizations at odds with those 
governments that were only just recently supported. Ongoing events in both 
countries show that these contradictions and the following confrontations 
are only increasing.  
This essay presented a panorama of labour relations and conflict in 
Argentina and Brazil in recent years. The realities in these countries are not 
analogous, just as the years of trade union “bonanza” during the Lula 
administration and Nestor Kirchner’s government were not alike either. The 
increasing strike activity during governments that had produced pro-labour 
policies took place in a context of economic slowdown and is a symbol of 
state-labour relations becoming more conflictual. In any case, the growing 
conflicts show that even though state-labour relations can be positive, there 
are persistent difficulties with generating processes that, given the current 
structure of production, can guarantee the basis for stable economic growth 
and a continuous improvement in workers’ conditions. How this dilemma is 
addressed will determine the future of the labour movement and the national 
governments.  
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 SAAD-FILHO, Alfredo. “Mass Protests under ‘Left Neoliberalism’: Brazil, June-July 
2013”. Op. Cit.  
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Strikes and labour relations in China 
Tim Pringle 
 
ntroduction  
Article One of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004) 
could not be clearer. China is a “socialist state under the people’s 
democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance 
of workers and peasants”.1 This apparent collective “exceptionality” of 
China stands in stark contrast to the dominant political ideologies of the 
current individualistic neo-liberal era of capitalist globalisation. However, 
when I look at China through a lens of labour relations and the class 
struggles they generate, the case for China’s “generality” – as opposed to 
“exceptionality” – hoves into view: it is very clear that the country is 
marked by high inequality, a poor implementation of labour laws and an 
obvious power imbalance between the forces of capital and the forces of 
labour relations in which the state mostly supports the former. Seen through 
this lens, China no longer resembles a state “led by the working class” but 
rather a state focussed on containing one that is finding its voice. It is this 
contentious dynamic that I examine in this paper.  
My paper is organised into four sections and concludes with some cautious 
observations on the future development of the nascent labour movement in 
China. The first section shows how economic reform has brought structural 
changes to China’s working class while placing the processes that generated 
these changes in a global context. I conclude the section with data on the 
incidence of resistance to the processes. Section two briefly unpacks the 
                                                 
1
 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Available at 
[http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm] 
Accessed May 20, 2015. 
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trajectory of resistance which, I suggest, has moved from defensive to 
offensive although hardly in a uniform manner. In the third section, I turn to 
the state’s response – including the ACFTU – to class struggles. The fourth 
section discusses specific examples of significant strikes in Guangdong 
province and attempts by the party-led ACFTU to support, deflect or squash 
them.  
The data and motivation for this paper comes from interviews with workers, 
workers’ representatives, labour NGOs (LNGO) and union figures during 
two fieldwork trips in the summers of 2013 and 2014. In total, I carried out 
semi-structured interviews with six workers representatives, 12 LNGO staff 
members and two trade union officials in Guangdong, Beijing and Hong 
Kong. I also draw on data from supervised field work with 23 sanitation 
workers conducted in July 2013 by an LNGO with almost two decades of 
experience of operating in Guangdong. This research was supplemented 
with two days of focus group discussions with four workers’ representatives 
from the Lide strike in July 2015. Furthermore, I also make use of 
secondary materials drawn from academic journals and books, traditional 
and alternative media resources and labour NGO reports in Chinese and 
English. Some of the latter material is not publicly available, but on file with 
the author. Dictated by my fieldwork location of Guangdong, this paper 
draws chiefly on evidence and strikes in this province. 
  
1. The Socialist Market Economy and Capitalist Labour Relations 
The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 opened up a power struggle that would 
determine the future direction of China. Put crudely, on one side the Maoists 
argued for (a) a continuation of the command economy based on the 
privileging of ideology over empirical-technical realities; (b) relative 
equality and; (c) a Party-determined mass line. On the other side were more 
centrist CPC cadres lined up behind a resurgent Deng Xiaoping. A veteran 
revolutionary and senior Communist Party of China (CPC) leader, Deng had 
been a target of Mao’s Red Guards during the turbulent early years of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-69) and was sent to the countryside to ponder his 
ideological shortcomings as a “capitalist roader” while, among other duties, 
cleaning public toilets. Mao’s death cleared his path back to power. After 
two years of manoeuvring, Deng and his supporters emerged as winners and 
in 1978, the Third Plenum of the 11
th
 Party Congress confirmed Deng as 
China’s new leader and signalled the beginning of the “reform and opening 
up” era. China’s transformation from a command economy to a socialist 
market economy in which capitalist labour relations would be gradually re-
introduced and eventually come to dominate had begun.  
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However, this was to be no Chicago-school influenced explosion of 
privatisation as witnessed in Chile in the 1970s or following the collapse of 
the USSR in the 1990s.
2
 The Chinese road away from state socialism is 
summed up in the Chinese idiom “crossing the river while feeling for the 
stones”, that highlights the gradual nature of the transition. Nevertheless, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the writing was on the wall for the Chinese 
working class fairly early on in the process: in 1982, the CPC removed the 
right to strike from the Constitution. At the time, this was justified on the 
basis that Chinese workers “owned” the enterprises that most of them were 
employed in. As a consequence, labour disputes were not seen as disputes 
between labour and capital but as “internal” and between the “people” rather 
than between classes.
3
 Again with hindsight, the net result was that just as 
China began to welcome foreign capital back to its Eastern and Southern 
shores – albeit cautiously and incrementally – the party announced its 
position in the new era: pro-capital in order to be pro-employment. 
Throughout the reform era, the CPC has consistently linked its political 
survival with the social stability it believes employment promotion brings.
4
 
In this situation, the legality of strikes remained a grey area. They were 
neither criminalised nor protected under law. In any case, the dramatic 
increase in strikes since 2004 suggests that workers have not been deterred 
by the lack of legal clarity and, on occasion, have even used it to their 
advantage. 
In the transition period, a perfect storm was brewing for the working class: 
in the then largely unknown world beyond Chinese borders, neoliberalism 
heralded a “momentous shift towards greater social inequality and the 
restoration of economic power to the upper class”.5 Within China, the 
gradual return of private capital and competitively-driven labour markets 
heralded the demise of industrial relations based on the integrated interests 
of managers and workers within a 单位 (work unit – usually involving at 
least one state-owned enterprise) working to meet production targets 
                                                 
2
 PRINGLE, T. AND CLARKE, S. The Challenge of Transition: Trade unions in Russia, 
China and Vietnam. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
3
INTERNATIONAL HONG KONG LIAISON OFFICE. Available at: 
[http://www.ihlo.org/IS/000805.html] Accessed on 20 May 2015. See also: 
[http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/000204.html]. 2002. Accessed 27 May 2015.  
4
 WHITE, G. “Restructuring the working class: labor reform in post-Mao China”. In: 
DIRLIK, A. and MEISNER, M. (eds.) Marxism and the Chinese experience. New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1989, pp. 152-170; NAUGHTON, B. Growing out of the plan: Chinese 
economic reform 1978-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; BLECHER, 
M. “Hegemony and workers’ politics in China”. China Quarterly. 170, 2002. pp. 283-303. 
5
 HARVEY, D. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 26.  
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negotiated with the central planners. In their place came contract-based 
time-defined capitalist labour relationships as the state worked to create an 
investment friendly environment aimed at attracting foreign investment 
initially led by capitalists from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South 
Korea.  
The storm did indeed hit the Chinese working class, but the warning flag 
was not officially hoisted in full view until the 15
th
 Party Congress held in 
1997 with the slogans 裁员增效 (shed jobs to increase efficiency) and抓大
放小 (let go of small and medium size enterprises and hold on to the large 
ones).
6
 The Congress announced full-scale restructuring and at least partial 
privatisation of the state sector. Small and medium-sized state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and some larger ones were privatised or bankrupted 
while the state held on to larger enterprises in key sectors such as energy 
and construction. The storm struck hardest in the urban heartlands of Maoist 
industry generating up to 50 million lay-offs of state-owned workers by 
2004.
7
 This traumatic and contested unmaking of the traditional working 
class
8
 was accompanied by the making of what some researchers refer to a 
“new working class”9 or 新工人群体 – literally new groups of workers.10 
By the end of 2009, China had just under 230 million internal migrant 
workers,
11
 most of whom were working in the private sector: joint ventures 
between foreign capital and Chinese companies, foreign-owned firms, 
Chinese-owned firms – including labour dispatch agencies providing agency 
workers to SOEs and township and village enterprises known as TVEs. 
These were the relics of agricultural communes that were privatised 
following a period of local government-led enterprise.
12
 The pluralisation of 
ownership took full advantage of a transition period with characteristics 
                                                 
6
 PRINGLE, T. Trade Unions in China: the challenge of labour unrest. Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2011, pp. 56-86. 
7
 PRINGLE, T. and LEUNG, A. “Causes, implementation and consequences of ‘xiagang’”. 
In: LUK, P. (ed.) Xiagang: Sacrifice in the Transformation of Labour Policy in the China 
from State to Market. Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Resource Centre.  
8
 CHEN FENG. “Industrial restructuring and workers’ resistance in China”. Modern China. 
2003, pp. 236-62. 
9
 CHAN, Jenny; PUN, Ngai; SELDEN, Mark. “The Politics of Global Production: Apple, 
Foxconn and China’s New Working Class”. New Technology, Work and Employment. Vol. 
28, n. 2, 2013, pp. 100-15. 
10
 吕途。 中国新工人迷失与崛起。北京：法律出版社。2013. p. 11 
11
 ILO. “Labour Migration”. Available at: [http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labour-
migration/lang--en/index.htm]. Accessed 10 January 2015.  
12
 WU FULONG. “China’s changing urban governance in the transition towards a more 
market-orientated economy”. Urban Studies. Vol. 39, n. 7, 2002, p. 1075.  
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often found in post socialist states: an evolving and largely non-enforced 
regulatory framework for labour relations; close links between powerful 
local government officials and agents of capital; a monopolistic trade union 
under the leadership of the ruling Party
13
; and severe repression of workers 
who attempted to organise autonomously.
14
  
Capitalists in China have proved adept at operating in this pro-investor/pro-
capital framework and have worked hard at either taking advantage of 
existing fragmentary pressures in labour forces or creating new ones. The 
large-scale labour migration of the reform era has been conducted under the 
administrative constraints of the hukou system that restricts access to public 
and welfare services to one’s place of birth. The consequent absence of state 
support for labour migrants has forced workers to rely on informal networks 
of support such as hometown associations. In some cases, capitalists were 
able to manipulate these networks as instruments of division; in other cases, 
they served to unite workers as struggles unfolded.
15
 Processes of 
informalisation associated with neoliberalism have also been important to 
capitalists. For example, workplace solidarity has been weakened by the 
widespread use of student interns by companies such as Foxconn
16
 as well 
as agency workers in key sectors such as the auto industry.
17
  
Incidents of resistance arising from the return of capitalist labour relations 
and related protests have increased numerically over time. Official data for 
so-called “mass incidents” (群体性事件), which are loosely defined as 
expressions of “civil unrest” 18 involving significant numbers of people, 
state there were 87,000 such protests in 2005.
19
 Researcher Yu Jianrong 
argued that there were over 90,000 in 2009 – with over 30 per cent of these 
related to labour incidents.
20
 However, the number of strikes as a component 
                                                 
13
 This was not the case in the former USSR where the state trade union split from the Party 
in 1987 eventually forming the FNPR.  
14
 PRINGLE AND CLARKE. Op Cit.  
15
 KING-CHI CHAN, Chris. “Strike and changing workplace relations in a Chinese global 
factory’. Industrial Relations Journal”. Vol. 40, n.1, 2009, pp 60-77. 
16
 CHAN, Jenny; PUN, Ngai; and SELDEN, Mark. “Interns or Workers? China’s Student 
Labor 
Regime.” Asian Studies 2016 (forthcoming).  
17
 ZHANG, Lu. Inside China’s Automobile Factories: The Politics of Labor and Worker 
Resistance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
18
 JUSTINE ZHENG REN. ‘‘Mass incidents’ in China’. Available at: 
[http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/13/mass-incidents-in-china/] Accessed on 12 
January 2015. 
19
 FREEMAN, W. “The accuracy of “mass incidents’”. Financial Times. 2 March 2010.  
20
 于建嵘. ‘ 群体性事件症结在于官民矛盾’. 中国报道. 2010. pp. 50-51.  
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of these figures is not known, and the state prohibits publication of national 
statistics on strike days lost. Indeed, in 2006 it stopped publishing data on 
“mass incidents” altogether. An alternative indication of unrest can be found 
in official records of labour dispute mediation and arbitration committees 
along with civil court records. These sources reflect the state’s efforts to 
construct formal institutions of labour dispute settlement that I will discuss 
in the next section. Despite the well-documented problems with the data 
collection
21
, they suggest a story of rising rights consciousness 
22
 and a 
willingness to pursue employers through juridical channels. Figure 1 below 
shows the significant rise in arbitration via cases and numbers of workers 
involved. The leap in 2008 was the outcome of the promulgation of the 
Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the impact of the 
financial crisis that led to over 26 million lay-offs.
23
 
Interesting though these figures are as a guide to overall trends, they tell us 
little about the changing forms of labour unrest or, indeed, the emergence of 
a labour movement.
24
 Increased reporting of strikes in the state media has 
prompted the use of internet technology to compile strike maps based on 
media and witness reports. China Labour Bulletin (CLB) recorded 1793 
strikes in the 2013-14 period with just over a quarter occurring in 
Guangdong province.
25
 The map records 235 incidents in the first quarter of 
2014, an increase of 49 per cent on the same period in 2013 that had 158 
incidents, and 180 per cent higher than the second quarter of 2012, which 
featured 84 strikes. CLB qualify this increase by stating that the rapid 
development of verifiable social media reports of disputes included in their 
database that have made strikes more visible.
26
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 PRINGLE AND CLARKE. Op. Cit. pp. 120-123. 
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 GALLAGHER, M and DONG, B. “Legislating Harmony: Labor Law Reform in 
Contemporary China”. In: KURUVILLA, Sarosh; LEE, Ching Kwan and GALLAGHER, 
Mary E. (eds.) From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalisation. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2011, pp 36-60. 
COONEY, S., BIDDULPH, S. and YING ZHU. Law and Fair Work in China. London: 
Routledge, 2013.  
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 MITCHELL, T. “China’s Migrant Workers Face Bleak Outlook”. Financial Times. 9 
February 2009. 
24
 PRINGLE, T. “Reflections on Labor in China: From a moment to a movement”. South 
Atlantic Quarterly. 112, 1, 2013, pp. 191-202. CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. “The 
Workers Movement in China: 2011-13”. Available at: [http://www.clb.org.hk/en/research-
reports]. Accessed 17 January 2015.  
25
 CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. ‘中国工人运动观察报告2013-14’. Available at: 
[http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/stepping-breach-labour-groups-start-take-role-trade-
union-china] Accessed on 21 May 2015.  
26
 CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. The strike map is available here: 
[http://www.numble.com/PHP/mysql/clbmape.html] Accessed 12 May 2015. 
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Figure 1: Labour Arbitration 1996-2011 
 
As dramatic as the statistics are, the changing nature of resistance is perhaps 
more important for our discussion here. Put very generally, there has been a 
transformation in the methods workers deploy to pursue demands. Strikes 
aimed at forcing employers to negotiate over wages, conditions and more 
recently social insurance payments have replaced short protests that had a 
much lower impact on production and were aimed at pressuring state 
officials to intervene directly and discipline employers over below-
minimum wages, wage arrears, overtime payments as well as compensation 
for factory movement to other areas. Over the last five years, the rise in 
what might be termed non-defensive strikes with demands that go beyond 
state-determined minimum wages has been further nuanced by a marked 
trend in strikes related to arrears in social security contributions or 
compensation relocation. While seemingly defensive in nature, this 
additional set of rights-based demands nevertheless reflects the same 
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increased capacity to organise against capital and state that has resulted in 
wage-based strikes.  
This shift in the forms of labour unrest is certainly not uniform across the 
country, and I do not suggest that a protest aimed at involving the state rules 
out a strike aimed at bargaining with capital. It has been characterised by 
some as a transition from protests over rights that have been fragmented by 
state juridical procedures into individual disputes to strikes over interests 
that are based on collective bargaining as an instrument of dispute resolution 
and even dispute avoidance.
27
 The state, the ACFTU and labour 
representatives and their supporters have, to various degrees and for 
different reasons, advocated forms of collective bargaining.
28
 Employers 
have been less enthusiastic.
29
 In the following section will attempt to 
unpack, briefly, the logistics of this complicated and nuanced 
transformation.  
 
2. The changing trajectory of labour unrest 
Labour protests throughout the 1990s and the first few years of this century 
reflected the early processes of China’s transition from a command to a 
market economy outlined above. As we have said, the main tactic of 
workers in both the state and private sectors was to get state officials 
involved in reaching a solution. But the logic behind these tactics was not 
the same for state workers as it was for migrants. The latter were many 
hundreds of miles from their home – often in special economic zones set up 
in south or east China. As we have seen, their ability to survive without 
wages away from family support networks was severely constrained by 
administrative restrictions on their rights to stay in a city without work or 
access to welfare associated with urban residence. Moreover, there was a 
large reserve army of labour in the countryside enabling employers to 
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replace “troublemakers” with or without the coordinated assistance of the 
local state. As the scholar Han Deqiang observed in 2002: 
Outside the gates of every enterprise in our so-called Special Economic 
Zones you can see small crowds of workers who are waiting to be hired 
even if the factory has no hiring policy at the time. When they do hire, 
this small crowd quickly turns into a crush of desperate migrant 
workers.
30
  
Trade union representation for migrants was weak to non-existent. In fact, 
the ACFTU did not recognise migrant workers as potential members until 
2003 and generally referred to them by using the state-constructed parlance 
of “peasant workers” (农民工). Faced with these constraints, workers’ 
tactics focussed on a mix of marches down to government offices or even a 
highway blocking – as opposed to declared strikes and picket lines – as well 
as testing the evolving juridical procedures of arbitration and the courts 
sometimes with the help of labour NGOs that were especially active in the 
southern province of Guangdong.  
In contrast, the logic underpinning resistance by workers in the restructuring 
state sector was determined by a somewhat different context. There were 
four main differences. First, although SOE workers were being 
automatically enrolled into the union, the possibility of the Party-led 
ACFTU leading opposition to a key CPC policy – SOE restructuring – were 
almost zero. Constitutionally, the ACFTU’s role was – and is – blurred by 
references to its mission to protect “the overall interests of the entire 
Chinese people” rather than the sectional interests of groups of workers. It 
works to “implement the Party’s basic line of centring on [the] economic 
construction”.31 As such, the union spent far more energy persuading its 
members to accept phased lay-offs and seek alternative employment – often 
vulnerable self-employment – rather than challenging the policy itself. In 
this way, the organisation adhered to its traditional role developed in the 
command economy era as a productivity orientated labour welfare 
bureaucracy rather than a trade union representing the interests of its 
members. Second, the redundancy policy was partially ameliorated by state-
imposed obligations on SOEs to keep laid off workers on their books for 
three years, provide retraining and livelihood stipends as well as medical 
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expenses. While these obligations were often ignored, acquisition of such 
entitlements nevertheless became the focus of widespread, but scattered 
protests
32
 and workers rarely demanded their jobs back. Third, the 
development of more actively class conscious and linked up resistance was 
constrained by the political framing of restructuring itself as references to 
the sensitive term of “privatisation” were studiously avoided in the official 
discourse. When the term was deployed either by radical market reformers 
or in the narrative of resistance, workers were more likely to refuse to “enter 
new property relations disadvantageous to them”.33 Finally, the material 
conditions necessary for strike action were rarely in place. The careful 
sequencing of the restructuring project by the state meant that workers’ 
protests erupted after they were stood down.
34
 As one labour academic from 
the ACFTU’s Labour Relations Institute pointed out at a seminar in Hong 
Kong in July 2001 there was often “no work to strike against!” (无工可罢!)  
As we can see, throughout this period the balance of class forces was 
heavily weighted in favour of capital. Migrant workers’ wages in 
Guangdong did not rise in real terms for 12 years
35
 and across China up to 
50 million SOE workers found themselves moved “from the centre to the 
margins of society”.36 This grim scenario began to change from 2003 
onwards and as a result, the passive and defensive nature of both migrant 
and urban worker protests depicted above has gradually transformed into 
resistance primarily based on strikes or at least the threat of them. For 
reasons of space, I will only highlight what I think are the three most 
important factors explaining this change. There are, of course, many more. 
Firstly, a bank of knowledge on the factory system itself has accumulated 
among migrant workers sometimes with the assistance of LNGOs. In turn, 
these LNGOs are nurturing a cadre of worker representatives with 
experience of collective bargaining and organisational leadership – 
sometimes both. In more recent years, the internet and social media has 
facilitated both the transfer of such knowledge and the dissemination of 
information on strikes. Workers and their supporters have used the 
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technology as a tool to organise in and beyond a given strike location. For 
example, mobile phone apps have been deployed to organise solidarity 
actions by sympathetic groups (群) of activists, lawyers, scholars and 
students – such as raising money to pay hospital fees of strikers injured by 
police attacks on picket lines.
37
 In another example, workers representatives 
at Lide shoe factory used the Chinese mobile phone and computer 
application weibo to publish up to 28 strike and organising updates.
38
 
Secondly, the political and material space between migrants and urban 
workers has diminished over the last decade. This is the result of a mix of 
factors, but primarily the privatisation of SOEs and convergence with 
private sector labour relations regimes; and the state’s alarm at growing 
inequalities and policies to address them, especially the policy of rapid 
urbanisation of central and western areas and the concomitant loosening of 
urban residence restrictions referred to earlier. While this has not yet 
produced a significant trend of examples of sustained solidarity between 
urban and migrant workers, the material conditions for such a scenario are 
increasingly in place as the distance between production and the 
reproduction of labour narrows.
39
  
But perhaps the most important factor driving the emergence of a labour 
movement based on well-publicised strikes as opposed to isolated protests 
has been the labour shortages that began in South and East China and are 
now a key feature of Chinese labour markets in many parts of the country.
40
 
This has put workers in a much stronger bargaining position. The 
aforementioned absence of statistics on strike days lost renders this change 
difficult to quantify but there is a growing body of labour academics 
referring to the “collectivisation of labour relations” emerging in the wake 
of labour unrest in part generated by structural labour shortages.
41
 While 
some of this literature is based on legal reform,
42
 others have analysed 
labour unrest, strikes and institutional responses to track this shift in the 
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balance of class forces.
43
 As we shall see in the following section, the 
combination of shortages of labour and increasing militancy moderated state 
policy under the previous leadership of Hu Jintao as the consolidation of a 
legal framework seemed to open up the space for labour militancy and 
foster a qualified tolerance of LNGOs activities at least in the South. The 
current regime of Xi Jinping has been far less tolerant although strikes 
continue to be a significant feature of labour relations keeping them near the 
top of the state’s agenda.44  
 
3. The State Response to Labour Unrest 
The response of the Chinese state – including the ACFTU – to labour 
militancy fits into three broad categories: legal, representational and 
political. My focus here is on the first two categories, but I will 
contextualise the discussion with a brief foray into a political analysis of the 
state’s response to unrest in general.  
In the broadest terms, the Chinese state moved from repression to 
concession in dealing with unrest in general and labour unrest in particular 
during the Hu Jintao era.
45
 Finding a balance between stability and rights 
has been an obsession with Chinese officials in Guangdong for over a 
decade. Failure to prevent an enterprise-based strike from developing into a 
strike wave can have serious career-related repercussions for state officials, 
and there is a reluctance to resort to repression for fear of providing the 
proverbial spark that ignites the prairie fire. The “soft” approach of the Hu-
Wen era is well-documented in the literature
46
 and represented a significant 
drain on non-police budgets as resources were re-directed towards 
upholding social peace. There is also the strong possibility that the legacy of 
this approach will constrain the development of more sustainable forms of 
dispute resolution as have been already piloted such as annual collective 
bargaining.
47
  
                                                 
43
 CHAN, C. The Challenge of Labour in China: strikes and the changing labour regime in 
global factories. New York: Routledge, 2010. PRINGLE, T. Trade Unions in China: The 
challenge of labour unrest. London: Routledge, 2011. FRIEDMAN, E. The Insurgency 
Trap: Labor, politics in post-socialist China. Ithaca: ILR Press, 2014. 
44
 CHUN HAN WONG. Op. Cit.  
45
 PRINGLE AND CLARKE. Op. Cit. 
46
 GALLAGHER, M. “China’s Workers Movement and the End of the Rapid-Growth Era”. 
Dædalus: The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 143(2), 2014, pp. 
81-95; CHEN, XI. Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
47
 I am grateful to Jenny Chan for highlighting this outcome and pointing me towards the 
“activist state” literature. On annual collective bargaining see PRINGLE, T. and MENG 
134 Tim Pringle 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
In contrast, the Xi Jinping era has displayed a far less tolerant attitude 
towards both civil society and labour activism since 2012.
48
 In Guangdong 
and no doubt beyond, this has spilled over into violent assaults on labour 
activists by unidentified men and the deployment of riot police in some 
strikes but does not appear to have had any marked impact on the 
willingness of workers to take such actions.
49
 Indeed, the anti-corruption 
campaign that has accompanied the Xi crackdown has also been directed at 
both state officials and capitalists. It may even be an opportunity for 
workers to pursue non-wage claims such as embezzlement of workers’ 
social security funds as was partly the case at the Yue Yuen strike discussed 
below.  
After years of gradualism, China’s legal framework for labour relations 
received a considerable boost in 2008 when three important labour-related 
laws were passed: the Labour Contract Law (LCL); the Labour Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Law (LMAL) and the Employment Law that was 
designed to coordinate employment agencies and reduce discrimination in 
the labour market. The LCL was an attempt to slow the rate of 
informalisation of employment and discipline employers into issuing 
permanent contracts to employees who had completed two consecutive 
fixed-term contracts (Article 14). In contrast to the earlier national Labour 
Law on 1995, the LCL carries an entire chapter on collective contracts 
signalling the state’s intention to move away from the individualised nature 
of the first national Labour Law promulgated in 1995 and perhaps giving 
more credibility to the ‘collectivisation’ literature referred to earlier.  
The LMAL was part of a general policy of channelling disputes into a two-
tiered juridical system of dispute resolution thus containing militancy in a 
rights-based discourse that keeps people in the courts and off the streets. As 
we can see from Figure 1, this certainly had an effect in terms of the sheer 
numbers of workers applying for arbitration, and the data trend is largely the 
same for court settlements.
50
 It also facilitated a consolidation of “legal 
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activism” that crossed over into ACFTU output as it trained substantial 
numbers of lawyers to represent members. However, the union has tended to 
stick to cases it can win. In Guangdong province, the subsequent vacuum 
has been filled partially by LNGOs alongside growing numbers of self-
trained paralegal activists and labour lawyers. The attitude of the 
Guangdong Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) towards such groups has 
wavered between offers of cooperation to wariness and suspicion of foreign 
funding and interference – stances that usually reflect the wider political 
climate of the time.  
An important addition to the framework came in 2011 with the Social 
Insurance Law. Article 95 expanded all five components of social insurance 
to all workers including migrant workers. The five components are 
pensions, unemployment, medical, work-related injury and maternity 
insurance. Importantly for migrant workers, the law stipulated that social 
insurance accounts may be moved from one workplace to another. 
However, this has proved very difficult to implement due to the “highly 
localized nature of the social welfare system...getting different jurisdictions 
to share information is fraught with bureaucratic and technical difficulties, 
especially for workers coming from rural areas of China”.51 Coverage for 
migrant workers remains very low. For example, according to a survey 
conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics in 2013, only 15 per cent of 
migrant workers employed outside their home province had pension 
accounts.
52
 At the same time, its promulgation has served as a legal context 
for strikes over social insurance premiums especially among older migrant 
workers. The strike discussed below by 40,000 workers at the Yue Yuen 
shoe factory in April 2014 was an important example. 
The second tier of the Chinese state’s response to labour unrest relates to the 
crucial question of representation – in my view the “elephant in the room” 
that impinges on all discussions on labour relations in China. As we have 
seen, the ACFTU remains a Party-led institution that has been slow and 
constrained in its adaption to the challenges presented by capitalist labour 
relations. Its role during the command economy era was primarily directive 
rather than representative and prioritised the meeting of production targets 
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and welfare rather than defence of their members’ interests.53 The 
organisation was hit hard by SOE restructuring losing up to 30 million 
members and a large number of experienced cadres prompting a 
membership drive that focused on migrant workers and the private sector. 
This has been enormously successful as the union had over 239 million 
members and rising in 2010 and a much stronger formal presence in the 
private sector.
54
 
However, the organisation remains limited in its capacity to represent 
members’ interests. At enterprise level, the issue is not just party leadership, 
but how the absence of freedom of association produces a structural reliance 
on capital. As I make clear in the following analysis of significant strikes, 
until recently, enterprise-level trade union representatives were almost 
always appointed by the employer and reliant on the latter for their 
livelihood – indeed this is often still the case despite regulatory constraints 
on such practices. While union appointments are supposed to be ratified by 
the next level up in the trade union, higher unions rarely get involved in 
such matters unless actions by workers compel them to do so. Strikes in 
which workers call for a re-organisation or re-election of an enterprise trade 
union committee are particularly important as improved representation is 
germane to developing an effective system of collective bargaining. But it is 
not elections in and of themselves that are the crucial issue here. Rather, it is 
the sustainability of, and support for, the trade union committee that 
emerges from an election process.  
 
4. Significant Strikes  
The famous 19-day strike in May 2010 by auto-parts workers and student 
interns on “vocational training” at the Nanhai Honda factory in Foshan kick-
started a strike wave that generated wage increases of up to 40 per cent in 
and beyond Guangdong.
55
 While most of the copy cat strikes that followed 
focused on pay, the Nanhai strike also demanded a re-organised trade union 
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committee at the plant.
56
 Following opposition to the strikers’ demands from 
management at the factory and the local district-level union – the latter 
leading to physical scuffles – more reform-minded union organisations 
located at a higher level stepped in and organised the election of a trade 
union committee. The higher union also facilitated talks between 
management and elected worker representatives that won a 32 per cent pay 
rise for the workers and a 70 per cent increase for the student interns.
57
 
Subsequent rounds of collective bargaining at the plant produced well-
above-inflation pay rises. However, the union committee has since been 
consistently undermined by management with union elections restricted to 
small sections of 20 or 30 workers electing a union committee that is largely 
devoid of shop floor representatives.
58
 Despite another short and victorious 
strike in 2013, key activists have left the factory and the previously ground-
breaking union branch appears to have “retreated to the backwaters of the 
workers’ movement”.59  
Nevertheless, the Nanhai strike is often referred to as a watershed moment 
in the emergence of China’s labour movement.60 There are two aspects of 
the strike that justify this status. First, the widespread global and local 
publicity that the strike received has finally put to bed the passive victim 
narrative that had underpinned much mainstream opinion of workers in 
China up until the strike. Of course, the growing confidence of Chinese 
workers to constrain capital by collective action had been discussed in 
academic papers, internal reports of both LNGO staffers, capitalist networks 
and the state as well as the occasionally insightful media report from 
approximately 2008 onwards. But the channelling of this energy into a 
globally supported 19-day strike that included the demand for an elected 
trade union committee eliciting the public support of senior trade union 
officials in Guangdong province was new territory.  
Furthermore, as the momentum continued and the strikes spread, they 
generated an outcome significant from an ACFTU policy perspective and, 
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more importantly, a labour movement perspective. The demands for 
representation at Nanhai did not suddenly emerge. Similar demands for 
improved accountability had been growing in Guangdong for some time. 
However, traditional regulatory conditions for direct elections of trade union 
representatives had been the absence of labour disputes or militancy of any 
form as well as restrictions on the size of factories.
61
 But the dilemma facing 
the ACFTU was that the increase in strike action lent urgency to the need 
for a more proactive response from trade unions on issues of both 
representation and bargaining. In Guangdong, the combination of predatory 
capital, labour shortages, experienced LNGOs and increased strike activity 
persuaded reform-minded leaders in union federations at city and provincial 
level to allow contained experiments in the direct election of enterprise-
level trade union representatives and processes of bargaining. While not 
unprecedented
62
, these initiatives go way beyond previous pilot projects 
elsewhere in China.
63
 However, they are largely restricted to specific sectors 
where workers enjoy significant structural power having won significant 
pay rises and concessions. In terms of policy, union elections were no 
longer confined to safe havens of strike-free factories and came to be seen 
by more forward-thinking union officials as a way of improving the 
representative performance of the ACFTU. This change in policy was 
motivated in part by wanting to defend workers’ interests but equally, if not 
more so, by the need to maintain broader stability via the reduction of 
strikes. As the former chair of the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions 
explained during a discussion in 2014: 
We were concerned about the strike for two reasons. First, it was a 
manifestation of the power workers had acquired under the conditions of 
globalisation. Secondly, it was a threat to the upholding of social stability 
and economic development. These two things are closely linked and they 
are both a concern and challenge for our trade unions and their future 
development.
64
  
Following further strikes and elections of trade union committees, the 
Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) announced in May 2012 that 
direct elections for enterprise-level trade unions would be rolled out across 
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163 enterprises in the city with more than 1,000 employees. Though 
significant from a policy perspective and opening up organising space for 
activists in the workplace, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that 
trade union elections are not as effective as strikes. Moreover, as the history 
of trade unions all too painfully demonstrates, employers can undermine 
elections by ensuring middle managers are elected rather than workers or by 
harassing, dismissing or promoting elected representatives as well as 
denying union time. In October 2013, university student researchers from 
the LNGO Student and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour 
(SACOM) wrote an open letter to the SFTU. They claimed that only two out 
the five factories their researchers visited clandestinely had effective union 
branches.
65
 
Potentially more important is the impact strikes are having in generating 
both experience and leadership in an emerging labour movement that 
appears to be acquiring a momentum despite attacks on activists and a 
repressive environment. Two strikes in the shoe industry demonstrate my 
point. A significant strike shook the authorities of Dongguan city both in its 
scale of 40,000 workers and the intensity of ill-feeling toward management. 
The strike was ostensibly over the failure of management at the giant 
Taiwanese-owned Yue Yuen shoe plant to pay full social security premiums 
into workers’ accounts. However, while this was definitely an issue, activist 
blogs, interviews with veteran workers and LNGOs providing support 
revealed that the strike was also connected to frustration with overall pay 
levels. There was no direct bargaining with management and the strike was 
important due to its size, duration of almost two weeks and the symbolic 
message of shop-floor power and solidarity. As the strike died down in the 
face of management concessions and strong pressure on workers to return to 
worker by the authorities, including the GFTU, one veteran worker 
predicted in an interview on a blog called Worker View Point that there 
“will be a big strike within half a year and there will only be one demand – a 
raise of at least 30 per cent. Workers can’t live on 2,300-2,400 Yuan!”66 The 
impact and lessons of the strike, in particular the need for accountable 
representatives and collective bargaining re-emerged not at Yue Yuen, but 
bore fruit at a much smaller shoe factory approximately 40 miles away.  
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The capacity of workers to elect and re-elect bargaining representatives was 
illustrated by a series of strikes and negotiations at the Lide Shoe Factory. 
The initial dispute was triggered in April 2014 by concerns over the 
factory’s planned relocation and subsequent attempts by management to 
force workers to sign new contracts in order to avoid social insurance 
arrears dating back to 1995.
67
 During the following six months, increasing 
numbers of the 2,500 workers at Lide took part in three strikes, the last 
involving 1,000 workers in December 2014. The time between April and 
December was used by workers to acquire training in collective bargaining, 
electing representatives and organising with support from local LNGOs. 
During the third strike, workers’ representatives immediately set about 
organising a solidarity fund and a social media blog as well as appointing 
picket marshals and media coordinators. Arrests of workers, issues with 
accountability and frequent bargaining in bad faith by management
68
 
eventually led to a five-night and six-day picket of the factory gates by 300 
workers and their representatives in April 2015 to prevent management 
from moving equipment and goods to another location.
69
 Following 
meetings with Lide and local government representatives, Lide agreed to 
pay all outstanding social insurance payments and pay relocation 
compensation in accordance with the law. The New Citizen Movement’s 
website referred to the victory as an historic breakthrough in terms of 
solidarity building and collective bargaining as well as a significant 
breakthrough for the labour movement in Guangdong’s Pearl River Delta.70 
This said, the focus group discussions I attended with four – and this has to 
be said – “inspiring” women organisers from Lide in the aftermath of their 
victory also revealed the challenges for the future evolution of a labour 
movement growing from below. Chief among them is the industrial 
upgrading in Guangdong province that was at least in part behind the Lide 
decision to relocate and downsize. All the organisers I spoke with had taken 
the redundancy pay outs they had won through struggle rather than offers of 
re-employment with due seniority of up to 19 years in the case of one 
                                                 
67
 CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN. “Shoe factory workers show collective bargaining is 
already a reality in Guangdong”. 2015. Available at: 
[http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/shoe-factory-workers-show-collective-bargaining-
already-reality-guangdong]. Accessed 20 May 2015.  
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 LIDE UPDATE 28. Available at: [http://www.weibo.com/p/1001603843556757369247] 
2015. Accessed 23 May 2015.  
69
 See ‘利得工人集体维权行动升级300多工人雨夜集体保护’. Available at: 
[http://www.weibo.com/p/1001603834006134222688] Accessed 22 May 2015.  
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organiser. Two of them said they would work with the LNGOs that had 
offered assistance throughout the struggle. One was not sure and a fourth 
planned to help run her son’s business. The trend of experienced workplace 
representatives leaving workplaces – often due to dismissal – following a 
dispute will likely continue against a background of relocation and closures 
arising from increasing diversity in capital flows to other provinces or 
abroad and an ongoing drop in exports. While the experience of such leaders 
and organisers is unlikely to be entirely lost, the labour movement would 
gain more from their ongoing presence in the workplace, negotiating and 
constraining capital, ensuring union accountability and building sector-level 
networks. Training from the outside is no substitute for representation and 
experience on the inside.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that when viewed through a labour relation lens, China’s 
“exceptionality” fades somewhat. It is replaced, or perhaps upstaged, by the 
growing militancy of a working class that is beginning to constrain capital. 
Also in sharp focus are the efforts by the party state to neutralise an 
emerging labour movement. Its strategy has included attempts to slow the 
rate of informalisation with legal reforms, notably via the Labour Contract 
Law; and experimentally, via toleration of accountable collective bargaining 
between workers’ representatives and employers – albeit in what often 
amounts to factory “closure bargaining”. In cases of annual collective 
bargaining, both state union and capital have moved to head off the potential 
for accountable collective bargaining. They have generated further militancy 
by taking back representation, to various degrees, under ACFTU control. 
This happened at Honda Nanhai factory and in the auto sector in general. 
Nevertheless, what is new and most significant in this scenario is the 
emergence of a layer of workers’ representatives, collective bargaining 
representatives and organisers who are acquiring significant experience due 
to the sheer frequency of strikes. This small group does not directly 
challenge the ACFTU but instead focuses almost entirely on collective 
bargaining and organisational skills in the workplace. Its members have so 
far survived the state’s more recent attempts to intimidate, co-opt and in 
some cases imprison them in order to reduce their influence. Their ability to 
continue to have an impact on the ongoing evolution of China’s labour 
relations and labour movement will depend on the party state not resorting 
to more comprehensive repression and equally important, the continuing 
frequency of strikes. 
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The strike as a challenge to the North and to the South
1
  
Hermes Augusto Costa and Hugo Dias 
 
ntroduction  
Historically, the strike represented a sign of resistance to the mechanisms of 
oppression generated by capitalism, becoming common in Europe and in the 
United States in the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the 
twentieth century.
2
 Its general features involve “forms of struggle, coercion 
and power in which a group of workers collectively stops working to 
enforce economic, social and/or political demands that matter to those 
directly concerned and/or others”.3 Thus, as a way of struggling for change 
in the unbalanced power relation between capital and labor, the strike 
consolidates itself as a mechanism for labour democracy. Today, however, it 
is called into question in different geographical, social and political 
contexts, as well as in the context of adverse economic scenarios. This 
seems to happen not only in countries associated with the “Global North”, 
labelled as developed or part of hegemonic regional blocs (such as the 
European Union), but also in countries associated with the “Global South”, 
which includes both the least developed countries and emerging 
economies.
4
  
                                                 
1
 A first draft of this text was presented in the international colloquium “Epistemologies of 
the South: South-South, South-North and North-South global learnings”, Coimbra, Faculty 
of Economics, 11 July 2014. 
2
 SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa. “A greve geral”. Visão, 17 de novembro 2011. 
3
 VAN DER LINDEN, Marcel. Workers of the world - Essays toward a Global Labor 
History. Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 182-183.  
4
 COSTA, Hermes Augusto; DIAS, Hugo. “A Greve e a democracia: desafios para o Norte e 
o Sul, paper presented at the International Colloquium “Epistemologies of the South: 
South-South, South-North and North-South global learnings”. Coimbra, Faculdade de 
Economia, 11 July 2014. 
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Considering that the important missions of regulating labor activity and 
boosting strike activity were attributed to trade unions, some starting 
questions guide our reflection in this text: considering the origins of trade 
unionism are found in the “Global North” – that is, in the context of the 
Industrial Revolution and the “national-industrial-colonial” era5 –, is 
Northern trade unionism prepared to embrace “Global South visions” more 
prone to a postcolonial perspective? To what extent can the literature on 
“epistemologies of the South” – which maximizes the adoption of anti-
capitalist, anti-colonial and anti-patriarchal attitudes
6
 – be considered a 
reference guide to trade unionism in the “Global North”? What can the old 
trade unionism, accustomed to struggle (through strikes) to protect jobs and 
stabilize job sectors, learn from a new trade unionism that sees the strike as 
a way to incorporate precarious and unstable sectors of society? And to 
what extent, in the twenty-first century, can Southern trade unionism 
replicate the “good practices” that trade unionism in the North established 
during the “golden age” of the twentieth century? 
We have no answer to these questions, nor do we have space in this article 
to debate each one in detail. However, our concern here is to try to 
understand to what extent the strike – as one of the instruments of trade 
union direct action – raises challenges to countries with different contexts, 
especially with regard to countries of the “South of the North” (such as 
Portugal) and countries of the “North of the South” (like India). Through 
this article, we intend to confront two realities concerning the phenomenon 
of the strike. However, we do not intend to present a comparative analysis, 
as we understand that Portugal and India are two countries with very 
different historical, geographical, socio-political and cultural dimensions. 
Similarly, the characteristics of the labour market, the role of trade union 
actors and labour law, among other factors, probably have more features 
that separate than unite the two. In any case, we are interested in seeking a 
rapprochement that can function as a mutual learning process between the 
two countries, as this can also demonstrate the challenges facing labour 
market actors (trade unions, workers, society movements) both in the North 
and in the South. 
                                                 
5
 WATERMAN, Peter. Recovering internationalism. Creating the new global solidarity: 
labour, social movements and emancipation in the 21
st
 century (E-Book). Helsinki: Into 
Publishing Books, 2012. 
6
 SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa; MENESES, Maria Paula (eds.). Epistemologias do Sul. 
Coimbra: Almedina, 2009.  
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It is therefore useful to provide an abbreviated set of elements to 
contextualize the two countries, which is what we do in the first part of the 
article. We propose using four framework elements of comparison: the 
system of industrial relations; the post-democracy processes of strike 
activity; the context of austerity/liberalization; and changes in labour law. 
In the second part of the article, we dedicate special attention to general 
strikes that took place in both countries. In the Portuguese case, five general 
strikes that occurred during the austerity period are examined. In the Indian 
case, the emphasis is on the general strikes of 28 February 2012, 20/21 
February 2013, 5 December 2014 and 2 September 2015. The comparison 
between the strikes in the two countries will consider four topics for 
scrutiny, in line with the proposal of Costa, Dias and Soeiro.
7
 First, the 
strike as a regulating mechanism – of “conflict institutionalization”8 or a 
“safety valve”9 – which seeks to anticipate the occurrence of a conflict in 
order to produce an adjustment between different parts of the system. 
Accordingly, in democratic societies, the publication of a strike notice (in 
order to legally anticipate the occurrence of a strike and publicly express the 
critical feeling that underlies the call for protest) and the definition of 
minimum services (as a way to safeguard the provision of essential services 
for the functioning of the economy) are two regulatory tools that can be 
used to monitor strike activity (calls for strike and actual strikes). 
Secondly, we propose to look at the strike as the product of a collective 
decision built upon the “sum of efforts”. It is true that the decision to go on 
strike or not depends on each citizen and that there is no obtainment of a 
collective good without considering the rationality (selfishness) of the 
individual actor. However, despite this “paradox of collective action”,10 the 
strike will be stronger if it is able to gather a greater number of trade union 
structures moving in the same direction, i.e., if it is able to promote a greater 
convergence of trade union sensibilities. 
Thirdly, one must keep in mind the scale in the analysis of the strike. By 
analyzing social protests between 2006 and 2013 in 87 countries, Ortiz et al. 
pointed out that the struggle against austerity held a prominent place in such 
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Portugal: olhares, expressões e recomposições”. Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais. n.103, 
2014, pp. 173-202. 
8
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Liberdade. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1981 [1961], pp. 133-155. 
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 COSER, Lewis. The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press, 1956. 
10
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protests.
11
 However, despite the global character of capitalism, since the 
legal regimes, wages, working conditions are defined within national 
borders, it is not surprising that national strikes are the most frequent. And 
yet, the national scale itself has different magnitudes, as is effectively 
demonstrated by the Portuguese and Indian cases. 
Finally, we consider that any strike must be related to the achievement of 
results. As a conflict, the strike is also part of a process in which the 
ultimate goal is the achievement of results associated with previously 
defined objectives. However, the degree of achievement can happen in the 
short, medium or long term.
12
 Yet, the fact that the achievement of strike 
goals is often not disclosed to the general public can enhance disbelief in 
their effectiveness. 
 
2. Portugal and India: some background elements 
Below are some elements providing a background to the Portuguese and 
Indian contexts. 
   
2.1. Industrial relations and employment systems  
In the Portuguese case, the main features of the industrial relations system 
can be summarized as follows: a pluralist and competitive model of the 
relationship within and among the representative organizations of labour 
and capital; strong politicization of collective bargaining regarding working 
conditions; linkages of trade unions and employer organizations to the 
system of political parties; the centrality of the state in the capital-labour 
relationship (despite the legal and institutional frameworks based on the 
principle of the separation of powers and on their capacity for self-
regulation); increasing impediments to collective bargaining.
13
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On the other hand, the employment system has been characterized by low 
productivity, low wages, a connection between employment and high labour 
intensity, low levels of education, qualifications and skills, lack of high 
quality employment and a high incidence of different forms of atypical 
work: fixed-term contracts, temporary work, part-time work and work in the 
informal economy (estimated to represent about 25% of GDP). 
In turn, in the Indian case, if a political vision of a planned mixed economy 
lasted until the end of the 1980s, since the beginning of the 1990s, 
specifically since 1991, the introduction of neoliberal policies in the country 
became a reality, emphasizing deregulation, reducing the role of the public 
sector, and creating opportunities for private investment and direct foreign 
investment. One of the structural features of the Indian labour market is the 
high percentage of the workforce in the informal sector. Although in 
principle Indian labor laws cover all sectors of activity, there are provisions 
that exclude a large amount of the workforce.  
At the trade union level, there is a historical division based on political, 
ideological and regional cleavages that has hindered their recognition as 
social partners and their access to regulatory bodies (Indian Labour 
Conference and Planning Commission). There are eleven trade union 
confederations and tens of thousands of trade unions – with the most 
relevant in terms of membership being those who are closer to the Hindu 
nationalist party BJP – seven of which meet the requirements set by the 
ILC.
14
 Of these, only SEWA (Self Employed Women’s Association) has 
sought to organize workers in the informal sector.
15
 Nevertheless, divisions 
and sectionalism have especially hindered the possibility of joint action and 
the production of significant impacts on the living conditions of the working 
class. 
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Alternativas (org.), A economia política do retrocesso: crise, causas e objetivos. Coimbra: 
Almedina/CES, 2014, pp. 127-188. 
14
 In 2011, four conditions for the recognition of trade union confederations were set: a 
minimum of one million members; spread over at least eight states and a minimum of four 
sectors of activity; and with a presence in rural areas. BHOWMIK, Sharit. “The Labour 
Movement in India: Fractured Trade Unions and Vulnerable Workers”. Rethinking 
Development and Inequality. Vol. 2, 2013, p.89. 
15
 Ibid. 
148 Hermes Augusto Costa and Hugo Dias 
 
Workers of the World, Volume I, Number 8, July 2016 
 
 
 
2.2. The legacy of democratic transition 
Despite intense strike activity between the late nineteenth century and the 
first decades of the twentieth century – 4,636 strikes were registered 
between 1871 and 1920
16
 – the long Portuguese dictatorship (which lasted 
48 years) constituted a strong brake on strike activity because strikes were 
prohibited. Indeed, 
Trade unions were permitted, but – through legislation – unique, with 
compulsory registration, with forced quotas, with a very well-divided 
territorial structure, with representation by profession as a certifying 
entity of professional qualifications, with controlled elections and the 
need of governmental approval of the members of governing bodies.
17
  
Hence, freedom of collective bargaining was absent and strikes were even 
considered a criminal offense.
18
 
Only with the end of the dictatorship and the resulting democratic transition 
(on 25 April 1974) did strikes strongly re-emerge in Portuguese society. The 
second half of the 1970s witnessed the period of the greatest collective 
mobilization, which occurred under the influence of a classist discourse that 
advocated the overcoming of capitalism. In turn, in the first half of the 
1980s strikes were aimed at defending “the achievements of April” and 
destabilizing the right wing and centrist governments.
19
 Meanwhile, the 
accession of Portugal to the European Economic Community (1986), a 
moment that coincides with the institutionalization of social dialogue with 
the participation of trade unions, marked a strong downward trend in the 
number of strikes (only reversed in 1989, with 307 strikes and 296,000 
strikers involved), reaching a record low of 99 strikes in 2007, involving 
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about 29,200 workers.
20
 Only since the end of 2010, with the outset of 
austerity, a new intensification of the forms of social protest and strike 
activity has been witnessed. 
In the Indian case, the trade union movement arose during the period of 
British colonial rule. The first Indian trade union federation was founded on 
31 October 1920 (AITUC - All India Trade Union Congress), having had a 
decisive role in mobilizing the support of the workers for the liberation 
struggle. During this historical period, the trade union movement remained 
united, but after independence (in 1947) it underwent a process of 
fragmentation. Consequently, the trade union movement was affected by 
fragmentation processes caused by ruptures in the political party system, 
initially at the national level, but from the late 1960s also at the regional and 
community levels. Thus, inter-union rivalries, at certain times, took on more 
intense contours than the conflicts between trade unions and employers. In 
terms of labour regulation, the state has built a complex and bureaucratic 
legal system that, although in theory would protect workers, in practice 
relied too much on lengthy disputes in the judicial system and created 
obstacles to trade union activity. These aspects, together with the low degree 
of attention devoted by trade unions to the huge informal sector typical of 
the Indian labour market, led to their inability to play a key role in 
structuring labor conflicts.
21
  
  
2.3. Austerity and liberalization process 
In the Portuguese context – especially following the adoption of austerity 
policies – and in the Indian context – especially after the intensification of 
liberalization in the 1990s – the processes of conflict have increased. In 
Portugal, the bailout plan signed on May 2011 between the Portuguese 
government and the troïka, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (EC), has 
produced huge negative impacts, generating by itself increased strike activity: 
strengthening of asymmetries in labor relations; increasing precarious forms of 
employment and of unemployment; fostering the loss of autonomy of social 
partners, especially trade unions, who were placed in an even more subordinate 
position; increasing tension in relations between the actors of industrial 
relations (including the labour field); increasing asymmetries, particularly 
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between high-income and low-income classes, and in the relationship between 
public and private sectors; creating a sharp drop in household purchasing 
power; further impoverishment of the productive sector; no reduction of the 
competitiveness deficit of enterprises.
22
  
In India, the assault on labour rights took place even prior to the 
liberalization period that started in 1991. According to Hensman: 
the bulk of labour legislation deliberately excludes informal workers – 
defined as workers either in small-scale unregistered establishments (in 
India referred to as ‘the unorganized sector’) or as workers in irregular 
employment relationships – and this provides employers with a variety of 
ways to evade these laws: splitting up an establishment into small units 
which are supposedly independent of each other, creating artificial breaks 
in employment so that workers never attain permanent status, employing 
large numbers of contract workers on site who are controlled by labour 
contractors and therefore do not appear on the payroll of the company, or 
subcontracting production to smaller workplaces. Although in theory 
informal workers have the right to organize, in practice the lack of legal 
recognition of their work – or even of their status as workers – makes it 
almost impossible to organize without being dismissed. And once 
dismissed, they have no access to legal redress, because there is no legal 
recognition of their employment or even their existence as workers.
23
 
Parallel to austerity and liberalization, labour law itself was the subject of 
transformations, as shown below. 
 
2.4. Signs of change in labour law 
In line with the austerity measures imposed by the troïka, several changes to 
Portuguese labor law were introduced, namely through Law 23/2012 (August 
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2012). These changes have generated negative effects on the labour market: a 
company can now choose who to dismiss in situations of job extinction; 
dismissal for unsuitability became broader-reaching; reductions to overtime 
pay were introduced; individual working-time accounts (bancos de horas) 
were created; severance pay in the case of dismissals was reduced; vacation 
days were reduced; the number of public holidays was cut; the Labour 
Inspectorate (ACT/Autoridade para as Condições de Trabalho) reduced its 
controls since firms are no longer required to submit their working-time 
schedules or agreements on working-time exemptions, etc.
24
  
In India, the most recent attempts to change labour legislation pointed towards 
the destabilization of stable sectors, with the proliferation of fixed-term contracts 
and precarious work, and the shift of certain segments of the workforce to 
informal sectors of the economy as a result of restructuring and productive 
subcontracting. One of the main attempts to reform labour law occurred during a 
BJP-led government between 1998 and 2004, which generated the first united 
response by the trade union confederations. The creation of the Trade Union 
Joint Action Committee (TUJAC), which organized a series of protest events that 
culminated in the general strike of 25 April 2001, proved to be key to a winning 
strategy that blocked this legislative change.
25
  
But the main problem remained the extent of the informal sector. In 1991, 
before the implementation of neoliberal measures, from a workforce of 
about 317 million, 91.5 per cent worked in the informal sector. According to 
recent data, this proportion rose to 93 per cent of a total of 470 million 
workers. Although in absolute terms the Indian economy has absorbed over 
8 million workers in its formal sector over this time-span (from 27 million 
in 1991 to 35 million today), the workforce employed in the informal sector 
increased at a faster pace.
26
  
The trade union movement has struggled to cope with the neoliberal offensive. 
In the formal sector, trade unionism has progressed because of the possibility – 
albeit with high employer resistance – of trade union recognition within the 
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workplace. This is in fact the main difference between the formal and informal 
sector and one of the reasons why employers favour precariousness and are 
interested in pushing the workforce to the informal sector.
27
 Overall, trade 
union density is around five per cent of the workforce and collective bargaining 
covers only one per cent.  
In short, both countries have witnessed favourable conditions for an increase 
in strike activity. At the same time, however, there is a tension between the 
increasing potential for protest and the fear of job loss or employer 
persecution resulting from participation in a strike. 
 
3. The role of general strikes  
General strikes are, roughly speaking, forms of protest that call for a wide 
and diverse mobilization. As proposed by Tengarrinha,
28
 general strikes 
involve “workers of a profession”, “workers of one or more jobs in a region 
or across a country” and “workers of all professions in a country”. Let us 
then see what happened in the Portuguese and Indian cases in recent years, 
taking into consideration the criteria set out in the introduction of the article, 
namely, the strike as a mechanism of regulation; the strike as a product of a 
collective decision, that is, a “sum of efforts”; the role of the scale of 
analysis; and the question of achieving results.  
 
3.1. General strikes in Portugal  
Since November 2010, Portugal has registered five general strikes, all 
lasting one day: three general strikes jointly called by the two trade union 
confederations, the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP), 
of communist orientation, and the General Workers' Union (UGT), of 
socialist and social-democratic orientation: 24 November 2010; 24 
November 2011; and 27 June 2013. Plus, two general strikes called by the 
CGTP: 22 March 2012, and 14 November 2012.   
 i) The regulatory process and its causes. All general strikes 
witnessed a regulatory exercise that had austerity as its backdrop. 
Incidentally, that could be noticed in the claims of the reasons for the strike. 
The general strike of 24 November 2010 was called against the cuts 
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between 3.5 and 10 per cent (from January 2011) in the salaries of civil 
servants with incomes above 1,500 euros. The strike of 24 November 2011 
was convened against the intensification of austerity that, in addition to 
wage cuts, manifested itself in cuts to holiday and Christmas subsidies to 
civil servants in 2012, as well as a 50 per cent surcharge on individual 
income tax and the Christmas bonus. In contrast, the general strike of 27 
June 2013 was called to denounce measures laid down in a “Fiscal Strategy 
Document” designed to operationalize state reform, including: retirement at 
66 years of age; increase in the civil service's weekly working hours from 35 
to 40 hours; reduction in vacation time; increased contributions to ADSE 
(health subsystem for civil servants); redundancies for 30,000 civil servants; 
a special mobility scheme, etc.  
In between, there were other general strikes called only by the CGTP: the 
general strike of 22 March 2012 in response to the social dialogue agreement 
(entitled Commitment for growth and employment) between the government, 
employer confederations and the UGT on 18 January 2012; and the general 
strike of 14 November 2012, which was called only by CGTP, but involved 
another 30 unions from UGT and was considered an Iberian-level trade union 
strike with a day of action organized by the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC). In Portugal, that strike was a response to the draft state 
budget for 2013, which implied a sharp rise in the tax burden. 
 ii) Sum of efforts and overcoming of antagonistic trade union attitudes. 
Even bearing in mind the absence of joint action in the 2012 general strikes, it 
is essential to point out, especially with regard to the three joint general strikes, 
that they represented an obvious sum of efforts and unification of intention 
within an often divided trade union sphere. And to reinforce the importance of 
this joint union action, a figure deserves to be highlighted: the 24 November 
2010 strike was, at that moment, the second joint general strike in the history of 
trade unionism in Portugal (only in March 1988 did the CGTP and UGT join 
forces in a general strike, at that time against changes to labor legislation). 
Indeed, this sum of efforts (which always had austerity as its backdrop) also 
paved the way for joint general strikes in the public sector, with the most recent 
one recorded on 13 March 2015. 
 iii) The scale of the strike. As suggested earlier, public and media 
space is predominantly structured on a national scale and framed by 
questions of discourse and of identification with national political 
communities. And the definition of scale cannot, in itself, be dissociated 
from the targets of the conflict. Now, even though general strikes meant a 
joint appeal to the whole of society, its national scale was marked by attacks 
on Portuguese civil servants, which in Portugal number 600,000 people. It is 
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obvious that the national scale of the strikes had repercussions not only 
regarding the working conditions of civil servants (through wage cuts and 
increased working hours, to give two examples), but also in the private 
sector, with the reductions of compensation for dismissals. 
 iv) Results? The Portuguese government remained virtually inflexible in 
their drift to austerity. Accordingly, results achieved by the trade union 
structures as a consequence of the general strikes are questionable. Incidentally, 
in 2012, a study conducted in Portugal
29
 noted that, despite the significant 
increase in the number of strikes and workers on strike, only 4.6 per cent of 
demands were accepted, 8.6 per cent were partially accepted and 86.7 per cent 
were refused. General strikes in Portugal were an important instrument of 
social critique of government policies and against the advocates of austerity 
policies in Europe. However, it can be said that since January 2015, the 
reimbursement of 20 per cent of the salaries of civil servants was no more than 
a “Pyrrhic victory” in a context where austerity remains and the public debt 
(supposedly in the name of which sacrifices are dictated) has continued to 
increase. And as if that was not enough, certain sectors of the labour movement 
do not always see other European examples of general strikes – as is the case 
with Greece, with more than twenty general strikes in a period of five years – as 
an inspiration, especially because they do not associate such strikes with the 
achievement of concrete results.
30
  
 
3.2. General strikes in India 
In recent years, India witnessed four general strikes – 28 February 2012, 20 
and 21 February 2013, 5 December 2014, and 2 September 2015, which 
corresponded to a new dynamics of joint action around the TUJAC and to 
the incorporation, at the heart of their agenda of demands, of the issues 
related to informal employment. 
i) Regulation on behalf of concrete demands. In their regulatory 
procedures, these strikes evidenced a diverse set of grievances and allowed 
for the expression of specific claims: the struggle against the rising cost of 
living; denouncement of the continued increase in fuel prices; demands for 
job creation; end of the divestment in strategic public enterprises; demands 
for pensions and social security for all workers in the informal sector, an 
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overwhelming majority in India; and combating the insecurity that prevailed 
throughout the country. 
ii) Sum of efforts in trade unionism and in society. Currently, there are 
some positive signs that the fragmentation and lack of influence of trade 
unionism is starting to be reversed. The struggles and strikes for the recognition 
of trade unions in the workplace have increased. This was the case with the 
strikes in Maruti Suzuki, the largest car producer in the country, in 2011, but 
also at other plants such as Honda, Nokia, General Motors and Holol.
31
  
More importantly, the eleven trade union confederations began to develop a 
strategy of unity of action around the TUJAC. They organized a mass 
demonstration on 20 February 2011, that brought together 500,000 workers 
in Delhi against rising food prices. Given the government’s insensitivity to 
the demands of trade unions, they have since then changed tactics and 
decided to call the four nationwide strikes listed above.
32
 
These shutdowns have had a significant impact in some sectors, and at the 
centre of their demands were the issues of informal and precarious work. 
Cumulatively, they interrupted (at least circumstantially) the typical 
divisions among trade union organizations and managed to join the formal 
and organized sector of the economy with the informal sector (precarious 
sectors, which accounted for about 75 per cent of protesters). More recently, 
the current right-wing government, elected in May 2014 and led by Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi, proposed the Labor Code on Industrial Relations 
Bill 2015, which aims to further remove workers’ rights that are considered 
as the main hurdle for expanding employment. This proposal, still awaiting 
approval from parliament, caused the call for the general strike of 2 
September 2015.
33
 Unity was broken by the retreat of the trade union 
confederation linked with the ruling party, but the continuity of this unity 
strategy does not seem to be in jeopardy.  
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 iii) A gigantic scale. As with the Portuguese case, we look back on a 
national scale. However, the almost 100 million people
34
 who joined the protest 
in 2013 are really impressive figures and give the phenomenon an expression of 
continental dimensions, in a country where the labour force is around 500 
million workers. On the other hand, the scale of the problems reported 
nationally was indicative of a broader agenda, where the role of public 
employees, unlike in the Portuguese case, was not the “spark” for the protest. In 
fact, despite the fact that one of the demands of the 100-million-strong strike 
was the end of the privatization of the public sector, the problems related to the 
informal economy – such as setting a minimum wage for all workers and the 
extension of coverage of the pension and social security systems to the informal 
sector – ended up dominating the whole protest. 
 iv) The strength of immediate impacts. The weight of the scale of the 
conflict (mentioned before) cannot be disassociated from the impact generated 
by the conflict. Regardless of the fact that there were no short and medium-
term results as a government response to the demands of the protesters, it is 
possible to notice a set of immediate results revealing that the general strike, in 
itself, caused major consequences that did not go unnoticed. Again, the strike of 
2013 can be seen as an example: it affected vital sectors of the economy; the 
banking system collapsed for two days; the public and private sectors were 
united in the transport sector (e.g. taxis stopped and nearly 100.000 government 
buses stayed in the garages); there were notorious actions of solidarity between 
different sectors (e.g. solidarity from teachers, post offices closed in many 
states). All of these impacts have put trade unions at the forefront of the 
construction of emancipatory strategies (articulated with the wider society); 
they are not just a closed-off social actor. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we analyzed the place of strikes – particularly general strikes – 
in two countries that are very distinct geographically, politically, 
economically and culturally. Our purpose was to confront divergent and 
convergent dynamics of strike activity that arise either from the “South of 
the North” (Portugal) or from the “North of the South” (India). We briefly 
recover here some ideas highlighted in our analysis.  
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It is ascertainable that, from the point of view of employment relations, the 
Indian case is characterized much more by the dynamics of informality, 
although in both the Indian and the Portuguese cases, there is a concern to 
tackle the burden of insecurity in the so-called “stable” labour relations. On 
the other hand, both in Portugal and in India, trade union structures are 
historically divided, though general strikes have been an opportunity for 
joint action, which in the Indian case went beyond the trade union universe. 
The moment of democratic transition in Portugal and of construction of 
independence in India were also times of opportunity for boosting 
conflictual strategies. Yet, especially in the last five years, strikes have been 
on the agenda because of austerity in the Portuguese case, and due to 
processes of liberalization in the Indian case.  
General strikes are directed at the state mainly when it implements changes 
that correspond to a profound transformation in wage relations. It may seem 
contradictory that the use of general strikes occurs at a time of further 
weakening of trade union strength, with the risk of low support, substantial 
costs and low efficacy, but the use of general strikes emerges exactly due to 
the absence of other means of influencing political power. Also, the results 
of general strikes are a way to measure their effectiveness. At least in the 
Portuguese case, it was not really possible to claim victory despite the 
strong support for  most of the general strikes held. In this regard, the Indian 
case appeared to show, at least regarding the immediate impact of a general 
strike, the force of a broad mobilization and hence the idea of paralyzing the 
country due to a massive protest. Be that as it may, however, in one case as 
in the other, the context of austerity and liberalization pushed general strikes 
into a more defensive strategy rather than an offensive one.  
In fact, rather than offensively targeting the achievement of better wages, 
working hours or working conditions,
35
 general strikes in both countries aim 
to defensively prevent more austerity and privatization by governments and 
employers,
36
 i.e., to reject setbacks to the social structure.  
Nevertheless, general strikes increasingly involve more impoverished citizens, 
whose dignity has been undermined. In this sense, they are also strong reactions 
against the loss of rights that so many generations of workers fought for and 
that appeared to be irreversible achievements; the unequal distribution of 
wealth (translated in the forfeiture of wages and pensions, the increases in 
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working hours, work intensity and taxation, and bailouts in favour of the 
wealthy); the neoliberal common sense that claims that there is no alternative to 
the impoverishment of the majority and the emptying of democratic choices; 
and the disproportionate power of financial capital.
37
  
Therefore, the construction of a trade unionism strongly oriented to the 
world of precarious and informal work comes across as urgent. The 
influence it may have in the future will depend on its capacity, as a strategic 
actor, to undertake substantial changes in its modus operandi, whether it is 
dealing with resistance to change and bureaucratic accommodation or with 
expanding its democratic governance.
38
 From this point of view, trade union 
action in countries such as India has been always confronted with the reality 
of informal work. And despite the fact that trade unions might not have 
always dealt with it in the most adequate way, they have entered a strategic 
reorientation that will eventually bear fruits in the near future.  
In this regard, the North has much to learn from the South. Trade unionism 
in the North was built around the Fordist wage relation. The deconstruction 
of social pacts and institutional arrangements of this capital-labour 
compromise led to, on the one hand, the loss of institutional strength and, on 
the other, to a decreased capacity of collective mobilization. Trade unions, 
in the “post-democratic” era39 do not have close partners in positions of 
political power, which also impels them to a strategic reorientation in an 
increasingly adverse context of action. In this situation, they recover 
approaches to collective action belonging to their historical arsenal of 
contention and seeking to build social alliances with the most marginalized 
and precarious sectors of society. Only in this way can trade unions aspire to 
represent, not only in their interior, but especially outside, the new 
morphology of the working class.
40
 A closer look of Portuguese unions to 
the position of the Indian trade union movement in strike processes would 
allow them to learn some lessons regarding unity needed for joining the 
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public and the private sectors in protest, as well as for joining formal 
associative structures (trade unions) and organizations of informal workers. 
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Understanding the Bombay textile strike of 1982-1983 
Ravi Ghadge 
 
he last two decades of the twentieth century saw a renewed interest in 
labour studies and social history in India. This was largely due to the 
dramatic transformations in the social worlds of Indian labour as a 
result of deindustrialization, characterized by a decline in traditional 
factories and increasing informalization and casualization of labour in 
the old industrial centers of India such as Bombay, Ahmedabad, and 
Kanpur.
1
 The dismantling of old industrial sites and the subsequent 
disintegration of working-class communities have bolstered elitist 
visions of the restructuring of these industrial cities, further intensifying 
social conflicts in these regions. In this context of a “vanishing 
history,” recent studies have focused on recovering the “lost worlds” of 
Indian labour by giving voice to workers’ past and contemporary 
struggles to preserve their culture and identity.”2 This paper takes a 
small step in that direction by understanding the predicament of textile 
workers in Bombay through their narratives of a strike that changed 
their lives dramatically.  
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Background of the Bombay Textile Strike of 1982-83 
More than three decades have passed since the 1982-1983 Bombay textile 
strike (henceforth, the strike).
3
 Although the strike had a far-reaching impact 
on Indian labour, it has not received the attention it deserves. It was one of 
the longest strikes in India’s working class history and possibly the most 
decisive in terms of its impact on the textile industry and workers in 
Bombay. The enormity of the strike can be seen by the number of workers 
who participated in it (almost 200,000) and by their collective effort to stay 
out of the mills for more than eighteen months. It is estimated that prior to 
the strike there were about 232,000 workers employed in the industry. The 
failure of the strike led to a massive retrenchment of workers. Almost 
106,000 workers lost their jobs. It is perhaps the biggest job loss in the 
history of modern industry in India.
4
 It is believed that most of these 
workers joined the ranks of the “new poor” in the unorganized industry, 
working as casual labourers or in the decentralized power loom sector.
5
 
The literature on the strike is scarce. There have been two in-depth studies 
on the strike.
6
 Both provide an elaborate account of the immediate context 
of the strike. There is research that deals with specific dimensions of the 
strike such as, leadership, technology, and alternative interpretations of the 
strike.
7
 However, there is no single sociological study on the strike that 
situates it within the broader social history of working-class formation in 
Bombay or which assesses broader implications of the strike from the 
workers’ perspective.  
Based on the analysis of oral testimonies of sixteen respondents associated 
with the textile mills in Bombay, this paper adds to the existing literature in 
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several ways: first, it provides an interpretive analysis of the strike from the 
workers’ perspective. Second, against the tendency of studying the strike 
only as an event based on its immediate socio-economic exigencies, the 
paper historicizes the strike within the broader process of working-class 
formation in Bombay. Finally, the paper discusses the broader implications 
of the strike on the working-class community in Bombay and the subsequent 
economic restructuring of the city.  
The paper is organized into three sections. The first section—Bombay and 
the Social Worlds of the Textile Workers—historicizes the strike, taking 
into account the process of working-class formation in the city. The second 
section—Exigencies on the Eve of the strike—discusses the immediate 
socio-economic context of the strike. These two sections provide the 
historical context to understand the oral testimonies of workers that come 
later. The third section—Workers’ Perceptions of the Strike—is based on 
the analysis of interviews of workers and residents of the mill district and 
discusses their views on the strike. It provides an opportunity to subjectively 
understand the meanings produced by those who were affected by the strike 
in addition to the numbers. 
  
Bombay and the Social Worlds of the Textile Workers 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Bombay had established itself as an 
important commercial center in India. According to Chandavarkar, an 
eminent historian of Bombay, the city “handled about two-fifths of the total 
value of India’s foreign trade, 70 per cent of the value of the coastal trade 
and the bulk of the re-export trade to the Persian Gulf and to the Arab and 
East African ports”.8 Bombay was essentially a late-seventeenth century 
extension of the East India Company’s (the company that was given 
exclusive trading rights over India under the British crown) trade with 
Gujarat (a state north of Bombay). There were three stages of the growth of 
Bombay. The first stage (mid eighteenth century) characterized the 
establishment of the British naval-commercial domination of the west coast 
of India. The second stage (early nineteenth century) was associated with 
the political domination and the establishment of the Bombay presidency. 
The third stage was the phase of industrial domination. Following the 
industrial revolution in England, India had become an exporter of raw 
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cotton and a market for imported mill-made cotton. This enabled the 
indigenous entrepreneurs of Bombay to set up their own cotton mills 
utilizing cheap labour from the coastal regions in the western part of India.
9
  
Although Bombay has widely been understood as a “colonial port city,” 
some scholars are not comfortable with this category. Chandavarkar argues, 
“even though Bombay was in part a product of its imperial connection and 
owes it origin and early growth to the colonial settlement, its commercial 
and industrial development was shaped increasingly and in important ways 
by its place within the internal economy.”10 Within this internal economy, 
the commodity markets were linked to wider relations of production and 
exchange in the hinterland. Therefore, textile mills of Bombay were 
increasingly dependent on the domestic market. Therefore, Bombay was not 
solely a product of colonialism, but its growth could be attributed to an 
interaction of global and regional/local processes. 
The labour for the new mills in Bombay was recruited from migrants from 
the adjoining rural hinterland. Despite years of working in the city, these 
migrants maintained close ties with their original villages and through their 
cash remittances contributed to the reproduction of the rural economy. 
These rural links were vital for the workers’ social reproduction in the city 
and in their labour struggles, as we shall see later in the context of the strike. 
The development of the mills from the mid-nineteenth century onwards 
engendered a unique working-class culture, giving rise to a distinct social 
and physical space in the central parts of the city, which came to be known 
as Girangaon or the “village of mills.” The workers who came to work in 
the mills were largely male rural migrants from the adjoining regions of 
Konkan on the west coast (mainly Ratnagiri) and the Deccan Ghat or 
plateau region in central India (mainly Pune, Satara, Sangli, and Nashik).
11
 
Also, those who migrated were not landless rural poor, but essentially small 
landowners who saw migration as an opportunity to earn “quick money” to 
strengthen their rural power base. 
To meet their material needs of employment, credit, and housing in the city, 
the workers had to rely on social networks of caste, region, and kinship. 
This further necessitated the maintenance of their rural links. The 
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persistence of rural networks led to the formation of various popular 
working-class institutions in the city. These institutions included gramastha 
mandals (village organizations), krida mandals (sports clubs), vyayam 
shalas (gymnasiums), khanavalis (community dining houses), and path 
pedis (credit societies). These institutions catered to the various material and 
cultural needs of the textile workers in the city.
12
 
Some scholars have understood the social relationships engendered by these 
institutions as “pre-capitalist,” which would dissolve with deeper 
industrialization. The presence of these “pre-capitalist” features was also 
linked to workers’ commitment (or their lack of) to the factory.13 However, 
later studies have shown that these informal institutions were an integral 
part of capitalist development in Bombay and a clear-cut distinction 
between the social organization of the neighborhoods and the workplace is 
untenable. The interdependent relationship between the workplace and the 
neighborhood was best exemplified in recruitment practices. The authority 
of the “jobber” (the recruiting middleman between the workers and the mill-
owners) in the neighborhood was based on his/her power to negotiate with 
the management at the workplace. Similarly, his importance at the 
workplace was based on the influence among the workers in the 
neighborhood mediated through ethnic ties based on caste and region.
14
 
Further, the neighborhood-workplace complementarity was also important 
in terms of the organization of work in the industry. Extensive use of casual 
labour and its increased insecurity forced mill workers to maintain social 
connections beyond the workplace, either in the village or in the urban 
neighborhood. These networks were particularly vital in times of industrial 
conflict to generate additional resources.  
It was not just the material needs of workers that constituted their 
neighborhood connections. Leisure and political activities contributed to the 
development of the “street” and neighborhood as a social arena. Workers’ 
patronage helped sustain a unique working-class theater in Girangaon. The 
mill theater has been in existence for over a century now and is associated 
with tamasha, a folk-art form of Maharashtra. The theater of Girangaon was 
considered as the “poorest of poor” theaters, where the playwright was often 
not paid and performances took place on makeshift stages during festivals 
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and competitions.
15
 The theater was not only a means of popular 
entertainment, but also served as a tool of political education as it engaged 
well with the lives of the workers. The regional content of the theater helped 
forge community bonds among the workers. It is believed that until the 
1960s and 1970s, there were 10-12 baris (performances) of tamasha 
everyday in theaters such as the Hanuman Theater in the Lalbaug area in 
Bombay. The baris commenced in the evening as the mill workers began to 
trickle in after work and would go on until late in the night. It was because 
of these popular institutions that Girangaon derived its exclusive working-
class identity in the city.  
 
Exigencies on the Eve of the Strike 
The Bombay textile industry provided employment to approximately one 
million people in 1982. As an organized workforce, it occupied second 
place (15.1 per cent) after food products (16.8 per cent). In the two decades 
preceding the strike, the number of factories rose from 8,233 in 1961 to 
16,594 in 1981. This reflected a similar rise in employment in the organized 
sector from nearly 800,000 to nearly 1.2 million workers during the same 
period. However, there was an emerging trend toward newer capital-
intensive industries in terms of productive capital, which far outweighed the 
growth of employment in the organized sector. The productive capital of 
these new industries grew from Rs. 6 billion ($ 857 million) to Rs. 700 
billion ($ 77 billion).
16
 This fact is closely tied to the increasing relative 
deprivation experienced by textile workers as the wages of the workers in 
the new industries were more than twice that of the textile workers.  
In the early 1980s, the annual average income of workers in the chemical 
industry was 14,367 rupees ($1,596) compared to 7,120 rupees ($791) for 
textile workers. The chemical industry contributed to nearly twenty-five per 
cent of the total value added in Maharashtra state, whereas its share of 
employment was a mere nine per cent (as compared to twenty-four per cent 
for the textile industry). The per capita worker output in the chemical 
industry was about 308,000 rupees ($42,222) as compared to 46,000 rupees 
($5,111) in the textile industry.
17
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The growth of capital-intensive industries also involved a shift of 
production to the capital-intensive power loom sector, which led to a loss of 
market share of the labour-intensive mills. While the overall production of 
cotton cloth produced in the cotton mills remained stagnant during the 
period 1970-1987, the production of blended cloth from the power looms 
kept growing since the 1970s. Even during the strike, the production of 
synthetic man-made fiber grew due to the decentralized power loom sector, 
which was unaffected by the strike. 
Along with declining share of production, the technological backwardness 
of textile mills further aggravated the situation. The obsolescence of the 
machinery used in spinning, weaving, and processing has been identified as 
the one of the main causes of the “sickness” of the industry.18 However, this 
technological backwardness is not new. The mill owners refused to 
modernize their mills forcing them to eventually close in order to redirect 
their investments into other profitable enterprises. In this context, the strike 
proved to be a blessing-in-disguise for the mill owners. Two years after the 
strike, the government announced a New Textile Policy (NTP) on 6 June 
1985, paving the way for full-scale modernization of the industry. 
The strike was called on 18 January 1982 and lasted for eighteen and half 
months. There were two main issues precipitating the strike. First, was the 
issue of bonuses and second, the disillusionment with the largely unpopular 
trade union—the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS) or the National 
Mill Workers Association.
19
 As per the Bombay Industrial Relations (BIR) 
Act, only a recognized union (in this case the Congress-backed RMMS) 
could represent the interests of the textile workers. 
Due to growing disillusionment with the RMMS, the textile workers 
approached Datta Samant, a popular trade unionist in Bombay, known for 
his legendary negotiating skills. Although Samant did not belong to the 
textile industry, his reputation as a hard bargainer in other industries 
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(particular engineering industries) convinced the workers of his 
effectiveness as a mediator between them and the management. With initial 
reluctantance, Samant accepted his mediator role and formed his own union 
called Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union (MGKU) or the Maharashtra 
Textile Workers Union in October 1981.  
In the following sections, I present an empirical analysis of workers’ and 
Girangaon residents’ narratives on the strike. Their narratives must be 
appreciated in conjunction with the preceding historical discussion on the 
working-class formation in Bombay. 
 
Workers’ Perceptions of the Strike 
Data and method 
The data for this section consists of sixteen transcribed interviews (of thirty 
hours duration in total) made available through the Archives of Indian 
Labour.
20
 The interviews were conducted from November 1999 to 
December 2000.
21
 Among the sixteen respondents, twelve were men and 
four women. Eleven respondents were former mill workers. Out of the 
remaining five, two women were wives of former mill owners and three 
were residents of the mill district consisting of a noted poet, a tamasha 
theater owner, and a rangoli artist.
22
 The respondents were all Marathi-
speaking and came from three regions of Maharashtra—Konkan, Kolhapur, 
and Satara. On losing their jobs after the strike, a majority of the 
respondents were now working in the informal economy stitching and 
selling garments for a garment company, tailoring, and weaving. 
There are some limitations in the data used for this study. First, as I did not 
conduct or translate the interviews, I have no control over the errors that 
occurred in the process of collection and translation. Second, as the 
conclusions are based on only sixteen interviews, they have limited 
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generalizability beyond the scope of the study. However, the relevance of 
the study outweighs its limitations. Because the interviews are unstructured 
and detailed, they provide sufficient information for an interpretive analysis 
of the strike. Further, considering the paucity of research on subjective 
understanding of the strike, such a rare data set is definitely worth 
examining.      
I used coding procedures of grounded theory as outlined by Strauss and 
Corbin for analyzing the interviews.
23
 These procedures involve initial 
microscopic examination of the data based on open and axial coding to look 
for indicator-concepts, writing theoretical memos, and generating core 
categories through further selective coding. All the indicators, concepts, and 
categories generated during the coding process are highlighted by double 
quotes in the paper. In order to save space and to preserve the flow of the 
paper, I will not provide a detailed description of the coding procedures. 
The process of selective coding of the interviews revealed five core 
categories or themes discussed by the respondents which I label as: 1) 
Expectations of the Strike and the Articulation of Demands, 2) Strategies of 
Survival During the Strike, 3) Analyzing Failure: State, Management, and 
the War of Attrition, 4) Loss of Livelihoods and Informalization of Work, 
and 5) Loss of Socio-Cultural Space. An overall graphical representation of 
the following analysis is presented in Figure 1 at the end of the paper.  
 
1. Expectations of the Strike and the Articulation of Demands 
There were growing expectations surrounding the strike. This comes across 
in most of the interviews. These expectations arose out of the feelings of 
desperation, hopelessness, economic deprivation, and also hope instilled by 
past struggles. However, the feeling of desperation seems to be the most 
pronounced with workers feeling that there was no other option but to strike.  
The interviews reveal that there were three factors that provided the context 
within which the expectations of the strike were created. First, the prior 
history of labour struggles of textile workers; second, the economic 
conditions on the eve of the strike and their experience of “comparative 
disadvantage” with regard to workers from other industries; and finally, the 
specific role played by the leadership of Datta Samant (see Figure 1).  
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It was in the textile industry that the earliest trade unions in India were 
formed. Due to their history of militant struggles, the Bombay textile worker 
was once regarded as the vanguard of the Indian labour movement. There 
haD always been a tradition of indigenous shop-floor level organization 
among the workers. Even though one does not find a complete record of the 
total number of work stoppages that occurred in the mills, the first 
prolonged general strike in the Bombay textile mills took place in 1928.
24
 
The strike lasted six months. Prior to that in 1924, there had been a failed 
two-month strike involving the issue of a bonus. There was another work 
stoppage in 1925.  
A peculiar feature of the textile workers in Bombay was their ability to take 
initiative in organizing themselves during a strike, which led to the 
formation of unions during the strike. As a quote from a famous trade 
unionist S. A. Dange during a court trial reveals: “The strike was not our 
creation, but we were the creation of the strike. An organization had not 
brought about the general strike of 1928, but the strike had brought forth an 
organization”.25  
The 1982-1983 strike had similar patterns. It is argued that both the strikes 
were “total,” in the sense that they elicited a near complete response from 
the workers. During both the strikes, the mill owners categorically refused 
to negotiate with the strikers. In 1928, it was the communists who were very 
active in the strike and in 1982 it was Datta Samant.  
There was an air of desperation at the time of the 1982-83 strike and the 
workers were prepared to pay any price for the strike. Economic hardships 
partly explain this desperation of the workers. There was also a widespread 
feeling of “comparative disadvantage” that textile workers experienced with 
regard to other industrial workers. One of the respondents explains that it 
was the textile workers who built the city economically and created the 
national wealth based on which other industries came into being. Some 
workers also felt that the oldest industrial workers in India were being 
discriminated against. It is in this context that the workers’ expectations 
towards the strike grew. One of the respondents highlights this point in his 
response: 
Textile workers were resentful of the fact that unlike workers in other 
industries in the organized sector, they could not hope for an 
increment...Benefits that were being given to workers in other industries 
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were denied to the textile workers…They [the textile workers] were the 
oldest workers and they were being discriminated against. Workers 
wanted to fight.   
However, the same respondent was also skeptical of the success of the strike 
as their work stoppage would be countered by a shift of production to the 
power looms.  
The strike was not an adventurous act on the part of Datta Samant. It was 
supported by everyone. Now I think he made a mistake in not taking into 
account the fact that power looms had come up all over the state, and the 
weaving was done there by mill owners…Even when starting the strike 
he should have taken note of this as the market did not suffer due to lack 
of cloth. The power looms were taking care of that demand. 
Finally, leadership played a very important role in raising people’s hopes for 
the strike. Dr. Datta Samant and his union MGKU played a key role in the 
strike. Dr. Samant did not belong to the textile industry. However, he was 
popular in other industries (especially the engineering industry). It was his 
ability to secure good compensation and settlements that drew the workers 
towards him. Therefore, he was considered to be a very influential trade 
union leader. In fact, it was the textile workers who approached him to lead 
the strike. The informants describe him as a “militant leader,” “dynamic 
leader,” “as someone who did things openly,” and “as someone who could 
feel the problems of the poor.” However, it was not leadership alone, but 
also a lack of alternate leadership that pushed the workers to look for 
leadership outside their industry. The workers in the mills were not happy 
with the recognized union in the mills, the RMMS. The BIR Act that 
governed the textile mills denied workers the right to affiliate with any other 
union than the one that was legally recognized by the textile industry. In this 
context, there was another rival union—Girni Kamgar Sena (GKS) or the 
Textile Workers Army (the trade union wing of the right-wing political 
party, Shiv Sena)—that was growing popular in the mill district. Some of 
the Konkani people workers approached the leader of the Shiv Sena 
Balasaheb Thackeray with their complaints as he too belonged to Konkan.
26
 
After this, the Shiv Sena started taking keener interest in the mills. 
However, the workers felt they were “back-stabbed” by the Sena as it 
isolated them at the very last minute. The Sena had called a one-day strike 
of the textile workers. However, the strike was called off at the last minute 
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and the workers suspected that this was due to the economic and political 
nexus of the elite classes in Bombay. The disgruntled workers then 
approached Dr. Datta Samant to lead them. Most of the respondents 
describe how the workers “forced” Datta Samant to assume their leadership. 
In this context, one of the respondent states: 
There was a meeting in which the workers brought pressure on Dr. 
Samant that the strike should commence right from tomorrow. Doctor 
was against it, but the people had decided. The workers called for a strike 
and Doctor was forced to take up leadership. 
Workers’ zeal in urging Datta Samant to assume leadership is further 
highlighted by another respondent when he says: 
Datta Samant had won an equally good wage hike in Empire Dyeing [a 
textile mill]. The workers decided that if we have to fight a decisive battle 
they would need a leader like Doctor Samant. So they decided to get him 
into the textile industry. Workers went to Dr. Samant, but he was not 
interested. He felt he could not be effective or solve the problem, given 
the BIR Act, the RMMS, the Congress government, and the mill owners 
and their strong nexus. But workers were adamant. They “gheraoed” 
[cordoned] him the whole day and night. So he had to agree.  
Datta Samant had warned the workers that the strike would be a long drawn 
affair, however most of the respondents believed that the strike would be 
over “today or tomorrow.” Based on Samant’s reputation, workers shared 
the perception that he would deliver the goods in a short time. One 
respondent expresses this in the following manner: 
At that time Doctor advised the workers not to go on a strike, all at once. 
He said the strike could go on for 4-5 years or could even take months. 
But the workers thought he would be effective and bring them victory, 
and so they rallied behind him and the strike happened. Doctor himself 
did not want the workers to go on strike, the workers themselves wanted 
to, and they did.  
The strike started around the bonus issue. However, one of the respondents 
very articulately points out that there was much more at stake than just 
workers’ bonuses. He states: 
The main issue was to scrap the BIR Act. That union recognition should 
be through elections. This was Doctor’s [Dr. Datta Samant] first demand. 
And then there was a demand for a wage hike of 150-250 rupees [sixteen 
to twenty seven dollars based on the exchange rate at that time] rupees in 
basic [salary]. Then there was the issue of the badli [contractual] workers 
to be made permanent. 
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Thus, we find that contrary to existing studies on the strike, there were 
multiple factors that influenced the workers to support the call for a strike. 
Some were immediate, having to do with the problems concerning the 
conditions related to organization, pay, and working conditions in the mills. 
However, the prior history of organized resistance in Mumbai and faith in 
good leadership also provided the workers the strength and hope to strike.  
 
2. Strategies of Survival 
Workers found it extremely difficult to survive the eighteen months of the 
strike (some even resorted to selling household items such as utensils to 
survive the strike). The union did its part in distributing food grains at the 
factory gate, but that was not enough. Some of the workers were forced to 
leave the city in search of work. Some even went to Bhiwandi (an adjacent 
power loom town) for work. However, the different strategies of coping 
employed by the workers were based on the resources available to them. 
The workers who migrated from the Desh region owned small amounts of 
land in their villages and could go back their villages. Even after the strike, 
the strategies of survival of the workers were based on access to resources 
like land and social networks, a point highlighted by most respondents. One 
of the woman respondents mentions: 
There is a difference between the workers who came from the Konkan 
and those who came from western Maharashtra—from Desh. They all 
went back to their villages because they had land there. But we, who were 
from Konkan, had to stay here. 
The union of Dr. Samant also tried to help the workers out of their distress. 
Dr. Samant started touring the rural areas garnering support for the striking 
workers in the form of prabhat pheris (morning marches). People responded 
by giving food grains and money. One of the respondents explains the 
process of distribution of bags of food grains and money: 
People from western Maharashtra responded enthusiastically and 
thousands of bags of grain would come daily into Mumbai. This would 
be sent to each zone and it would be distributed from there. The other 
unions owing allegiance to Doctor [Samant] in Bombay collected about 
three crore rupees [around $330,000] for the textile workers. This was 
distributed for the children, for their fees and books and also for those 
who fell ill, for medical expenses. 
Thus, these “pre-capitalist” rural networks were extremely important means 
that sustained workers’ resistance during the strike.  
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3. Analyzing Failure: State, Management, and the War of Attrition 
So what went wrong with the strike? One of the respondents argues, “the 
union that was responsible for the strike was also responsible for its failure.” 
The strike was initially called in eight mills. The idea was to “escalate the 
strike” if there was no change in the attitude of the government. However, 
over a period of time people realized that the demands were not been met 
and workers began to feel restless. It was perceived that if there was no 
participation from all the workers, the prospects of getting any demands 
were bleak. Dr. Datta Samant wanted “time to lobby,” but as the workers 
were growing restless he had to yield to their pressure. 
There are mixed opinions as to why the strike dragged on for such a long 
period. None of the workers wanted nor expected the strike to last that long. 
Some respondents believed that the strike dragged on due to the tactics of a 
joint effort of the management and the government. The mill-owners did not 
care much about the workers and were always looking for an excuse to get 
rid of workers. The strike was also an opportunity to close the mills and 
divest the money into other lucrative businesses. Some respondents argued 
that the Congress government at the center and in the state saw Datta 
Samant as a threat to their power due to his popularity. Therefore, they 
refused to act on the workers’ demands.  
The respondents discuss various strategies adopted by the management to 
break the strike. The legally recognized, but worker-estranged union 
RMMS, played an important part in breaking the inactivity of the workers. 
One of the respondents discusses how the RMMS tried to break the strike 
with the help of the police. The management of some mills resorted to 
police support in escorting workers to the mills. Moreover, the police even 
escorted strikebreakers to the mill gates in trucks. The management too tried 
to lure the workers with free food. One of the respondents informs that some 
workers even slept in the mills. According to him, there was no production 
in the mills. All that the workers would do is clean the machines and the 
departments. Some workers mention that the management even threatened 
workers with evictions from the mill residences in order to force the 
workers back to work. One of the workers states: 
The trick used by the management was simple. They went to the quarters 
of the workers and told them—if you are not coming back to work get out 
of the chawl [working class tenement] and go where [ever] you like. The 
workers had no option but to go back to work. This way in each mill the 
owners broke the strike.  
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Most of the respondents believe that the first six months of the strike were 
“total”. No one went to work. However, they believe that “the strike was 
dragged on for too long” after that. The above respondent believes that the 
strike was prolonged due to the inability of the union to gain recognition 
through the BIR Act. He further shifts the blame of prolonging the strike 
away from Samant by explaining that he had no option but to keep the strike 
going and the fact that it eventually “had become a matter of prestige” for 
the workers.  
There was also widespread “disillusionment” and “secrecy” surrounding the 
strike that proved detrimental to workers’ mobilization. For example, a 
respondent says that “[w]e did not know that the strike was to begin on 
January 18.” The respondent only realized that the workers of the mills were 
on strike when he was stopped at the gates of the mill as he went to work the 
next day.  
The effectiveness of the strike was also blunted by the fact that there were 
efforts from the Congress-affiliated Indian National Trade Union Congress 
(INTUC) with the help of the government to “call people to work.” A 
respondent describes in detail the manner in which the workers were 
escorted to the mill gates under excessive police security. Thus, according to 
him the first major strike-break was due to the INTUC and the Congress 
government itself. He says: 
RMSS people were sent to the villages and with the help of the local 
Congress leaders they started to pressurize [sic] and bribe and threaten 
the workers to return to the mills. State transport buses were pressed into 
service and the workers were brought back.  
Finally, the effect of attrition began to show after the sixth month. The 
workers, who stayed back in the city with the hope of resuming work after 
meeting their demands, began to go back to their villages. Some began to 
seek work outside the city. 
 
4. Loss of Livelihood and Informalization of Work 
It is difficult to estimate the exact number of jobs lost due to the strike. It is 
believed that around 100,000 workers were affected by the strike. The 
government estimates are much lower. The Kotwal Committee (constituted 
in 1986 to assess the impact of the strike) points out that close to 51,000 
workers were dismissed after the strike and around 46,000 workers had not 
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been paid their dues.
27
 However, this number does not include people who 
either resigned, retired, or who had not been re-employed for other reasons.  
The interviews provide us with details regarding the economic hardships 
that the workers and their families had to face after the strike. A woman 
employee discusses how the local businesses had been affected by the 
strike. She observes that the business of khanawalis (community dining 
homes) had to close down. Khanawalis was a very peculiar feature of the 
social life in Girangaon. Most men that migrated to Bombay in search of 
work in the textile mills left their families behind. They could not afford to 
sustain their families in the “big city.” They stayed in small rented rooms, 
usually ten to twelve people sharing a single room. Cooking was almost 
impossible in these small rooms and for this reason these dining homes were 
popular with the mill workers.  
One of the male respondents compares the pre-and post-strike economic 
situation: “In those days the situation was good. They (workers) had some 
money to spend. It was a period that mill workers bought things even for 
their neighbors. All festivals were celebrated properly”.  
Later the same respondent compares the above situation to the post-strike 
period through a very moving story: 
There was an incidence of death in one of the workers’ family. But the 
family had no money to perform the last rites. Finally the worker sold his 
wife’s mangal sutra [necklace made of black beads symbolizing 
marriage] to arrange the money. People were that desperate. 
The selling of the mangal sutra evokes a strong emotional response in the 
Indian context. In India, many Hindus consider the mangal sutra as the most 
visible and sacred ornament of married women. In this case, the selling of a 
mangal sutra highlights not only their extreme poverty, but also a sense of 
“personal loss” or humiliation on the part of the male worker for not being 
able to preserve the sanctity of marriage. 
Many of the workers who lost their jobs were pushed into the informal 
economy. Some worked as vendors selling vegetables or flowers, while 
some turned to small-scale self-employed business activities such as selling 
pan (betel-nut leaves). Some women took up work as domestic help in 
houses. One of the women respondents survived by selling sarees 
(traditional garment worn by Indian women) door to door. These facts point 
to the increasing informalization of work in Bombay, following the strike. 
Informalization of work has far reaching consequences not only on the 
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living conditions of the workers, but also on their ability to organize. The 
traditional trade unions have either been reluctant or unable to organize such 
people in the informal economy, leaving the fate of such workers to the 
vagaries of the market.   
          
5. Loss of Socio-Cultural Space 
The strike also had a significant impact on working-class culture in 
Girangaon. This issue was linked to the transformation of the physical 
landscape of the mill district. A woman respondent on being asked to 
describe whether she observed any changes in Girangaon after the strike 
responds by saying, “yes, earlier there were a lot of workers. When the mill 
shifts got over, there used to be a lot of crowd as if it was some kind of a 
padyatra [pedestrian rally]. But now the number has reduced considerably. 
Not many men on this road”. 
The decline in the sheer visibility of workers is a powerful metaphor of the 
post-industrial transformation in the city. Gone are those days where one 
would see crowds of workers lined up at the factory gates. Does this “non-
visibility” have anything important to tell us? This is especially important in 
case of Mumbai, which is trying to project itself as a “global” or “world 
class city” by promoting the service sector at the expense of manufacturing. 
The failure of the strike has also had important implications for the 
contemporary economic restructuring of Mumbai. In 1995, Bombay First, 
the think-tank of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
sanctioned McKinsey (a prominent consultancy firm) to produce a report 
known as the Bombay First Report.
28
 The report envisions Mumbai as a 
“world class city” in the mould of such cities as Shanghai, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore. The report bears testimony to the shift in the priorities of urban 
policy that is now geared toward protecting the interests of the wealthy at 
the cost of the poor urban working classes in the city.
29
 With a decline of the 
textile industry in Mumbai, there is a push to redevelop closed mills into 
commercial office space for new service-based industries. 
The liberalization policies introduced in the early 1990s have further 
accelerated the process of deindustrialization and spatial re-organization of 
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the city.
30
 The contemporary economic restructuring of the city marginalizes 
the physical and cultural space of people associated with the textile industry. 
A tamasha theater owner highlights this point as he laments: 
Now there are hardly any mills running and very few textile 
workers…There used to be tamashas and plays performed there, starting 
late in the night when workers were free from work….but now our 
audiences have almost become extinct. The tamasha artists are unable to 
survive. This artistic tradition is likely to die out. 
The question of space has assumed central importance. The association of 
space and culture is also brought out by one of the poet-performers 
associated with the working-class movement in the city. He says: 
Mills should not close. They are the pride of the city. They talk of 
utilizing open land, but why can’t they remain open? Why does it bother 
you I want to ask them! We don’t want to leave this area. We don’t want 
money; we want to live on the land of our forefathers, our traditions. I 
have lived here for 63 years and my father lived here before me. 
The economic losses due to the strike also resulted in familial instability, 
loss of children’s education, and loss of prestige. One of the women 
respondents narrates how the lack of financial contribution to the joint 
family during the strike affected the relationship between the family 
members. She also mentions that some of the workers who faced acute 
financial crisis also contemplated committing suicide.                 
The children of the mill workers held particularly strong opinions against 
the strike. They considered the strike responsible for their misery. For some 
respondents, the fact that women were now “forced” to work outside their 
homes was itself a kind of humiliation. One respondent mentions that his 
son could not complete his education, and his wife started working. His 
daughter too could not be educated and was “forced” to work. The strike 
and the financial loss associated with it also affected the lives of the workers 
in other ways. According to the above respondent it became difficult for the 
workers to get their sons and daughters married. He says: 
The textile worker gets about Rs. 4000 (about eighty dollars per month) 
or so, and a sweeper in a big engineering company gets almost that much! 
And textile workers used to be number one workers in the city. Now no 
one wants to give their daughters away to a textile worker or his son. 
Some workers had become fatalistic toward their future. On being asked 
whether he had any memories associated with the strike, or any particular 
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incident or event that he would like to talk about, the respondent summed it 
all up by saying: “We have come to the conclusion. There is no hope. That 
is the only memory.”  
 
Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates the utility of historicizing the analysis of the 
Bombay Textile Strike of 1982-1983 within the broader process of working-
class formation in Bombay and the specific conjuncture of the strike. It 
illustrates that it is inadequate to understand the strike solely on the basis of 
the social context of the work place. The unique historical formation of the 
working class in Bombay highlights the fact that a clear distinction between 
the working-class neighborhoods and the work place is untenable. 
Historically, there always existed a symbiotic relationship between the 
working class neighborhoods and the work place. This inter-relationship 
was evident in the history of recruitment of labour in Bombay, the survival 
of workers in the city, as well as in their ability to organize and resist the 
excesses of capital.  
The analysis of the strike (see Figure 1) confirms the above thesis. The 
strike was a culmination of a number of factors. In addition to socio-
economic factors, the immediate causes of the strike also included workers’ 
perceptions about past working-class struggles and the role of leadership. 
The workers’ strategy of survival during the strike highlights the role of 
rural connections of the workers, which can only be understood within the 
context of the particular process of migration and adaptation of the workers 
in the city. The rural connections of the workers helped them sustain 
prolonged periods of industrial unrest as most of the workers returned to 
their villages to await the outcome of the strike. The “totality” of the strike 
owed much to this. However, we also find that this “buffer zone” of rural 
connections was not available to some of the workers involved in the strike 
due to lack of adequate resources in their rural settings. I hypothesize that it 
is these workers that were most adversely affected by the strike. They were 
either forced to find alternate informal work in the city or find work outside 
the city. The strike had a far-reaching impact on the lives of those associated 
with the textile industry. The losses were not only economic. The strike and 
the subsequent policies of economic restructuring destabilized the working-
class culture of Girangaon as the fate of these communities was intricately 
tied to the physical space of the neighborhoods and the mills.  
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Future critical studies on labour conflict in India should take a more holistic 
approach in understanding industrial conflict taking into account not only 
economic issues of the workplace, but also sociocultural factors beyond it. 
Further, they should also include interpretive accounts of actors (particularly 
workers) involved as this yields a more multi-dimensional analysis of the 
conflict that can help in more effective formulation of policies addressing 
the problems of industrial workers and their families. 
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Dossier: Mass strikes in the global crisis. Coordinated by Alexander 
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Hugo Dias and Lídia Fernandes 
The November 2012 general strike and anti-austerity protests – analysis 
from the Portuguese case 
Opposition against austerity was the cornerstone of the protests which took 
place since 2010. In Portugal, the first signs of mobilization came from the 
trade unions, although the emergence of new actors allowed the movement 
to widen its social influence. This article reflects on the Portuguese 
contribution to the transnational general strike on the 14 November 2012 in 
order to explore its insertion in this period’s contentious politics, not only 
regarding its transnational dimension – within the European Union 
framework –, but also concerning the relationship between different actors – 
particularly between trade unions and new political actors. While facing a 
political agenda aimed at implementing major changes to the regime of 
labour and social policies, the unions encountered increased challenges 
regarding the use of their ultimate instrument of struggle – strikes –, 
especially with consideration to its bases of power, which were already 
quite weakened ahead of this cycle of mobilization.  
Keywords: 14 November 2012; Portugal; general strike; transnational 
collective action; austerity 
 
Maria Gorosarri and Luciole Sauviat 
The Uneven Development of (Mass) Strikes in France and Spain 
This article analyses the strikes in recent years against the dominant 
government strategies of crisis management in France and Spain. It argues 
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that there is a marked difference in the dynamics of the strikes in these two 
countries: whereas the stoppages in Spain came close to a mass strike in a 
Luxemburgian sense with new forms of working class consciousness and 
organisation emerging, the same cannot be said of France.  
 
Stefanie Hürtgen 
Authoritarian Defence of the German Model? Conflicts on the freedom 
of collective bargaining and militant strikes in the German railway 
sector 
This article argues that the recent strike wave in the railway sector can be 
seen as a reflection of a deep-seated social crisis in the country. This crisis 
was born out of the deregulation and fragmentation of labour relations, and 
is reflected in the privatisation and marketisation of the German railway 
system. The “small” train drivers’ union GdL successfully led the 
opposition against the changes and did so by using the strike weapon. When 
the Merkel government responded by cracking down on the right to strike 
for smaller unions with a new law, the GdL managed to bypass this 
crackdown. 
 
Jörg Nowak 
Class Coalitions or struggles within the working class? Social unrest in 
India and Brazil during the global crisis 
Here we compare strikes and their links to political protest movements in 
Brazil and India. We highlight the fact that large strike waves in the 
automobile industry (India) and the construction and public sectors (Brazil) 
preceded the emergence of political protest movements with significant 
middle-class involvement. These movements were directed against 
corruption and also, in the Brazilian case, against public transport fare hikes, 
the state of the public sector and the government in general. A key 
difference was that workers in India were more politicised than workers in 
Brazil; however, for the street protests, the reverse was true: Whereas the 
Indian activists just lambasted corruption, the Brazilian movement had a 
broader political agenda. 
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Luis Campos and Bruno Dobrusin 
Labour conflict in Argentina and Brazil: challenging an alliance? 
The rising number of labour conflicts in Argentina and Brazil over the 
recent years is a sign of changing times for the dominant pattern of labour-
state relations in both countries during the last decade. This paper addresses 
the issue of labour conflict analyzing the available data on both countries, 
and providing a broad explanation of the reasons behind the rising conflicts 
in the field of labour over the last three years. 
Key Words: Trade Unions; Strikes; Latin America  
 
Tim Pringle 
Strikes and labour relations in China 
Over the last decade, strikes have emerged as an important instrument of 
workers’ agency in China. This paper discusses the evolution of strikes, the 
demands of strikers, the constraints and opportunities for labour militants 
who organise them as well as the main ways in which they are resolved. In 
doing so, I present an analysis of their impact on the evolving framework 
for labour relations. I argue that the combination of a rise in the frequency 
of strikes and the institutional particularities of this framework including the 
absence of trade union plurality and no tradition in collective bargaining has 
generated two connected outcomes. On the one hand, it has generated 
efforts by the Party-led All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) to 
improve its representative credibility and on the other hand, the strikes have 
facilitated the emergence of an alternative layer of workers’ representatives 
often with the support of labour NGOs. While careful to avoid directly 
challenging the monopolistic position of the ACFTU, the ongoing militancy 
suggests that the numbers of such representatives and their influence on 
labour relations is likely to increase. 
Key words: strikes, ACFTU, workers’ representatives, elections, labour 
relations. 
 
Hermes Augusto Costa and Hugo Dias 
The strike as a challenge to the North and to the South 
The authors take up the theme of the “general strike”, which is discussed in 
several of the other articles, and do so by engaging in a comparison across 
the North/South divide that focuses on Portugal and India. In their view, the 
general strike is a defensive form of struggle in the neoliberal age chosen 
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because other means of influencing political decision-making are absent. In 
the Portuguese case, the strikes took place against the backdrop of the 
imposition of austerity through governments and the troika; in the Indian 
case, the background was the liberalisation of the economy and the 
insensitivity of governments to union demands in a situation of general 
economic insecurity. All in all, Costa and Dias say that unions in the north 
have much to learn from unions in the south in the sense that they have to 
reach out to marginalised and precarious sectors of the population.  
 
Miscelanea 
Ravi Ghadge 
Understanding the Bombay Textile Strike of 1982-1983 
The Bombay Textile Strike of 1982-1983 is a watershed moment in India’s 
labour history. It was one of India’s longest strikes involving more than 
200,000 workers who collectively stopped work for more than eighteen 
months. However, there are relatively few studies that have analyzed the 
strike from the workers’ perspectives. Based on a interpretive grounded 
theoretical analysis of interviews of former textile workers and residents of 
the textile mill district, this paper analyses the meanings produced by the 
workers surrounding the strike within a long-term historical process of 
working class formation in Bombay. The paper supports the idea that a 
critical analysis of labour conflicts in India must go beyond the workplace, 
taking into account the social context of the neighborhood.  
Key words: Bombay Textile Strike, Mumbai, Working Class, Girangaon, 
India 
 
